The UAV sent by the Houthis, which struck a residential building in Tel Aviv on Thursday night is another step in the war of attrition by the Iranian axis of resistance against the State of Israel. The UAV has inherent advantages that make it difficult to detect early: It has a low radar signature, mainly because of its materials, relatively small dimensions, and a flexible flight profile with capabilities of maneuvering and flying at low altitudes and over complex topography. These features allow the UAV to fly to its target in a “roaming armament” configuration, while early detection becomes a technological challenge with many possibilities for false alarms and penetration through the country’s defense layers.
However, it is important to remember that the UAV is not a surprising or game-changing weapon, but rather a technical upgrade of old weapons that can be countered. The Iranian-made UAV that was launched from Yemen and hit Tel Aviv is likely an advanced model of the Samad-3 type. This UAV has a range of between 1,700 to 2,400 km, with a warhead of 30–40 kg of explosive material, which can be adjusted according to the desired flight range. The average flight height is 4 km, its speed is around 200–250 km/h, and its navigation is usually done with GPS or inertial navigation.
The main defense against the UAVs is interception with fighter planes or the Iron Dome. This action is not always effective, due to the differences in speed between the fighter plane and the UAV and the high economic cost of interception in relation to the cost of the target. The UAVs can also be dealt with using barrel weapons with a high rate of fire such as the M61 Vulcan cannon, or radar-guided anti-aircraft guns currently being developed in Germany and the United States, combined with the “Stinger”—anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles.
An interception device currently under development in the United States is a cannon that produces high-power microwave radiation. This radiation is able to “cook” and destroy the electronic mechanisms of the UAVs and disrupt their flight. In addition, it has the ability to deal with swarms due to the dispersion of the radiation in space allowing for large volume coverage. Another means close to operational implementation in several countries, including Israel, is the use of the laser cannon. The laser radiation with a power of 50–100 kilowatts may cause mechanical failure in the UAV and its interception. The laser cannon is not an ultimate solution to the problem but rather an additional layer to the existing layers of protection, due to limitations arising from environmental conditions, time spent on the target, and limitations on the optimal distance from the target.
Another means of dealing with UAVs is the control of the spectral dimension, referring to the control of the communication channels of the UAVs with the navigation system or with their operators and disrupting them.
And of course, there is also an offensive option as the IDF carried out on Saturday—damage to storage warehouses, critical infrastructure, and the supply chain. The flames emanating from Hodeidah Port serve as a reminder to all our enemies of the capabilities of the State of Israel in attack and defense.
ByGSpeech
The UAV sent by the Houthis, which struck a residential building in Tel Aviv on Thursday night is another step in the war of attrition by the Iranian axis of resistance against the State of Israel. The UAV has inherent advantages that make it difficult to detect early: It has a low radar signature, mainly because of its materials, relatively small dimensions, and a flexible flight profile with capabilities of maneuvering and flying at low altitudes and over complex topography. These features allow the UAV to fly to its target in a “roaming armament” configuration, while early detection becomes a technological challenge with many possibilities for false alarms and penetration through the country’s defense layers.
However, it is important to remember that the UAV is not a surprising or game-changing weapon, but rather a technical upgrade of old weapons that can be countered. The Iranian-made UAV that was launched from Yemen and hit Tel Aviv is likely an advanced model of the Samad-3 type. This UAV has a range of between 1,700 to 2,400 km, with a warhead of 30–40 kg of explosive material, which can be adjusted according to the desired flight range. The average flight height is 4 km, its speed is around 200–250 km/h, and its navigation is usually done with GPS or inertial navigation.
The main defense against the UAVs is interception with fighter planes or the Iron Dome. This action is not always effective, due to the differences in speed between the fighter plane and the UAV and the high economic cost of interception in relation to the cost of the target. The UAVs can also be dealt with using barrel weapons with a high rate of fire such as the M61 Vulcan cannon, or radar-guided anti-aircraft guns currently being developed in Germany and the United States, combined with the “Stinger”—anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles.
An interception device currently under development in the United States is a cannon that produces high-power microwave radiation. This radiation is able to “cook” and destroy the electronic mechanisms of the UAVs and disrupt their flight. In addition, it has the ability to deal with swarms due to the dispersion of the radiation in space allowing for large volume coverage. Another means close to operational implementation in several countries, including Israel, is the use of the laser cannon. The laser radiation with a power of 50–100 kilowatts may cause mechanical failure in the UAV and its interception. The laser cannon is not an ultimate solution to the problem but rather an additional layer to the existing layers of protection, due to limitations arising from environmental conditions, time spent on the target, and limitations on the optimal distance from the target.
Another means of dealing with UAVs is the control of the spectral dimension, referring to the control of the communication channels of the UAVs with the navigation system or with their operators and disrupting them.
And of course, there is also an offensive option as the IDF carried out on Saturday—damage to storage warehouses, critical infrastructure, and the supply chain. The flames emanating from Hodeidah Port serve as a reminder to all our enemies of the capabilities of the State of Israel in attack and defense.