The operation carried out in Doha has profound implications for the two war objectives. Their achievement will be determined by the operation’s consequences for Hamas, Qatar, the United States, and Israel.
1. From Hamas’s perspective, if indeed the entire leadership was eliminated, this is an earthquake. Hamas abroad, based in Qatar, enjoyed the status of diplomatic protection—almost like an official embassy—through which it raised funds and coordinated its diplomatic campaign against Israel. Following the operation, the center of gravity will shift back to the Gaza Strip. This time, however, it will be without the Sinwar brothers, leaving an exhausted junior leadership to face an intensifying campaign in Gaza.
Hamas is now much weaker, and that is a welcome development, even if belated. Its stance on the hostage deal and ending the war is not expected to change in the short term, since doing so would signal weakness. In the long term, however, there will be a change. The direction of that change depends greatly on the mediators’ position and on the United States.
2. Qatar, which had carefully positioned itself as the main mediator in the hostage deal, has suffered a humiliating blow. It is a weak and militarily fragile state that depends on the American protective umbrella for survival. Since it’s likely that the United States was privy to the operation’s details, an important component of Qatar’s security perception has been shaken. In the short term, Qatar is expected to retreat from mediation efforts and increase its subversive efforts against Israel in retaliation. However, without hosting Hamas senior officials, its relative advantage as a mediator has evaporated. The ball will pass to Egypt, to which Hamas leaders in Gaza will now turn.
3. The United States: President Trump wants to end the war, and, characteristically, he seeks to do so through a show of force and a determined push toward negotiations. This strike, which was apparently approved by him, will indeed bring criticism, but it will also inject renewed energy into efforts to end the war in Gaza. It is likely that the Egyptian–American axis will take the lead. Qatar does not have much leverage over the United States; on the contrary. Therefore, Trump can neutralize or mitigate Qatar’s potential damage.
4. Israel: The Israeli government is conducting a dangerous maneuver of walking on the edge of chaos. Increasing the pressure on Gaza, eliminating Hamas’s leadership, and the American ultimatum all create the possibility of projecting an image of victory and ending the war with a comprehensive agreement. The problem, however, is that there are too many moving parts here. This path may lead to victory, but it could also result in further entanglement in a military operation to capture Gaza City, without any mediation channel translating this pressure into a framework for releasing the hostages. Therefore, since negotiations are meaningless in the short term due to the inevitable delay, operational pressure is also not urgent. It is therefore recommended to suspend the operation in Gaza and give the newly created effect time to settle and exert influence.
In conclusion, this was an important operation. While it may cause a temporary delay in the negotiations, it also injects new energy that, if used properly, could lead to an image of victory and the achievement of the war’s objectives.
This column was first published in Hebrew on the N12 website.
The operation carried out in Doha has profound implications for the two war objectives. Their achievement will be determined by the operation’s consequences for Hamas, Qatar, the United States, and Israel.
1. From Hamas’s perspective, if indeed the entire leadership was eliminated, this is an earthquake. Hamas abroad, based in Qatar, enjoyed the status of diplomatic protection—almost like an official embassy—through which it raised funds and coordinated its diplomatic campaign against Israel. Following the operation, the center of gravity will shift back to the Gaza Strip. This time, however, it will be without the Sinwar brothers, leaving an exhausted junior leadership to face an intensifying campaign in Gaza.
Hamas is now much weaker, and that is a welcome development, even if belated. Its stance on the hostage deal and ending the war is not expected to change in the short term, since doing so would signal weakness. In the long term, however, there will be a change. The direction of that change depends greatly on the mediators’ position and on the United States.
2. Qatar, which had carefully positioned itself as the main mediator in the hostage deal, has suffered a humiliating blow. It is a weak and militarily fragile state that depends on the American protective umbrella for survival. Since it’s likely that the United States was privy to the operation’s details, an important component of Qatar’s security perception has been shaken. In the short term, Qatar is expected to retreat from mediation efforts and increase its subversive efforts against Israel in retaliation. However, without hosting Hamas senior officials, its relative advantage as a mediator has evaporated. The ball will pass to Egypt, to which Hamas leaders in Gaza will now turn.
3. The United States: President Trump wants to end the war, and, characteristically, he seeks to do so through a show of force and a determined push toward negotiations. This strike, which was apparently approved by him, will indeed bring criticism, but it will also inject renewed energy into efforts to end the war in Gaza. It is likely that the Egyptian–American axis will take the lead. Qatar does not have much leverage over the United States; on the contrary. Therefore, Trump can neutralize or mitigate Qatar’s potential damage.
4. Israel: The Israeli government is conducting a dangerous maneuver of walking on the edge of chaos. Increasing the pressure on Gaza, eliminating Hamas’s leadership, and the American ultimatum all create the possibility of projecting an image of victory and ending the war with a comprehensive agreement. The problem, however, is that there are too many moving parts here. This path may lead to victory, but it could also result in further entanglement in a military operation to capture Gaza City, without any mediation channel translating this pressure into a framework for releasing the hostages. Therefore, since negotiations are meaningless in the short term due to the inevitable delay, operational pressure is also not urgent. It is therefore recommended to suspend the operation in Gaza and give the newly created effect time to settle and exert influence.
In conclusion, this was an important operation. While it may cause a temporary delay in the negotiations, it also injects new energy that, if used properly, could lead to an image of victory and the achievement of the war’s objectives.
This column was first published in Hebrew on the N12 website.