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Home Posts Why Did Iran Decide Against Joining Hezbollah’s Response?

Why Did Iran Decide Against Joining Hezbollah’s Response?
Danny Citrinowicz
26 August, 2024

In his speech yesterday, Hassan Nasrallah revealed that the members of Iran’s axis had decided on separate responses following the assassinations of Fuad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh. However, the statement by the new Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, regarding Iran’s future response, indicates that Iran still intends to respond to Haniyeh’s assassination and is only waiting for “the appropriate time and place.”

It’s important not to underestimate Iran’s decision not to join Hezbollah’s response. A united response would have significantly increased the likelihood of causing damage to Israel and “balanced” the equation between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah. However, it seems that Iran’s decision stems from Tehran’s fear of the consequences of such a response.

Tehran has been under intense pressure since Haniyeh’s assassination, including the unprecedented US military presence in the region, public messages from senior US officials, including President Biden, regarding the US determination to defend Israel, as well as reports of internal struggles in Tehran regarding the response, particularly emphasizing President Pezeshkian’s fear of a regional campaign. These challenges make it difficult for Tehran to make a decision in this context. The fear in Iran of being portrayed as the party responsible for destroying any chance of a ceasefire to preserve Hamas’s presence in the Gaza Strip influenced not only the delay in the response but also the decision not to join Hezbollah in its retaliation.

It’s still unclear how Iran’s decision will affect the dynamics of the Axis, and particularly how the other Axis members, led by Hezbollah, will evaluate their commitment to the alliance after their desire to respond individually to Haniyeh’s assassination. It’s apparent that Iran has a separate set of considerations, and the assassination of Haniyeh is not equivalent to that of Shukr. Nonetheless, this decision aligns with reports of tensions between Iran and Hezbollah following Hezbollah’s reluctance to join the Iranian response to Mahdavi’s assassination, and these disagreements could potentially damage the unity within the Axis.

In any case, it seems from the public statements that Iran is committed to responding to Haniyeh’s assassination. However, the continued American military presence in the region, the time that has passed since the assassination, and the decision to respond independently rather than with Hezbollah indicate that Iran is seeking a way to resolve the incident without escalating the situation in the region.

Ultimately, there is still a significant probability that Iran will respond to Haniyeh’s assassination. The public commitment of its leaders, including the supreme leader of Iran, has led Tehran into a position from which it can’t easily retreat. This fact, along with the Houthis’ desire to seek revenge for the bombing in the Hodeidah Port, suggests the risk of a regional campaign remains, even after Hezbollah has completed its response to Shukr’s assassination. Yet, it seems that Tehran is puzzled over how to respond to Haniyeh’s assassination without becoming embroiled in a broader regional conflict. It’s crucial to remember that any response by Tehran, even if limited, against Israel carries the risk of escalating into a wider conflict. The vapors of the fuel for such a campaign are still in the air.

Topics: Iran, Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel, Swords of Iron War
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