The statement published this week by the Reform Front in Iran, outlining a series of demands for sweeping changes in both domestic and foreign policy, has attracted considerable attention in the Israeli media. Among the demands are the renewal of negotiations with the United States, the suspension of uranium enrichment in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, the release of all political prisoners, the abolition of the Islamic dress code, and the removal of the Revolutionary Guards from political involvement.
Is this an interesting development? Absolutely. It reflects the sharp discourse that has long characterized Iran’s two main political camps, radical conservatives and pragmatic reformists, which are far from being monolithic. This discourse has reemerged with even greater intensity since the end of the warwith Israel. The call for a “paradigmatic change,” voiced immediately after the war by academics, experts, and political activists—mainly from Iran’s pragmatic circles—expresses two things. First, there’s a recognition of the urgent need to address the growing domestic crises, particularly the economic crisis, through changes in both domestic and foreign policy. Second, in their view, the war created an opportunity to implement these changes by harnessing the public’s mobilization around the patriotic and nationalist sentiment that the war unleashed.
Moreover, the reformists currently view this period of drawing lessons and preparing for the post-Khamenei era as a renewed opportunity to strengthen their political standing after years of being sidelined from Iran’s decision-making processes. It’s therefore no surprise that the Front’s statement drew sharp criticism from the conservative right, including accusations of treason and capitulation to Western dictates.
The key question, however, is whether this statement signals a change in the political balance of powerwithin Tehran’s ruling elite. On this point, it’s important to stress that Iran’s governing institutions are still dominated by conservatives, even after Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory in last year’s presidential elections. The recent appointment of Ali Larijani, a pragmatic conservative, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council hasn’t fundamentally altered the balance of power.
In addition, contrary to some recent reports, the Reform Front shouldn’t be seen as “the president’s faction.” Some of its members (it’s a coalition of bodies and parties) did support Pezeshkian’s candidacy, mainly because they considered him “the lesser evil” compared to his rival Saeed Jalili, who is identified with the Steadfast Front, the radical-revolutionary right-wing faction. Jalili, incidentally, remains one of the leader’s two representatives in the Supreme National Security Council.
Furthermore, even within the pragmatic camp and among some of the president’s supporters, reservations have been voiced in recent days about the Front’s statement. Critics argue that it weakens the president precisely during these challenging days after the war and may ultimately benefit the radical circles. More importantly, over the past year, and particularly since the war, the government andeven the Supreme National Security Council have made efforts to ease tensions between the authorities and the public to prevent the renewal of protests. For example, the Council suspended the implementation of a bill passed in the Majles that would have introduced harsher penalties for womenviolating the Islamic dress code. Recently, the government also decided not to implement another proposal, which called for stricter restrictions on publishing sensitive content on social media. The appointment of Ali Larijani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council may also be interpreted as a conciliatory message from the authorities.
That said, political and civil repression has not eased but rather has intensified since the war, including a wave of mass arrests and executions. Likewise, there hasn’t been any sign of change in the president’s standing relative to other centers of power in Iran, particularly the Supreme Leader’s Office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
Additionally, there hasn’t been any indication so far of a shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Tehran shows no genuine willingness to renew negotiations with the United States on the nuclear issue. It continues to refuse the resumption of the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it remains committed to its proxies in the so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian arena.
In conclusion, the 12-day war has sparked a renewed debate within Iran over the lessons to be learned from the war, both in terms of its domestic and foreign policies. This discourse reflects the ongoing power struggles and divisions that have characterized Iran’s political system and public sphere for years.However, at this stage, there’s no evidence of any substantive shift in the political structure or in the balance of power among the ruling elite. Significant transformations will remain unlikely as long as there is no real change in the Iranian regime, particularly regarding the succession of the supreme leader.
The statement published this week by the Reform Front in Iran, outlining a series of demands for sweeping changes in both domestic and foreign policy, has attracted considerable attention in the Israeli media. Among the demands are the renewal of negotiations with the United States, the suspension of uranium enrichment in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, the release of all political prisoners, the abolition of the Islamic dress code, and the removal of the Revolutionary Guards from political involvement.
Is this an interesting development? Absolutely. It reflects the sharp discourse that has long characterized Iran’s two main political camps, radical conservatives and pragmatic reformists, which are far from being monolithic. This discourse has reemerged with even greater intensity since the end of the warwith Israel. The call for a “paradigmatic change,” voiced immediately after the war by academics, experts, and political activists—mainly from Iran’s pragmatic circles—expresses two things. First, there’s a recognition of the urgent need to address the growing domestic crises, particularly the economic crisis, through changes in both domestic and foreign policy. Second, in their view, the war created an opportunity to implement these changes by harnessing the public’s mobilization around the patriotic and nationalist sentiment that the war unleashed.
Moreover, the reformists currently view this period of drawing lessons and preparing for the post-Khamenei era as a renewed opportunity to strengthen their political standing after years of being sidelined from Iran’s decision-making processes. It’s therefore no surprise that the Front’s statement drew sharp criticism from the conservative right, including accusations of treason and capitulation to Western dictates.
The key question, however, is whether this statement signals a change in the political balance of powerwithin Tehran’s ruling elite. On this point, it’s important to stress that Iran’s governing institutions are still dominated by conservatives, even after Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory in last year’s presidential elections. The recent appointment of Ali Larijani, a pragmatic conservative, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council hasn’t fundamentally altered the balance of power.
In addition, contrary to some recent reports, the Reform Front shouldn’t be seen as “the president’s faction.” Some of its members (it’s a coalition of bodies and parties) did support Pezeshkian’s candidacy, mainly because they considered him “the lesser evil” compared to his rival Saeed Jalili, who is identified with the Steadfast Front, the radical-revolutionary right-wing faction. Jalili, incidentally, remains one of the leader’s two representatives in the Supreme National Security Council.
Furthermore, even within the pragmatic camp and among some of the president’s supporters, reservations have been voiced in recent days about the Front’s statement. Critics argue that it weakens the president precisely during these challenging days after the war and may ultimately benefit the radical circles. More importantly, over the past year, and particularly since the war, the government andeven the Supreme National Security Council have made efforts to ease tensions between the authorities and the public to prevent the renewal of protests. For example, the Council suspended the implementation of a bill passed in the Majles that would have introduced harsher penalties for womenviolating the Islamic dress code. Recently, the government also decided not to implement another proposal, which called for stricter restrictions on publishing sensitive content on social media. The appointment of Ali Larijani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council may also be interpreted as a conciliatory message from the authorities.
That said, political and civil repression has not eased but rather has intensified since the war, including a wave of mass arrests and executions. Likewise, there hasn’t been any sign of change in the president’s standing relative to other centers of power in Iran, particularly the Supreme Leader’s Office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
Additionally, there hasn’t been any indication so far of a shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Tehran shows no genuine willingness to renew negotiations with the United States on the nuclear issue. It continues to refuse the resumption of the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it remains committed to its proxies in the so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian arena.
In conclusion, the 12-day war has sparked a renewed debate within Iran over the lessons to be learned from the war, both in terms of its domestic and foreign policies. This discourse reflects the ongoing power struggles and divisions that have characterized Iran’s political system and public sphere for years.However, at this stage, there’s no evidence of any substantive shift in the political structure or in the balance of power among the ruling elite. Significant transformations will remain unlikely as long as there is no real change in the Iranian regime, particularly regarding the succession of the supreme leader.