Publications

On April 2, 2020, Yahya Sinwar, the head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, was interviewed on the Hamas-controlled al-Aqsa TV channel. During the interview Sinwar sought to dispel public fears about COVID-19, make it clear that Hamas is managing the situation effectively, and strengthen public trust in the organization's leadership. Sinwar also directed a message at Israel regarding a possible deal for releasing prisoners. He insisted that there has been no change in the official Hamas stance demanding the release from Israeli prisons of its operatives who were freed as part of the Shalit deal and rearrested during Operations Brother's Keeper and Protective Edge of 2014. He also stated that the leadership vacuum in Israel over the last year has prevented progress on this issue. At the same time, he added that in light of COVID-19 there may be a possibility for a humanitarian initiative in which "the occupation" – his term for Israel – releases older and sick Palestinian prisoners, and Hamas for its part will offer some partial compensation. He stressed that a wider deal would require Israel to pay a heavier price.

Israel's official public response to Sinwar's statement was that the coordinator for hostages and missing soldiers and his team "are committed to work constructively with the aim of bringing home the two missing civilians and the bodies of the two soldiers" and bring this affair to its end. It was also stated that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for a speedy dialogue with the mediators between Israel and Hamas in order to move a deal forward. This response is exceptional in the history of Israeli conduct in negotiating deals for the release of Palestinian prisoners, which has been characterized by minimal release of information and sometimes by deliberate obfuscation until a deal is finalized. Most information that has come out about past negotiations has come from Palestinian sources, and typically has proven correct.

Sinwar's announcement was backed by the entire upper echelon of Hamas, including Ismail Haniyeh, Khalil al-Hayya, and Musa Abu Marzouk. Media affiliated with the group and many others gave the impression that this is a serious initiative that serves the interests of both sides. Musa Dudin, the head of prisoner affairs, said on April 4 that if Israel is willing to release elderly, sick, and female prisoners, Hamas – "the resistance," according to him – will be willing to make a comparable step. He also clarified that the prisoners initiative does not supplant the conditions of "the resistance" to formulating an overall prisoner exchange and that the seriousness of Israel's intentions in this field should be doubted.

Hamas is eager to involve Russia in the process, because it believes that Russia's influence on Israel has increased lately. Ismail Haniyeh, who recently visited Moscow, told Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov after the Israeli statement was published that his organization is determined to achieve the release of the Palestinian prisoners in an exchange deal, which is achievable if Israel meets its demands. He also emphasized that the mediators contacted Hamas, and repeated the lie that the military wing of Hamas holds four Israeli soldiers.

It is clear that the outbreak of COVID-19 is the main catalyst behind these developments, as it created a set of shared interests between Israel and Hamas that might forge a "relatively cheap" deal for both sides. Hamas, which is eager to see its people released from Israeli prisons, is well aware of the limitations of its ability to handle a coronavirus outbreak in the Strip. It has dispelled many of the fears among residents of the region early on in the crisis, by managing to halt the entry of the virus into Gaza. However, the Hamas leadership is fully aware of its total dependence on Israeli assistance, which it believes would be the only source for the help required in the event of a widespread outbreak.

In the background is the tension Hamas has faced since its 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip between cementing its status as the party responsible for governance of the civilian population of Gaza and maintaining its status as the leader of the armed struggle against Israel. Even before Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, and particularly since Sinwar was chosen as the head of the Hamas political bureau in Gaza, the organization has shown an interest in reconstructing the Strip. It is also surmised (including by Hamas itself) that Hamas would not be capable of withstanding an additional major military confrontation with Israel. This explains its attempt to achieve a ceasefire that includes significant easing of the closure (or "siege," as Hamas calls it) of Gaza. In order to make headway on the possibility of reconstructing the Strip and show that it can improve life for the local population, the group's leadership aspires for a long period of quiet during which no one is killed or wounded. They seek to achieve this without giving up on the principle of struggling against Israel, by expanding and diversifying their conception of this struggle.

The COVID-19 outbreak has worsened the plight of Gaza's population, and that of Hamas. External sources of aid have thinned out. States including Iran that assisted in the past have had to significantly reduce their aid, and while assistance from the Palestinian Authority has actually increased recently, it is still insufficient for Hamas. Qatar, which is publicly committed to aid, has also expressed impatience with bearing exclusive responsibility for the burden of supporting Gaza for so long.

In this context, and while facing the threat of a coronavirus outbreak, the Hamas leadership in Gaza has identified the COVID-19 crisis as an opportunity. This pragmatic approach was reflected in the attempt to promote a prisoner exchange deal on more flexible terms than those expressed prior to the crisis. Israeli assistance will allow Hamas to successfully overcome the crisis and prove its governance capability, and also demonstrate that it is a valid alternative to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile the claim of humanitarian concerns due to the coronavirus allows it to bypass stringent ideological principles that had restricted the Hamas leadership on this issue over the past few years.

This initiative by Hamas, which its leadership characterizes as humanitarian, offers Israel an opportunity to gain the release of the bodies of IDF soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, and the release of the two civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed (who entered the Strip of their own initiative) at a relatively low price and in a manner that "bypasses" some of the restrictions on security prisoner exchange deals imposed by a 2014 cabinet decision.

Israel is also already giving health assistance to Gaza in order to decrease the danger of a COVID-19 outbreak in the Strip, both because this could then increase coronavirus infections in Israel, and because of the danger of military and/or civilian escalation including those infected with coronavirus streaming across the border. This would occur in circumstances in which Israel's military response capacity is limited by the fear of soldiers becoming infected, as well as by the desire to avoid shooting at helpless civilians.

Sinwar's statement and related statements by additional Hamas leaders about a possible deal with Israel demonstrate that this is a planned move by the group aimed at creating a new dynamic in discussions with Israel and exploiting the coronavirus crisis as a humanitarian matter and a problem shared by the two sides. At the same time, however, senior Hamas officials' statements have been somewhat reserved. For example, Musa Abu Marzouk declared on April 14 that the potential deal is similar to the move during the Gilad Shalit era, in which ill and elderly prisoners were released in exchange for information about those held by Hamas. However, it may be that even a limited agreement could open up a dynamic that is leveraged toward broader agreements beyond the scope of an initial deal, such as a long term ceasefire and easing the closure of the Strip.

From Israel's perspective, it is recommended to oppose any offer based on releasing Palestinian prisoners (in this case, terrorists) in exchange for information alone, if only because as far as is known Israel's intelligence information about the captive civilians and soldiers is extremely accurate. But the question on the table is whether the medical and humanitarian issue will limit the extent of any prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas, or whether Israel should "grab the bull by the horns" and push Hamas, while taking advantage of the coronavirus crisis in Gaza, to lay the groundwork for a wider arrangement that would include two stages.

The first stage will be on a humanitarian basis, enabling the return of the bodies of the soldiers (one of whom, Hadar Goldin, was killed in a violation by Hamas of a humanitarian ceasefire during Operation Protective Edge) and the civilians, in exchange for the release from Israeli prisons of older Palestinian prisoners nearing the end of their sentences. The second stage, if the first stage is approved, would be an attempt to leverage the dynamic created by the implementation of the prisoner deal for laying the foundations for a wider and longer-lasting arrangement for the phase after coronavirus, based on medical and humanitarian assistance, and easing of the security closure on the Gaza Strip by Israel.

It seems that Hamas is now more willing than in the past to commit to a long term security arrangement that includes easing the closure. Such a move would enhance the governance capabilities of Hamas and strengthen its legitimacy in Gaza and elsewhere. As long as this process is not perceived as going beyond a local ceasefire, it may not generate resistance by the Palestinian Authority.