A week before the return of the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran (the “snapback”), Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering has reached a dead end, leaving both Tehran and the international system facing a new crisis. In a procedural discussion at the Security Council, a necessary stage in reinstating sanctions, South Korea submitted a draft resolution to cancel the sanctions on Iran. The proposal failed to obtain the required support of nine members and therefore did not even require a veto for its rejection. Now the path is clear for the reimposition, on September 28, of all Security Council sanctions related to the nuclear issue.
Before the Security Council’s decision, direct talks were held between the Iranian foreign minister and European representatives, in which he proposed a partial “roadmap” for progress in exchange for suspending the snapback and beginning negotiations with the United States on a nuclear deal. Similar messages were conveyed to the American envoy, Steve Witkoff. However, the minimum terms demanded by Washington and the E3 did not meet the maximum offered by Tehran. At the same time, Iran, with the support of Russia, China, and other states, tried to pass a resolution at the IAEA forbidding attacks on nuclear facilities. This effort failed at the last moment due to US pressure on the participants and Tehran’s realization it would not succeed.
Meanwhile, the debate in Iran has been intensifying over how to respond to the return of sanctions. Pragmatic and reformist elements are calling for a broad policy change, including halting enrichment. In contrast, voices, such as that of the editor of the conservative daily Kayhan, a close associate of the Supreme Leader, have called for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arguing that two decades of negotiations have failed to protect Iran’s nuclear facilities. Many parliament members also support leaving the NPT, and some even advocate adopting a policy of ambiguity and eventually conducting a nuclear test, which, according to one, would prevent Iran from sharing the fate of Iraq and Libya.
This polarization of positions reflects assessments and worldviews that have sharpened within the regime’s leadership following the 12-day war with Israel. Some argue that the war exposed Iran’s vulnerability and loss of deterrence, underscoring the need to improve dialogue with the public to secure its support for the regime’s stability. They also favor political flexibility that could avert further sanctions and prevent further economic deterioration. By contrast, more hardline elements believe that concessions would harm Iran, and they advocate resisting Western demands and point to Iran’s survival thus far despite US sanctions, while deepening ties with Russia and China.
If Iran were to leave the NPT, it would prevent supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and leave assessments of its nuclear program’s status solely to intelligence sources. Such a situation would heighten tensions surrounding Iran’s activities and increase fears of renewed nuclear capabilities and covert steps toward developing nuclear weapons. A week before the sanctions are set to return, there is little chance of finding a formula to delay the crisis, and even a decision to abandon the treaty would, according to the treaty’s rules, leave 90 days for continued negotiations.
A week before the return of the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran (the “snapback”), Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering has reached a dead end, leaving both Tehran and the international system facing a new crisis. In a procedural discussion at the Security Council, a necessary stage in reinstating sanctions, South Korea submitted a draft resolution to cancel the sanctions on Iran. The proposal failed to obtain the required support of nine members and therefore did not even require a veto for its rejection. Now the path is clear for the reimposition, on September 28, of all Security Council sanctions related to the nuclear issue.
Before the Security Council’s decision, direct talks were held between the Iranian foreign minister and European representatives, in which he proposed a partial “roadmap” for progress in exchange for suspending the snapback and beginning negotiations with the United States on a nuclear deal. Similar messages were conveyed to the American envoy, Steve Witkoff. However, the minimum terms demanded by Washington and the E3 did not meet the maximum offered by Tehran. At the same time, Iran, with the support of Russia, China, and other states, tried to pass a resolution at the IAEA forbidding attacks on nuclear facilities. This effort failed at the last moment due to US pressure on the participants and Tehran’s realization it would not succeed.
Meanwhile, the debate in Iran has been intensifying over how to respond to the return of sanctions. Pragmatic and reformist elements are calling for a broad policy change, including halting enrichment. In contrast, voices, such as that of the editor of the conservative daily Kayhan, a close associate of the Supreme Leader, have called for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arguing that two decades of negotiations have failed to protect Iran’s nuclear facilities. Many parliament members also support leaving the NPT, and some even advocate adopting a policy of ambiguity and eventually conducting a nuclear test, which, according to one, would prevent Iran from sharing the fate of Iraq and Libya.
This polarization of positions reflects assessments and worldviews that have sharpened within the regime’s leadership following the 12-day war with Israel. Some argue that the war exposed Iran’s vulnerability and loss of deterrence, underscoring the need to improve dialogue with the public to secure its support for the regime’s stability. They also favor political flexibility that could avert further sanctions and prevent further economic deterioration. By contrast, more hardline elements believe that concessions would harm Iran, and they advocate resisting Western demands and point to Iran’s survival thus far despite US sanctions, while deepening ties with Russia and China.
If Iran were to leave the NPT, it would prevent supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and leave assessments of its nuclear program’s status solely to intelligence sources. Such a situation would heighten tensions surrounding Iran’s activities and increase fears of renewed nuclear capabilities and covert steps toward developing nuclear weapons. A week before the sanctions are set to return, there is little chance of finding a formula to delay the crisis, and even a decision to abandon the treaty would, according to the treaty’s rules, leave 90 days for continued negotiations.