The regional arrangement in the Middle East, which includes ending the war in Gaza and achieving normalization with Saudi Arabia, has three stages and requires two crucial decisions. The risks are more tangible than the opportunities, but the strategic benefit is enormous.
- Rafah—hostage deal
The opportunity: It seems that the proposal on the table is in line with Hamas’s preconditions. If the proposal is accepted, it will pave the way for a long pause in the fighting. This pause can be used to negotiate a ceasefire with Hezbollah and to compel the withdrawal of the Radwan force from the border through a temporary understanding that will allow the residents of the north to return to their homes.
The risk: If Hamas emerges as victorious, Hamas’s leader Sinwar could harden his positions, to the point of preventing or postponing a deal. In such a case, the Israeli government’s only tool will be military pressure and a military operation in Rafah. If the move is not coordinated with the United States, it may jeopardize the continuation of American support. Above all, the current situation, characterized by stagnation and indecision, wastes the precious time remaining to save the hostages.
- Ramallah—consent by the Palestinian Authority and Israel to allow an international force to be responsible for the civil administration of Gaza
The opportunity: The Arab–Western coalition, which works in coordination with Israel, aims to assume responsibility for the civil administration of Gaza and aid in its rehabilitation. The United States, leading the coalition, supports this direction and will ensure the success of this initiative, if Israel agrees to the terms.
The risk: One of the conditions is the involvement of the Palestinian Authority, which the Arab countries will require for their participation, with Israel’s consent. The PA will do this as part of a process that, in their view, leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Although this is only a vision and not an actual plan, it lacks support from the current Israeli government. In the absence of an alternative, it appears that Hamas will restore the civil situation in the Gaza Strip, and it will continue to manage aid as a means to regain its rule and military power.
- Riyadh—normalization with Saudi Arabia
The opportunity: The United States and Saudi Arabia continue to promote normalization. This represents a significant strategic shift for Israel, particularly against Iran.
The risk: For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel is not a vital interest. Therefore, the Saudis will insist on a Palestinian political component as part of the process, as a “tax” to the Arab world. They might be content with only a “vision of two states,” but it is doubtful whether the current Israeli government, given its composition, will be able to agree to that.
In conclusion, we are at a crossroads. Israel holds the key to making decisions to end the war in exchange for the return of the hostages and to allow the Palestinian Authority to assume responsibility for managing Gaza. These difficult decisions have the potential to improve Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East, but they do not guarantee the defeat of Hamas and certainly do not meet the unfortunate definition (in the wake of the October 7 failure) of “total victory.”
The regional arrangement in the Middle East, which includes ending the war in Gaza and achieving normalization with Saudi Arabia, has three stages and requires two crucial decisions. The risks are more tangible than the opportunities, but the strategic benefit is enormous.
The opportunity: It seems that the proposal on the table is in line with Hamas’s preconditions. If the proposal is accepted, it will pave the way for a long pause in the fighting. This pause can be used to negotiate a ceasefire with Hezbollah and to compel the withdrawal of the Radwan force from the border through a temporary understanding that will allow the residents of the north to return to their homes.
The risk: If Hamas emerges as victorious, Hamas’s leader Sinwar could harden his positions, to the point of preventing or postponing a deal. In such a case, the Israeli government’s only tool will be military pressure and a military operation in Rafah. If the move is not coordinated with the United States, it may jeopardize the continuation of American support. Above all, the current situation, characterized by stagnation and indecision, wastes the precious time remaining to save the hostages.
The opportunity: The Arab–Western coalition, which works in coordination with Israel, aims to assume responsibility for the civil administration of Gaza and aid in its rehabilitation. The United States, leading the coalition, supports this direction and will ensure the success of this initiative, if Israel agrees to the terms.
The risk: One of the conditions is the involvement of the Palestinian Authority, which the Arab countries will require for their participation, with Israel’s consent. The PA will do this as part of a process that, in their view, leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Although this is only a vision and not an actual plan, it lacks support from the current Israeli government. In the absence of an alternative, it appears that Hamas will restore the civil situation in the Gaza Strip, and it will continue to manage aid as a means to regain its rule and military power.
The opportunity: The United States and Saudi Arabia continue to promote normalization. This represents a significant strategic shift for Israel, particularly against Iran.
The risk: For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel is not a vital interest. Therefore, the Saudis will insist on a Palestinian political component as part of the process, as a “tax” to the Arab world. They might be content with only a “vision of two states,” but it is doubtful whether the current Israeli government, given its composition, will be able to agree to that.
In conclusion, we are at a crossroads. Israel holds the key to making decisions to end the war in exchange for the return of the hostages and to allow the Palestinian Authority to assume responsibility for managing Gaza. These difficult decisions have the potential to improve Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East, but they do not guarantee the defeat of Hamas and certainly do not meet the unfortunate definition (in the wake of the October 7 failure) of “total victory.”