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The emerging proposition in the Israeli defenseestablishment, reported recently in the media, to shut down the gasmasks project to protect the country’s civilians on the home front is yetanother manifestation of the fluctuations that have characterized Israelipolicy in this critical area. Only two months have passed since public andmedia pressure caused anxiety at the mask distribution centers in Israel, followingthe US threat to employ force against Syria after the regime’s August 21, 2013chemical weapons attack against the rebels. There was also a suggestion, originatingfrom the National Security Council, to place the financial burden of purchasingthe masks that were lacking, some40 percent, directly on the public. The extent to which Syria is in factdestroying its extensive arsenal of chemical weapons is still not clear, nor areits intentions regarding the production capabilities. Under such circumstances,is the new idea of closing the program, on which billions of shekels of taxpayermoney have been spent, correct?

The project to distribute gas masks forpersonal protection against chemical weapons started in connection with the perceived Iraqi threat.The decision was made in 1990, on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War. Although theIraqi threat never materialized, theIDF Home Front Command maintained the project until 2003, when the decision was taken by thegovernment to collect the gas masks from the public, which took place in 2007-2008.Two years later, upon the recommendation of the Home Front Command, thegovernment decided to resume the gas masks distribution, despite  reservations from, among others,  IDF quarters. However, the funding providedfor the renewed project was far less than needed. This has never changed,creating an odd situation in which there has been a constant gap between supplyand demand, with masks unavailableto morethan one third of the Israeli public – even those who wished to respond to the ongoingpleas of the Home Front Command to acquire the masks.

From the outset the gas mask chapter has beenaccompanied by sharp controversy within the defense establishment and thepublic at large. On the one hand, there is the natural tendency – some wouldsay critical need – to provide optimal protection to the general public againsta threat that has been presented as real, even if most of its impact ispsychological in nature. Technologically, the gas masks indeed provide a high quality,simple solution for the consumers, even in a biological attack scenario. Thechemical threat has always been perceived in the civil defense system as a primaryrisk component and has prompted serious and meticulous response steps in manyfields, including the medical system. Numerous and frequent exercises have alsobeen held in a chemical attack environment, to sustain a high rateof Israeli preparedness.

On the other hand, there are those whorepeatedly argue that although Syria possesses large quantities of chemicalweapons, and despite the history of Arab states (Egypt, Iraq) that have used such weapons in conflict situations, as well as theunconfirmed reports about the spillover of chemical weapons to terroristorganizations, the chances that this weapon will be used against Israel are slimand have never created a real risk that made this broad and very expensive civilianproject necessary. The main argument in this context is that Israel’s deterrentcapability will be sufficient, particularly as there is arguably no precedent to using chemicalweapons against an enemy that has the ability to launch a tough and painfulresponse. The budget was always at the center of this ongoing debate, becauseof the very high cost involved. Estimates suggest that it would now cost some 1.4 billion shekels just to complete theproduction and distribution of gas masks to the entire population, with an additional300 million shekels a year over twenty-five years required to maintain themasks and replace those that have worn out.

Discussion on a different, more professional level,namely, the issue of emergency preparedness, should focus on the strategic prioritiesfor building the right and balanced response to the needs of the home front inIsrael. Like many other countries that deal with protecting the homeland and engage with mass disaster preparedness, Israel has a clear tendency to invest most of its resources in resistance and prevention. Over the years, Israel has invested indeterrence and offensive capabilities, based on the correct assumption that thosewill contribute to at least postponing the next conflict. On the second level thereare the growing expenditures on defensive measures, and in particular, acquisitionof “hard” systems of protection. Here, for example, are the extensive procurementof active defense systems, such as the Iron Dome and the components of passive protection,such as the gas masks and the public and private shelters. In this context too there is anongoing debate about the scope of expenditure required. There are those whobelieve it is not appropriate “to protect ourselves to death” (in the words offormer Prime Minister Ehud Olmert) and hence the tendency to limit the spendingto the extent possible. Others, like the current Home Front Defense Minister GiladErdan, hold that the gaps in passive protection are not acceptable and call foradditional funding. Investments in the realm of resilience, which addressthe consequences of disruptions on the “day after” and the fast recovery offunctional continuity and rehabilitation, are regarded only as a  distant third priority.