Strategic Assessment

Keywords: Israel, civil-military relations, militarism, IDF, strategy, existential threats, terror, civil control

Introduction

The State of Israel was established in May 1948, only three years after the end of World War II and the most extensive genocide in modern history. It was perceived by its Arab neighbors as a local aberration, an ultimate outcome of European colonialist and imperialist endeavor, a historical sin, a catastrophe for the Palestinian people, and a humiliation of the entire Arab world. Beside existential threats, a small population, and the challenges of a small country with no natural resources, and with the absence of any defense alliance or superpower protection, Israel was embedded in a hostile sphere that enjoys resources and military might far more extensive than its own. Under these circumstances, Israel faced, at least during its first two decades, an ongoing existential threat (Barak & Sheffer, 2010; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Yair, 2014; Del Sarto, 2017).

The existential fear of the Israeli Jewish psyche is deeply rooted in the history of its persecutions in general and the trauma of the Holocaust in particular. The Holocaust was not only the physical extermination of millions of Jews; it was solid proof of two basic conceptions: Jews can be under a concrete and genuine existential threat anywhere and anytime; and given that the world abandoned the Jews to their tragic fate, they clearly can rely only on themselves and their own power to ensure their survival. The existential anxiety functioned in a dual manner: on the one hand as an accelerator of defense mechanisms vis-à-vis essential threats, and on the other hand, as a barrier to a rational approach to a reality that enables taking calculated risks, realizing historical opportunities, and making essential strategic choices and decisions (Abulof, 2019).

Security threats play an essential and influential role in Israeli discourse. Some claim this encourages and strengthens the militaristic approach of Israeli society and its political and military echelons. But in practice, Israel has demonstrated military restraint.

Against this historical background, security threats play an essential and influential role in Israeli discourse. Some claim this encourages and strengthens the militaristic approach of Israeli society and its political and military echelons. But in practice, Israel has demonstrated military restraint over the last decade. This ostensible contradiction is the focus of this article, which examines political, military, and civilian realms, as well as the political civil control over the IDF.

The article begins by defining the essence of existential threat in the Israeli context, followed by the main argument and a short discussion about Israeli militarism as discussed in the literature. It then presents the core disputes about the essence of the existential threats among leading Israeli scholars, statespeople, and military professionals, and then introduces the idea of militarism as reflected in the Clausewitzian triangle: the political echelon, the military echelon, and the public. It concludes with a discussion regarding the essence of Israeli militarism and civil control as reflected in the encounter and discourse of the political and military echelons.

Existential Threats in the Israeli Context

The term "existential threat" in the Israeli case is defined by Kobi Michael (2009), who identifies four main dimensions: physical; governmental (i.e., sovereignty, loss of effective control over territories and population); political (international legitimacy to the existence of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people); and issues related to identity that risk the state's existence, its agreed sovereignty, and its character as the democratic nation of the Jewish people and have the potential to cause severe damage to the state's capacity to tackle external and domestic threats successfully (for further reading, see: Winter, Michael, & Shiloah, 2020).

The term "existential threat" is used in the public and academic discourses in Israel to describe both external threats, like the Iranian nuclear threat, and domestic threats to Israeli society, such as the ramifications of socio-political rifts for social cohesion and national resilience. An existential threat can be real or imagined. It might reflect a military balance assessment, or subjective and controversial perceptions disputed among societies and individuals (Abulof, 2006; Hirshberger, 2014). Due to the potential devastating ramifications of existential threats and because a state might take far reaching steps in order to prevent them (Manners, 2002), there is crucial importance to their definitions.  

Given the status of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and its centrality in the Israeli ethos and daily life, many scholars describe Israel as militaristic. Indeed, in terms of cultural militarism, Israel can readily be described as a militaristic society, where military symbols are embedded in the public sphere—in ceremonies, language, and icons. Yet when it comes to political militarism in the sense of supporting, prioritizing, and legitimizing the use of military force in order to resolve political problems, the political echelon is cautious, accountable, and responsible; the military echelon proves to be a restraining actor; and the Israeli public is sober and realistic as to the possibility of resolving political problems by using military force.

This paradox can be explained by the processes the IDF went through over the last 15 years, which led it to understand and internalize the limits of military force in the era of hybrid conflicts and non-state actors and its full subordination to the political echelon—vertical civil control (Kuehn & Levy, 2020)—on the one hand, and its restraining influence over the cautious political echelon on the other hand. This dynamic is supported by the public that understands the importance of military power in unstable and dangerous environments but internalizes the limits of using military force in order to resolve political problems.

In this regard it might be claimed that the political echelon and the Israeli public perceive the military echelon as subordinate and mandated to follow the political echelon's directives. Therefore, both see no problem of deviation from the principles of civil or horizontal control in a democratic country, which means they are satisfied with the efficiency of the vertical civil control. Such satisfaction enables the IDF greater and broader professional autonomy, which increases its status as an epistemic authority (Michael, 2009) regarding security matters and its restraining influence over the political echelon, decision making processes, and the shaping of national security strategy. This increasing influence could be understood as a reflection of weak or ineffective horizontal civil control (Kuehn & Levy, 2020) because the IDF gains unlimited independence regarding military strategy that under the Israeli circumstances—where in most cases, no prime minister or security cabinet will act against the IDF recommendations—becomes the state's security strategy.

The Main Argument

Although the political echelon in Israel casts the Iranian threat as existential, and others include Hamas and Hezbollah as well, the military echelon perceives it differently. For its part, the Israeli public perceives Iran as a serious threat but not necessarily existential. With regard to the other major security threats, Hezbollah and Hamas, the Israeli public is concerned but not terrified, frustrated and angry that Hamas dictates or influences its daily life. While it expects the government and military to retaliate in a more aggressive manner in order to exact a price and improve deterrence, it understands and internalizes that it must live with these threats.

The military echelon internalized the nature of hybrid warfare, and stopped believing in victory vis-à-vis non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. It defines victory as the realization of the political objectives that should be determined by the political echelon, and prefers containment over decision. Its doctrine has been adjusted accordingly; thus, the "main goal of this ‘hybrid’ military strategy is to maintain the security status quo rather than changing it by military means" (Barak, Sheniak, & Shapira, 2020, p. 2), and it becomes the moderating player in the encounter with the political echelon.

If militarism is defined as the clear preference and legitimacy for using military force in order to resolve political problems, the definition of contemporary Israel as militaristic is highly equivocal. In other words, that political militarism is currently a pervasive policy or strategy in Israel is questionable, at the very least.

If militarism is defined as the clear preference and legitimacy for using military force in order to resolve political problems, the definition of contemporary Israel as militaristic is highly equivocal. In other words, that political militarism is currently a pervasive policy or strategy in Israel is questionable, at the very least.

Militarism in Israel

In many research studies relating to the Israeli context there is an emphasis on the uniqueness of the Israeli case (Siniver, 2012) and the ongoing feeling of existential threat and siege (Del Sarto, 2017; Yair, 2014, Bar-Tal, & Antebi, 1992). In addition, there is a broad consensus among leading Israeli scholars like Baruch Kimmerling (1993), Yagil Levy (2003), Uri Ram (2008), Lev Grinberg (2008), and others that Israeli society is militaristic, marked by decided Israeli militarism, which in turn accounts at least largely for Israel’s security reality.

Kimmerling (1993) identifies three dimensions of militarism: political/force, cultural, and cognitive. Political militarism is evident under direct or indirect military rule and is based on force and absolute loyalty to the military leadership. In such cases army generals are the decision makers and establish national policy. In Israel one may not find political militarism within its borders, but the West Bank may reflect this dimension of militarism. Cultural militarism is referred to as civilian militarism by Alfred (1937), reflected by the central role of the army in collective experience and identity. Cultural militarism is one of the central collective symbols and the full embodiment of patriotism. Wars are perceived as a dominant, necessary social process, internally and externally. Education, industry, science, technology, and other fields are recruited to the needs of the “homeland.” Robin (1971) notes that in such cases the border between the military and social institutions is blocked politically but penetrable culturally. Military generals gain respect and prestige but not actual political power. The third dimension is civilian/cognitive, expressed when militarism penetrates structurally and culturally into the collective “state of mind.” The essence of civilian militarism is when military considerations defined as “national security-related” will be always prioritized and located above political, economic, or ideological considerations.

Kimmerling notes that all three dimensions can be found in various forms in Israel. In 2019 Uri Ben-Eliezer, one of the leading scholars among Israeli critical sociologists, published an extensive book in which he explains the development of ethno-national and militaristic ideology during 100 years of Zionism, with the religious dimension added recently, and defines it as the central element for understanding the sources of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the concluding chapter he introduces the main argument and conceptualizes it as "militaristic nationalism": “This approach became an ideology in the sense that it introduced a clear worldview…that shaped reality by force and was routinely translated into use of and reliance on military force" (Ben-Eliezer, 2019, p. 600).

According to the approach of critical scholars, the roots of Israeli political militarism were not inevitable. Some explain the phenomenon as a reflection of the IDF's dominant status in Israeli society; others refer to Israeli militarism as an outcome of the post-1967 occupation and the ongoing control over the territories and the Palestinian population (Gur, 2005). Some see the power of the political right wing and messianic religious groups as enabling the perpetuation of Israeli militarism (Levy, 2007; Ben-Eliezer, 2012), while others even reject the idea of existential threats and perceive them as political manipulation to justify militarism. Some claim that even if Israel is under existential threats, it can handle them by non-military means, and therefore there is a need to prioritize political arrangements and peaceful strategies for conflict management and resolution.

Thus historically and almost traditionally, Israel and Israeli society are described in the literature as militaristic. The historical context of many wars and military campaigns, the Israeli control over the territories since 1967 until the Oslo accords (1993-95), and its security control over part of these territories until today, as well as the unique societal status of the IDF have provided factual and interpretive bases for strong conclusions about Israeli militarism. But since the Second Lebanon War (2006) and maybe even after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria in 2005, significant transformations have occurred in Israeli society and politics, joined by far-reaching changes and developments in IDF strategy and military thought regarding the limits of military force. 

The Disputes about Existential Threats among Israeli Experts

If until 1973 (the Yom Kippur War was the last war between the IDF and regular Arab armies) the assumption was that the principal effort by the Arabs will be a military effort, the outcome of the war convinced Arab leaders that they will not be able to destroy Israel through conventional military means, and therefore they turned to alternative efforts, chiefly, nonconventional efforts (WMD, mainly nuclear weapons) and sub-conventional efforts (terror and delegitimization, including boycotts). They believed that such efforts will enable them to exhaust Israeli society, by undermining Israel's economy and international legitimacy (Ya'alon & Friedman, 2018, pp. 9-10).

The collapse of the USSR, the Oslo process with the Palestinians, the Iranian efforts to export their religious revolution and expand their influence and hegemony in the region, and the Arab upheaval that began in 2010 have changed the geo-strategic reality and the threat perceptions in the region. The heightened Iranian and Salafi-jihadist threats, the collapse of the territorial nation state order, the multiplying state failures, and the increasing presence and influence of non-state actors (Michael & Guzansky, 2017) created new alliances in the region that face common threats and share strategic interests. Israel finds itself cooperating with Arab states against those threats.

The familiar regional geo-political order based on the territorial nation state was replaced by a bloody struggle for hegemony and influence between four main camps or axes: the Shiite axis led by Iran; the Salafi-jihad axis led by ISIS and al-Qaeda; political Islam, supported by Turkey and Qatar; and the pragmatic Sunni Arab countries axis led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Heller, 2016, pp. 19-21). This struggle changed the perception of the pragmatic Sunni Arab leaders. At a time that the pragmatic camp faces three severe external and domestic threats—Iran, Salafist jihadism, and political Islam—its leaders find Israel a reliable and desirable, if not necessary ally for tackling these threats (Yadlin, 2016, p. 161).

With the changes in the regional order, the importance and centrality of the Palestinian issue decreased, and became more marginal and problematic in the eyes of the pragmatic Arab leaders (Ben-Menachem, 2019). Therefore, for Israel, the Palestinian issue has become a security threat because of Hamas and other organizations operating mainly from the Gaza Strip, which is not under the PA control, and due to organizations and factions in the West Bank; it is a domestic threat because of the political dispute about the political stalemate and its implications for the Zionist vision of Israel as the democratic nation state of the Jewish people (Gavison, 2006).

Summarizing the current strategic reality regarding the external threats that Israel faces, the conventional military threat has been removed; Palestinian terrorism from the PA territories has been contained after five bloody years of war against terror (the second intifada 2000-2005); delegitimization efforts and campaigns have achieved limited success and failed to undermine the international legitimacy of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people (Yogev & Lindenstrauss, 2017); and even the economic damage caused by the BDS movement has been marginal.  

Therefore, the significant external threats to Israel's strategic stability today are the Iranian threat, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The latter are perceived as severe with the potential of disruption of the daily routine in Israel and extensive damage to essential strategic infrastructures, mainly with regard to Hezbollah's capacities, which are far greater than Hamas's, but not existential threats. The Iranian threat is perceived by the political echelon as the most severe and even an existential threat (the military and the public share this assessment, but to a lesser degree), due to Iran’s determination to achieve nuclear capabilities and the goal of the extremist regime to erase Israel from the map—objectives that are met by the international community, at least in Israeli eyes, with decided weakness.

Despite the analysis of the geo-strategic that Israel lives in, many security experts and professionals in Israel who do not underestimate the severe threats believe that there is a tendency, primarily among the political echelon and other politicians, to exaggerate and the threats and depict them as more dangerous than they really are.

On the other hand, there are experts who deny the existential nature of the Iranian threat due to Israel’s capability to delay and undermine Tehran’s efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities and the assumption that Iran will not dare to attack Israel with nuclear weapons because it knows that Israel has second strike capability and its estimation that the US will intervene and attack Iran with nuclear weapons. The more significant fear among many in the political and military echelons is the nuclear arms race that will develop in the region because of Iranian nuclearization (Yadlin & Guzansky, 2012), which will lead to regional chaos and undermine regional stability completely.

Despite the analysis of the geo-strategic reality and threats that Israel lives in, many security experts and professionals in Israel who do not underestimate the severe threats believe that there is a tendency, primarily among the political echelon and other politicians, to exaggerate and the threats and depict them as more dangerous than they really are. To the Executive Director of INSS and former head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, "generally speaking, Israel's strategic situation today is the best since its establishment” (2018). Indeed, experts and security professionals like Yadlin believe that the IDF is the strongest and most advanced military in the Middle East and that Israel has many strategic strengths, including technological capacities; its status as a "start-up nation"; its international status, in particular, the special and close relations with the US administration; developed economic and scientific relations with China; upgraded strategic relations with India; strategic intimacy with Russia; tight relations with the Eastern Mediterranean countries, mainly Greece, Cyprus, and Italy; improved relations with countries in Eastern and Central Europe; blossoming relations with the African continent; close strategic and intelligence relations and cooperation with some Arab states; the diplomatic connections of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his close ties to the Trump administration; economic strengths; and in the near future, energy independence.

Assessing Threats and Militarism in the Clausewitzian Trinity

The sense of existential threat and willingness to use military force in order to remove such threats can be analyzed according to the Clausewitizian trinity of government (the political echelon), army (the military echelon), and people (the public) as follows: the actual policy realized by the political echelon, and the way it chooses to use military force in order to resolve political problems; IDF strategy and modus operandi as articulated in doctrinal documents and by senior officials in the public sphere and in encounters with the political echelon; and Jewish public opinion in Israel as reflected in different public opinion polls and surveys since 2006.

The Political Echelon

In the last two decades, the political echelon has internalized the essential changes in the nature of external conflicts as reflected in the respective strategies of state (mainly Iran) and non-state (Hamas and Hezbollah) actors. This internalization was demonstrated in the decisions on unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon (May 2000), the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria (summer 2005), and the withdrawal to the international borders (Evstein & Avidar, 2019), in both cases despite IDF opposition.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin can be considered a forerunner of this approach because of his decision to advance the Oslo agreement with the Palestinians. He was followed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who decided on the unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon; Prime Minister Arik Sharon, who led the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria; and his successor Ehud Olmert (who served as Prime Minister 2006-2009), who led his Kadima party and won the 2006 elections with the promise to continue Sharon's vision, in the spirit of the 2005 engagement, by disengaging from most of the territories in the West Bank.

Prime Minister Barak is quoted (Evstein & Avidar, 2019) as saying: "We have no illusions. The dreams and aspirations of many in the Arab world haven’t changed…we live in a villa in a jungle." Evstein and Avidar believe that the shift in Israeli strategy has presumably led to the new and increased threats along the borders. The enemy that gave up on the option of conventional military decision has emphasized and improved its capacities on exhausting and undermining the IDF and Israeli society by terror, conflict, and friction along the borders and political warfare (lawfare and delegitimization). The development of semi-military forces that operate methods of terror, guerilla, and nonconventional warfare pushed the IDF to concentrate on defense. The political directive that supported the IDF's decision to give up on the offensive efforts enabled the enemy to organize itself in its territories and to "knock on the villa's walls" (Ibid., pp. 150-151).

The last decade has been marked by ongoing military conflicts with Hamas in and along the Gaza Strip, the “lone wolf” terrorism in the West Bank and Jerusalem (2015-2017), Hezbollah’s increased missile and rocket threat, and the Iranian military entrenchment in Syria. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Arab world's weakness in the wake of the Arab upheaval, the international community's increasing weakness, and the US distancing from the Middle East have led Iran to intensify its subversion efforts, and in turn, to increased regional instability.

Benjamin Netanyahu, who has served as Prime Minister since 2009, has consistently demonstrated restraint vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip despite severe public criticism, including from his political opponents on the ideological right. He has avoided expanding the military campaign and reoccupying the Gaza Strip or embarking on a significant military campaign to topple Hamas or neutralize its military capabilities. Even in face of Hezbollah's strengthened efforts, the political echelon demonstrates restraint through the mutual deterrence that has been maintained since the Second Lebanon War, avoids operating against these efforts in Lebanon, and concentrates the efforts primarily on Syrian soil (with one exception in the summer of 2019, for which Israel did not assume responsibility).

The political echelon pursues an offensive doctrine vis-à-vis the Iranian threat only—and even these measures are pursued according to the principles of the campaign between wars. The essence is to undermine the Iranian efforts to entrench military facilities and capabilities in Syria, while continuing to prevent and disrupt the Iranian efforts toward military nuclear capabilities. The political echelon retains this strategy despite repeated declarations by the Prime Minister defining the Iranian threat as an existential threat, comparing it to Nazi Germany, and criticizing the international community's soft approach. In most cases, Israel avoids taking responsibility for attacking Iranian targets and prefers to operate in ambiguity; it maintains a high level of cooperation and intimacy with Russia that controls the Syrian air space and has its own interest in preserving the Syrian regime, and is able to curtail Iranian and Syrian retaliation. Thus far and despite some cases in which Iran chose to retaliate against Israel and was rebuffed aggressively by Israel, in order to preserve and ensure deterrence, this strategy has proved successful.

The last decade under Netanyahu could be characterized as a decade of cautious and restrained policy. This policy includes limited political aims vis-à-vis the external threats and restrained military strategy.

The last decade under Netanyahu could be characterized as a decade of cautious and restrained policy. This policy includes limited political aims vis-à-vis the external threats and restrained military strategy. An article published in Commentary described Netanyahu as follows:

He has shown himself to be a careful thinker, a leader whose reading of complex situations has allowed him to outmaneuver adversaries and protect Israel’s interests. ….Netanyahu has been quietly shaping the situation to protect his country’s interests.…Though often portrayed as a warmonger, Netanyahu is extremely cautious around military campaigns. Netanyahu, recall, did whatever he could to avoid a ground incursion in Gaza in 2012.…He also sought repeated cease-fires before ordering a ground invasion in 2014. And despite massive support for an expanded push into Gaza, Netanyahu made do with a limited incursion to deal with Hamas’s tunnel network. If anything, his approach to Hamas reveals an excess of caution, not zealousness. (Berman, 2016)

The Military Echelon: From Decision to Containment

The criticism against the IDF about the shift in its thinking and operational modus operandi since the end of the second intifada and mainly after Second Lebanon War focuses on the IDF commanders. According to critics, the commanders gave up on decision, and continue the politicization process in the IDF, evident since the military’s partnership with the political echelon in the Oslo process, which prompts the military echelon to consider political considerations that should not be within the IDF's purview. The critics from within the IDF and without blame the military echelon for the loss of will and determination to win. Even if good answers can be provided to those critics, the fact that military thought has gone through significant changes cannot be ignored. These changes are articulated in the IDF Strategy and other doctrinal documents, and mainly in the way the IDF has operated vis-à-vis the different fronts, particularly the Palestinian arena, where the daily friction level is the highest.

The restraint demonstrated by the military echelon relies in part on the “strategic avoidance model” (Derouen & Sprecher, 2006; Fordham, 2005), influenced by the perceptual crisis that leads to mistrust in the ability to win or decide, and mistrust regarding the main formation—the ground maneuver. In addition, the common belief reflects both the absence of existential threat and an aspiration to keep and preserve the status quo, i.e., the absence of territorial aspirations or the drive to redesign the geo-strategic environment. Eventually, the military echelon internalized the meaning of domestic and international delegitimization to the way war is conducted and its price, as well as the importance attributed by society and the political echelon to defend and preserve the population's routine and daily life. The developments in the US military, perceived as a strategic ally with which the IDF maintains close cooperation, influence the IDF as well in adopting the strategic avoidance model.

The outcome is reflected in the noticeable objective to shorten wars and violent conflicts as much as possible, and this is the logic behind the idea of a "lethal military" (Dostri, 2019) developed by Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the current IDF Chief of Staff. The aim is to return quiet and ensure the status quo. The drive to guarantee that wars are as short as possible leads to enthusiasm for technological innovation, mainly regarding deadly precision weapons and aspirations for intelligence superiority and dominance. Along with these preferences, the military echelon continues the effort to transfer the responsibility for designing offensive campaigns, aimed at changing the geo-strategic reality, to the political echelon, as part of the attempt to prompt it to define the essence of victory and political goals and priorities. The IDF Strategy, published in 2015 and updated in 2018, is a salient expression of this effort, and some even interpret it as a challenge to the political echelon (Michael, Elran, & Siboni, 2016; Even & Michael, 2016).

This approach differs entirely from the territorial expansion approach defined by Dov Tamari (2014), based on IDF operational plans, as "spatial nationality." This approach characterized the IDF since the War of Independence (1948) until the First Lebanon War (1982). Its organizing rationale relies on the principle that the ultimate solution for Israel's security problems is significant capture of territories beyond those that were determined in the1949 armistice agreements. This translated into an initiated or imposed war as a result of an external crisis; the war then aimed to occupy large swaths of territory that could subsequently be annexed to state territory by Israeli governments (Tamari, 2014, p. 6).

Hesitation, avoidance, or tendency to delay out of fear of complication and loss of achievements in the different levels of war have influenced the willingness to operate ground formations during the campaign between wars.

The conceptual change signals the beginning of the maneuver crisis in the IDF ground forces (Brun, 2008; 2010; Tamari & Kalifi, 2009; Ortal, 2009), and it signals a delay in realizing the deciding strategy aimed for the creation of a strategic change. Hesitation, avoidance, or tendency to delay out of fear of complication and loss of achievements in the different levels of war have influenced the willingness to operate ground formations during the campaign between wars (for more about the campaign between wars, see Shabtai, 2011) or in intensive conflicts. The ground maneuver became the last resort for limited decision (Tzur, 2016, pp. 58-59; Shelach, 2015, pp. 41-43, 119-120).

The avoidance and containment approach was ultimately reflected in the IDF's preferred policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and West Bank after the second intifada was close to an end. The IDF pursued a policy of relief for the civilian population based on the principle of differentiation between the uninvolved civilian population and those waging acts of terror. The attempt to gain leverage by pressuring the civilian population to encourage a restraining influence over the Palestinian leadership that collaborated with participants in terror activity was replaced by a policy based on the differentiation between the civilian population along with the Palestinian leadership and terror performers, and a combination between civilian and military efforts in the operational activities against terror.

Even the professional military literature exhibits restrained and framed discourse that encourages the discussion on deterrence over decision. Many articles discuss theoretical and doctrinal aspects of victory, decision, and deterrence in militarily journals published over the last decade.¹ This diverse and rich writing undermines the validity of the concepts of victory and decision in the context of contemporary conflicts, and suggests strategic and conceptual alternatives for these concepts and IDF strategy (see, for example, Tira, 2007; Eisenkot, 2010; Shabtai, 2012). Rather than decision and territorial occupation to change the strategic situation, the emphasis is on building quality means for creating and preserving effective deterrence. The military restraint has begun focusing on denying the enemy's capacity over occupying its territories.

The IDF Strategy document first publicly issued in August 2015 could be defined as a "wake-up call" for the political echelon. "According to the document, the IDF sees its role as achieving ’victory,’ which does not necessarily mean defeating the enemy; the political echelon together with the chief of staff must define the concept of victory before the military is deployed. The publication of the IDF Strategy was unprecedented in Israel’s civil-military relations” (Michael & Even, 2016, p. 19). In this regard, it seems that the Chief of Staff created an infrastructure for a new theory in the world of civil-military relations in the sense of concrete clarification of the required discourse between the echelons regarding the political directive and the definition of victory. The document reflects the military echelon's expectation and even demand from the political echelon to take upon itself the responsibility for defining the expected victory yielded from exercising military force, by clear wording of the political objectives and defined priorities. No more "galloping horses" that urge their government to "let them fight and win"; on the contrary, cool and moderate generals internalized that the short-term achievements the politicians want to attain must suit the protracted ideological hybrid conflicts and the limits of military force.

In the IDF Strategy the restraint is reflected in the context of the avoidance approach, maintenance of the status quo, and absence of efforts toward a clear strategic victory (IDF Strategy, 2015, p. 14) which is beyond the required achievements as defined by the political echelon (the political definition of victory). In other words, to the IDF, war or military conflict is not an ultimate opportunity for generating an essential strategic change.

Civil Society

In order to assess the existence and/or level of militarism in Israeli civil society in recent decades, this section examines three aspects: threat perception among the public; faith in the ability of the military to handle the threats; and willingness of the public to use military force. A principal resource here is a research study conducted by Zipi Israeli at the Institute for National Security Studies (2020), which presents an overview of the National Security Index monitoring public opinion polls during the years 2015-2019.

Threat perception

Israeli (2020, p. 45) notes that threat perception is influenced by psychological, sociological, economic, and cultural factors, and is shaped heavily by the leadership. Indeed, the establishment defines threats for society and hence creates a sense of threat, which eventually becomes deeply rooted in society.

The reality of various military confrontations and terror attacks, especially since 2000 and the second intifada, has led Israelis to see the potential of war as more evident than the potential for peace (Israeli, 2020). Between 62 and 64 percent of the Israeli public, have embraced the notion that there is no partner for peace, and therefore the citizens of Israel are forever destined to "live by their swords" (Israeli, 2020, pp. 50-51, 203-204).

Table 1. Israel’s greatest external threat (in percent)

It seems that since 2017, the public has regarded the northern arena as the greatest external threat, presumably because the Syrian civil war has led to an increased Iranian presence and influence in Syria (Table 1). As the Syrian regime faced growing, more intense threats, Iranian involvement deepened. With an emphasis by the Israeli government and military on this sphere, the gravity of the situation penetrated the public discourse in Israel and contributed to a rising sense of an actual and substantive threat, followed by an assessment that the northern arena may evolve into a highly volatile confrontation. Indeed, the National Security Index of 2015-2018 found that a substantial majority of the public—over 80 percent—believed there is a concrete threat of a military confrontation in the northern border and/or Gaza within three years (Israeli, 2020, p. 50).

The Iranian nuclear threat has remained dominant and the perception of this threat has even grown slightly. Hamas is no longer a major threat in the eyes of the public, and international delegitimization is also substantially less intimidating. Israeli (2020, p. 202) finds that 82 percent believe that Israel should rely only on its own power. This notion is reflected in the low percentage of Israelis that regard isolation as a threat.

Confidence in the military and civil ability to handle threats

In the face of concrete, ongoing threats, and a belief that war is interlocked with the fate of the Jewish state, the public demonstrates a strong sense of confidence in Israel's ability to handle any threat. In April 2018, 59 percent of the public agreed with Netanyahu’s statement on Independence Day that “we are stronger than ever,” and 59 percent thought the emergency systems are ready in case of an all-out war (Table 2). The confidence in Israel’s military abilities is so profound, that 45 percent believed that in the case of an all-out war, the Israel will suffer only dozens of casualties. The National Security Index in 2018 found that only 38 percent of the public were concerned mainly with external security-related threats (Israeli, 2020, p. 47). This relatively low figure may be explained in that 87 percent of the public in 2016-2018 believed that Israel will be able to successfully fight a war with Hamas and Hezbollah simultaneously, and 57 percent had faith in the ability to deal with the Iranian nuclear ability to attack Israel (Israeli, 2020, p. 55). In 2019, the survey found that 93 percent of the public had confidence in the IDF, and 87 percent felt that the IDF is highly prepared for any future military confrontation (Israeli, 2020, p. 213).

The Israeli Voice Index published by the Israel Democracy Institute found that in May 2018, 58 percent of the public were optimistic regarding the future of Israel’s security. In August 2019, 56 percent thought that Netanyahu did a very good or good job strengthening Israel’s military power, and 50 percent thought Netanyahu did a very good or good job coping with Iran. Moreover, the Israeli Voice Index (2020) notes that 67 percent of the Israeli Jewish public demonstrates faith in Israel’s military ability to handle war. Similar findings appear in the Peace Index public opinion polls, which found that Israelis are mostly optimistic and see their security situation as generally good, despite the existing threats. The National Security Index in 2018 found that 52 percent believed that Israel’s strategic situation has never been better. A certain shift is noted in 2019 when only 44 percent shared this notion (Israeli, 2020, p. 205).

Table 2. Faith in Israel’s ability to handle external, physical threats (in percent)

The findings illustrate that even though Israelis see themselves as isolated and able to rely only on their own military capabilities, the Jewish public has adjusted to this reality. It projects optimism and faith in Israeli military capabilities, along with a permanent soberness that war is highly possible at any given time. In 2018 the Israeli public demonstrated the highest sense of optimism regarding the future measured in the past fourteen years.

Willingness to use military force in order to handle external threats

According to the National Security Index, in 2018 63 percent agreed with the notion that Arabs understand only force; 81 felt that if someone seeks to kill you, you should kill preemptively (Israeli, 2020, p. 41). Presumably, then, the Israeli public might support a militaristic approach and a tendency to use military force in the face of threats. However, the public's perception regarding external threats on the one hand and its confidence in the state and IDF ability to successfully tackle these threats on the other converge in a sober approach that leads to reduced willingness and legitimacy for using military. Furthermore, 55 percent of the public believed that the military echelon restrains the government as far as using military force against the Palestinians is concerned; 66 percent considered this approach by the IDF to be correct.

At the same time, notwithstanding this clear and restrained approach, in times of concrete security crises, Israelis are not reluctant to use force, to the point of disregarding potential international complications. For example, when the political-military establishment defined the Iranian presence and Hezbollah in the northern arena as an extremely grave threat, this had a direct effect on the Israeli public, and 70 percent supported an initiated military action against the Iranian presence in Syria, even if it leads to war. Fifty-one supported a military attack against Iran. At the same time, 68 percent claimed they are not preparing for any state of war.

Another significant distinction is between a declarative militaristic approach that expresses an Israeli proclivity to use force, but mainly frustration when terror attacks occur and obstruct civilian lives, and the public's actual willingness to use force.

These findings indicate that the public supports an initiated military action mainly when threats are perceived as concrete and evident. Use of force is restricted to such specific circumstances and threat levels, and is not an immediate or desired response to threats in general. Such restraint as demonstrated by the public indicates lack of inherent political militarism in Israel. Peri (1996) notes that when military force is used successfully, a natural tendency for using excessive force might occur, but in Israel this prompts the public to seek to limit and restrain military power. He argues that Israeli society is constantly struggling to define the boundaries for the use of military force.

Another significant distinction is between a declarative militaristic approach that expresses an Israeli proclivity to use force, but mainly frustration when terror attacks occur and obstruct civilian lives, and the public's actual willingness to use force. The mainstream does not appear impulsive, but rather demonstrates a profound understanding that force will not necessarily solve the threats, and that diplomatic channels are preferable whenever possible, despite Israel’s frequent inherent distrust of these channels.

When closely analyzing threat perception and willingness to use force, public opinion polls demonstrate that despite the threats and the historical background, Israelis demonstrate optimism, confidence, and faith rather than a militaristic tendency to use force in order to obtain stability. The Israeli public supports an extensive use of force only when reality provides no other option. When that does happen, the Israeli public is united in its support of political and military leadership, and ready to face any challenge.

Conclusion

The most notable finding in this essay is the dialectical approach of the Jewish public in Israel regarding the significance and necessity of military power. The Jewish public adopts Jabotinsky’s "Iron Wall" mentality and understands the necessity of military force as a critical component for the existence of the State of Israel and as a display of military strength needed for deterrence. It supports military operations in response to provocations or actions against Israel, is frustrated and angered by Hamas acts that blatantly impede routine life,, and at the same time is sober about the ability to solve political foundations through military force.

Martin (1991) makes a significant distinction between militarism as an active preparation for war and a militaristic ideology that illustrates a social set of values and faith lending extremely high value to military activity. This distinction between the heart and the mind is prominent in Israel. Different polls since the Second Lebanon War (2006) indicate this duality among Jewish public opinion. Other salient indications of this duality are the significant majority for a two-state solution, support for an agreement with Hamas to achieve calm in the Gaza Strip, and opposition to a broad military campaign against Iran.

The military echelon in Israel has undergone significant changes since the Second Lebanon War, with military thinking and conduct in various arenas guided by principles of containment and restraint, resulting from the recognition and internalization of the inability to defeat Hamas and Hezbollah militarily and the futility of widespread military moves that will bring the parties at the end of any lengthy and bloody campaign back to the starting point. This approach has been criticized by those who have come to view the IDF of recent years as being a containing rather than a deciding military, and oppose the changes undergone by the military, which is reflected in the allocation of resources to the air force, intelligence, and means for precision firearms at the expense of the maneuvering combat ground forces (Siboni & Bazaq, 2019). For example, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Chico Tamir defines the second intifada as evidence of the senior military's reluctance to suppress terrorism and as an attempt to evade the pressure applied by Prime Minister Sharon's efforts to achieve decision over terrorism, because they were enslaved to the perception of Oslo and security cooperation with the Palestinian security forces. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yair Golan, who was the deputy chief of staff, spoke about a problematic attitude for the combat / maneuvering ranks—more investment in the air force, technology, intelligence, and less in the maneuvering level, which heightens the inability to arrive at a decisive outcome.2

The findings indicate a real discrepancy between a rhetorical level that is sometimes characterized by expressions of militarism, and the sense of preference against using military force to solve political problems or willingness to use military force for these purposes.

The military's concept of containment is even more pronounced in relation to the West Bank, and especially during the so-called knives intifada of 2015-16. Then-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot expressed on more than one occasion that he did not want to see an IDF soldier empty a rifle magazine on a girl with scissors (Steinmetz, 2016). Along with intelligence efforts and operations against the individual perpetrators, the military echelons urged the political echelon to continue efforts to improve the economic reality in the West Bank, to allow more Palestinian workers to enter Israel, and to avoid collective punishment as much as possible (Eichner & Zeitun, 2018). This position of the military is also reflected in its recommendations to the political echelon regarding the threat of Hezbollah on the northern border, expressing reactions to events exceptional in significance, such as the terror tunnels dug by Hezbollah from Lebanon into Israel or damage to the precision weapons project on Lebanese soil. The military echelon strongly opposes a proactive attack to neutralize Hezbollah's military capabilities but has prepared for severe harmed by Hezbollah's capabilities in the event of a military escalation (Dekel, Orion, Ben Haim, & Magen, 2018).

An interesting and expansive reference to the issue of threats facing Israel, which may also reflect ideas among the military echelons, appears in a comprehensive document entitled Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy, written by Eisenkot and his colleague Gabi Siboni (2019). In the section dealing with the presentation and analysis of the threats, the concept of "existential threat" does not appear. Rather, the authors emphasize instead the high risk of internal threats—the threat to Israeli solidarity as an element of national resilience. Their approach to external threats is characterized by clear restraint and linkage between the use of military force for policy purposes and the political echelon's responsibility. They introduce a deep understanding of the limitations of the military's force and the need to design a broad and comprehensive national security concept that brings about a combination of state-wide efforts, with the use of military force as only one mode of effort. The military echelon is a containing and restraining factor, and in some cases, it even limits the political level when it seeks to respond with a significant military attack to a threat it views as severe or a red line crossed. Thus, for example, Eisenkot said: "It happened to me as a Chief of Staff, and not only once, that a political official called me and said, 'We must go to war here, a war there, but it did not end that way' (Fishman, 2019). On the other hand, despite the tendency of the political echelon to exacerbate the portrayal of external threats to Israel, and despite statements about the willingness and even preparedness for a severe military response (especially against Hamas), the political echelon does not criticize the containment and the measured military response, due to its understanding of the limitations of military force and its questionable relevance to the problem’s solution.

The findings indicate a real discrepancy between a rhetorical level that is sometimes characterized by expressions of militarism, and the sense of preference against using military force to solve political problems or willingness to use military force for these purposes. Consequently, there is a desire to minimize threat potentiality by maintaining effective deterrence against the threat generators; neutralizing/thwarting threats perceived as cross-border (mainly in the Iranian context, but the same applies to Hezbollah's terror tunnels); formulating a regional coalition; and gaining US backing for a military move, if required, against Iran, and international legitimacy for more significant military moves against Hamas and Hezbollah in the event that a red line is crossed.

Consequently, Israeli policy vis-à-vis the principal external threats emerges as a responsible, restrained, and contained policy, with notable differences regarding offensive and preventive approaches to the Iranian threat and reactive approaches to threats from Hamas and Hezbollah. But despite the differences, Israel is cautious against the deterioration to an all-out war and exercises its military force in a focused and responsible manner.

The political and military echelons and the Israeli public do not believe in the possibility of reaching more than a limited agreement with Hamas or Hezbollah, which is why Israel chooses to respond militarily and sometimes intensively (for example, the Second Lebanon War and the three anti-Hamas campaigns in the Gaza Strip) whenever Hamas or Hezbollah crosses the red lines defined by Israel and exercises military force against it, in order to retaliate or preserve deterrence. Military conduct, backed by political decisions and policies, goes beyond this principle when it comes to Iran's military establishment in Syria, and more recently in Iraq. Regarding Iran's military nuclear threat, Israel is preparing for an independent military operation in case all hope is lost. But at this stage, it prefers to exhaust any political and economic possibility left under the US leadership, together with persuading the partner countries of the JCPOA.

Israel is situated in an environment fraught with violence, threats, and instability, among many actors in the region who object to Israel’s very existence and call for its destruction. The military remains a major and significant institution in Israel. Israel’s mandatory conscription model, which endeavors to preserve the IDF as “a people's army,” and the military's significant presence in the Israeli ethos and in state and nation life are reflected in cultural militarism, which is significantly more salient than in the West. However, with regard to militarism in its political sense, the restrained conduct of the political and military echelons, as well as the attitudes of the Jewish public in Israel, seems to indicate a much lower level than that presumed by social scientists and other analysts over the years.

As far as civil control is concerned, the reality is not less dialectic. Where the formal (vertical) civil control is realized by the obedience and subordination of the military to the political echelon—although essentially, the political directives, in most cases, are in high concordance with the military's recommendations and it is rare to find examples where the political echelon decided to act against the military echelon's recommendations—the horizontal civil control does almost not exist. It seems that it is, at least partly, because of the full independence the IDF has regarding military issues, including the way of operating military force, and the indifference of the political echelon and public to these matters because everybody seems satisfied with the way that the vertical civil control is realized.

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