Publications

This essay examines how the State of Israel has provided for its civilian population in the face of the evolving array of threats to the civilian front (otherwise known as the “home front,” or the “rear”) since the Six Day War. The article presents a three-dimensional strategic paradox that has challenged the State of Israel over the last five decades. The first dimension is that as the traditional threat from the Arab states diminishes, the perceived threat to the population of Israel increases; the second suggests that despite Israel’s strategic might and its unequivocal advantage over its non-state adversaries at all levels and in all aspects, Israel finds it difficult to dispel the growing, persistent threat that its adversaries present to the civilian front; and the third is that through its official reaction to the nature and scope of the threat to the civilian front, the government of Israel contributes to the reverberations created by these threats, and consequently amplifies them in the public domain. All of these have direct and negative implications for Israel’s perception of the security threat and, in turn, for its perception of the military conflict with its adversaries.

The essay discusses the essential manifestations of the transformation of the threat to Israel’s civilian front, from what historically was a relatively passive and marginal level to the contemporary active and central role. The article also looks at the gap between the weight of the current threats and the responses to them and presents necessary recommendations for narrowing this gap on the strategic level. The analytical prism used here is the trifold paradox and its negative implications for Israel’s threat perception.