Iran is currently marking three years since the most severe, extensive, and prolonged wave of protests since the 1979 revolution. The protests, which erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini after her arrest by the “morality police,” quickly spread throughout the country until they were suppressed in early 2023. The remaining question is what has changed—and above all, what has not—since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.
The most prominent change concerns the enforcement of the Islamic dress code. The hijab obligation, one of the most prominent symbols of the Islamic Republic, was not abolished but is no longer enforced with the same intensity. Videos from Iran show many women, especially in Tehran, without hijab in public spaces. The regime’s attempts to restore the situation to its previous state failed, and in December 2024, the Supreme National Security Council even decided to freeze implementing the new hijab law, which was intended to impose severe sanctions on women who do not comply with dress regulations. Political changes also contributed to this, following the replacement of President Raisi with President Pezeshkian, which brought pragmatic forces back into positions of power, although conservative dominance has remained intact.
However, the regime’s willingness to ease restrictions somewhat was seen by most of the public as too little, too late. The deep social processes in Iranian society—centered on the growing gap between the regime and the younger generation, increasing secularization, and the erosion of the status of the clergy—did not stop and even accelerated in light of the harsh reality. Even the 12-day war with Israel, which brought about temporary solidarity, could not overshadow the authorities’ failure to provide solutions to daily hardships, primarily the economic crisis, shortages of water and electricity, and the suppression of civil liberties.
At the same time, the balance of power between the regime and its opponents has not changed significantly. The protest movement continues to suffer from the fundamental problems that have characterized it for years: It’s unable to mobilize a critical mass of demonstrators, most protests remain local, without a central leadership and without coordination or cooperation between different focal points. Many still fear a revolutionary change that could lead to chaos. Conversely, the regime, despite ongoing internal disagreements, has managed to maintain its cohesion and determination to suppress any potential threat to its stability.
In this reality, it becomes increasingly likely that political change in Iran will not occur through a popular revolution but rather through a gradual process of internal regime collapse or following leadership succession expected after the departure of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Khamenei. In any case, even three years after the outbreak of the protest, the struggle over the path, identity, and future of the Islamic Republic continues, even if its outcome has yet to be decided.
Iran is currently marking three years since the most severe, extensive, and prolonged wave of protests since the 1979 revolution. The protests, which erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini after her arrest by the “morality police,” quickly spread throughout the country until they were suppressed in early 2023. The remaining question is what has changed—and above all, what has not—since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.
The most prominent change concerns the enforcement of the Islamic dress code. The hijab obligation, one of the most prominent symbols of the Islamic Republic, was not abolished but is no longer enforced with the same intensity. Videos from Iran show many women, especially in Tehran, without hijab in public spaces. The regime’s attempts to restore the situation to its previous state failed, and in December 2024, the Supreme National Security Council even decided to freeze implementing the new hijab law, which was intended to impose severe sanctions on women who do not comply with dress regulations. Political changes also contributed to this, following the replacement of President Raisi with President Pezeshkian, which brought pragmatic forces back into positions of power, although conservative dominance has remained intact.
However, the regime’s willingness to ease restrictions somewhat was seen by most of the public as too little, too late. The deep social processes in Iranian society—centered on the growing gap between the regime and the younger generation, increasing secularization, and the erosion of the status of the clergy—did not stop and even accelerated in light of the harsh reality. Even the 12-day war with Israel, which brought about temporary solidarity, could not overshadow the authorities’ failure to provide solutions to daily hardships, primarily the economic crisis, shortages of water and electricity, and the suppression of civil liberties.
At the same time, the balance of power between the regime and its opponents has not changed significantly. The protest movement continues to suffer from the fundamental problems that have characterized it for years: It’s unable to mobilize a critical mass of demonstrators, most protests remain local, without a central leadership and without coordination or cooperation between different focal points. Many still fear a revolutionary change that could lead to chaos. Conversely, the regime, despite ongoing internal disagreements, has managed to maintain its cohesion and determination to suppress any potential threat to its stability.
In this reality, it becomes increasingly likely that political change in Iran will not occur through a popular revolution but rather through a gradual process of internal regime collapse or following leadership succession expected after the departure of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Khamenei. In any case, even three years after the outbreak of the protest, the struggle over the path, identity, and future of the Islamic Republic continues, even if its outcome has yet to be decided.