The Iranian discourse on social media is divided into two camps. One is led by Iranian exiles, primarily located in the United States and Israel, who are conducting a broad media campaign centered on the call to overthrow the Iranian regime. The other is led by Iranian citizens living within Iran who emphasize their patriotism and reject what they perceive as the “Israeli bear hug,” while grappling with why the barrier of fear has not yet broken and why, at this stage, the likelihood of popular protests remains low.
The Exile Discourse
This discourse is almost entirely led by Iranian exiles and carries a clear agenda: the overthrow of the Ayatollah regime. It revolves around two central campaigns:
Campaign 1: “The Ayatollah regime is as fragile as a spider web.” This campaign includes consistent publication and amplification of content showing damage to regime symbols inside Iran, accompanied by videos and documentation intended to highlight the regime’s internal cracks and loss of control. The campaign also seeks to encourage the Iranian public to return to the streets and protest as they have in the past.
Campaign 2: “Everyone is fleeing to Moscow” or “Khamenei’s fate will be like Assad’s.” This campaign spreads fake videos supposedly showing the families of regime officials fleeing on flights to Moscow. While such a phenomenon might occur in the future, it is not happening at present. Additionally, this campaign tries to suggest widespread joy among Iranians following the Israeli strikes. It is important to clarify that this campaign does not reflect the true mood in the streets of Iran but rather the voices of the exile community. Even if some Iranians aspire to see the regime fall, no current grassroots campaigns exist to bring people into the streets.
The Internal Iranian Discourse: Patriotism and the Fear Barrier
Three central narratives characterize the internal discourse among Iranians within the country:
1. “Out of hatred for Haman, not love for Mordechai”—There is a clear distinction between hatred for the Ayatollah regime and deep love for Iran. Iranians clearly choose to support their country over Israel’s military actions. There is also real disdain toward the Israeli government, which is perceived as right-wing, brutal, and responsible for the suffering of Gazans. Iranians express their discontent with the “Israeli bear hug” that portrays them as traitors. Similar to the cases of the Druze and Alawites, such a “hug” is viewed as suffocating rather than supportive. Many oppose linking Israel’s military actions to their internal struggle to overthrow the regime.
2. Paralysis in the face of regime fear—Alongside patriotism, there is an apologetic tone explaining why protests are not currently taking place and why the fear barrier has yet to break. The public is still not ready to take to the streets. Therefore, current expectations of a major popular uprising are more wishful thinking by Israelis than a reflection of the actual situation on the ground. Residents of Iran express cries of fear, while exiles abroad share cries of joy.
3. Cries of fear, not of joy—The Iranian public values life and is deeply afraid that Tehran could suffer the same fate as Jabalia or the Dahiya district in Lebanon. Just three days into the operation, we have witnessed a mass exodus of Tehran residents fleeing the city. So far, however, Israel has focused on military targets, and there hasn’t yet been widespread panic. However, if residential buildings in Tehran are hit, this trend is likely to change.
The Iranian discourse on social media is divided into two camps. One is led by Iranian exiles, primarily located in the United States and Israel, who are conducting a broad media campaign centered on the call to overthrow the Iranian regime. The other is led by Iranian citizens living within Iran who emphasize their patriotism and reject what they perceive as the “Israeli bear hug,” while grappling with why the barrier of fear has not yet broken and why, at this stage, the likelihood of popular protests remains low.
The Exile Discourse
This discourse is almost entirely led by Iranian exiles and carries a clear agenda: the overthrow of the Ayatollah regime. It revolves around two central campaigns:
Campaign 1: “The Ayatollah regime is as fragile as a spider web.” This campaign includes consistent publication and amplification of content showing damage to regime symbols inside Iran, accompanied by videos and documentation intended to highlight the regime’s internal cracks and loss of control. The campaign also seeks to encourage the Iranian public to return to the streets and protest as they have in the past.
Campaign 2: “Everyone is fleeing to Moscow” or “Khamenei’s fate will be like Assad’s.” This campaign spreads fake videos supposedly showing the families of regime officials fleeing on flights to Moscow. While such a phenomenon might occur in the future, it is not happening at present. Additionally, this campaign tries to suggest widespread joy among Iranians following the Israeli strikes. It is important to clarify that this campaign does not reflect the true mood in the streets of Iran but rather the voices of the exile community. Even if some Iranians aspire to see the regime fall, no current grassroots campaigns exist to bring people into the streets.
The Internal Iranian Discourse: Patriotism and the Fear Barrier
Three central narratives characterize the internal discourse among Iranians within the country:
1. “Out of hatred for Haman, not love for Mordechai”—There is a clear distinction between hatred for the Ayatollah regime and deep love for Iran. Iranians clearly choose to support their country over Israel’s military actions. There is also real disdain toward the Israeli government, which is perceived as right-wing, brutal, and responsible for the suffering of Gazans. Iranians express their discontent with the “Israeli bear hug” that portrays them as traitors. Similar to the cases of the Druze and Alawites, such a “hug” is viewed as suffocating rather than supportive. Many oppose linking Israel’s military actions to their internal struggle to overthrow the regime.
2. Paralysis in the face of regime fear—Alongside patriotism, there is an apologetic tone explaining why protests are not currently taking place and why the fear barrier has yet to break. The public is still not ready to take to the streets. Therefore, current expectations of a major popular uprising are more wishful thinking by Israelis than a reflection of the actual situation on the ground. Residents of Iran express cries of fear, while exiles abroad share cries of joy.
3. Cries of fear, not of joy—The Iranian public values life and is deeply afraid that Tehran could suffer the same fate as Jabalia or the Dahiya district in Lebanon. Just three days into the operation, we have witnessed a mass exodus of Tehran residents fleeing the city. So far, however, Israel has focused on military targets, and there hasn’t yet been widespread panic. However, if residential buildings in Tehran are hit, this trend is likely to change.