Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

With the US-brokered ceasefire with Iran taking effect, it appears that a majority of the Israeli public opposes it: 61% is opposed, compared to only 29% of the public who supports it. At the same time, there is notable disappointment with the achievements of the campaign and the extent of the damage inflicted on Iran. Whereas in the early stages of the campaign 69% of the public had assessed that the ayatollah regime would be significantly harmed, now only 31% believes that such damage actually occurred. A similar trend is reflected in assessments of damage to the nuclear project: At the outset of the campaign, 62.5% of the public believed it would be significantly harmed, compared to only 30.5% who now thinks this indeed happened. Likewise, 73% initially estimated that the ballistic missile arsenal would be significantly damaged, compared to 42% who thinks so today. Satisfaction with the military achievements in Iran is low at 37%, while satisfaction with the political achievements is even lower at only 23%. Looking ahead, 73% believe that Israel will be required to renew the campaign against Iran within the coming year, and 76% assess that the war’s objectives will not be achieved within the anticipated negotiations. In the northern arena, 69% supports continuing the campaign against Hezbollah regardless of developments in the Iranian arena, while 62% believes that the current campaign in Lebanon will not ensure long-term security quiet. Finally, public trust in the IDF remains high (78%), while trust in the government remains low (30%) and continues to be politically polarized.

Methodology

The survey was conducted on April 9–10, 2026 by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies, approximately seven weeks after the outbreak of Operation Roaring Lion, in the context of the ceasefire with Iran and continued fighting in the Lebanese arena. Data collection was carried out by iPanel, with 801 respondents completing the survey online in Hebrew and 152 in Arabic. After sectoral weighting, the sample constitutes a representative sample of the adult population in Israel (ages 18+). The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public | Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

Trust in Persons and Institutions

The Security Establishment

Public trust in the security establishment remains high, although there has been moderate decline since the beginning of the military campaign. Trust in the IDF remains very high, while trust in the political echelon is lower and clearly influenced by political polarization.

• 78% of the Israeli public reports high trust in the IDF (42% “to a great extent” and 36% “to a fairly great extent”), compared to 20% reporting low trust. This reflects relative stability since the beginning of the campaign, when 80.5% expressed high trust in the IDF in the March 1–2, 2026 survey. Similarly, there has been no significant change compared to late March, when 77% claimed high trust.

• • By political breakdown: 90% of coalition voters and 82% of opposition voters have high trust in the IDF.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 89% of the Jewish public has high confidence in the IDF, compared to only 34% among the Arab public.

• 82% of the public reports high trust in the Air Force, compared to 15% reporting low trust. This represents only a slight decline compared to the beginning of the campaign (85%), and is similar to the levels in February (79%) and during Operation Rising Lion (~83%).

• • By political breakdown: 91% of coalition voters and 87% of opposition voters have high trust in the Air Force.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 92% of the Jewish public expresses high confidence in the Air Force, compared to only 39% among the Arab public.

• 68% of the public reports high trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, compared to 26% reporting low trust. This marks a slight increase compared to late March (66%), but a moderate decline compared to the beginning of the campaign (71%).

• • By political breakdown: 76% of coalition voters and 75% of opposition voters have high confidence in the chief of staff.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 78% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the chief of staff, compared to only 25% among the Arab public.

The Political Leadership

Trust in the political leadership remains low and continues to be characterized by sharp political polarization alongside significant sectoral gaps. Following the increase recorded at the beginning of Operation Roaring Lion, trust in the government and the prime minister has returned to levels similar to those measured prior to the campaign.

• 30% of the public reports high trust in the Israeli government, compared to 69% reporting low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, this reflects a slight decline in the level of confidence (from 34% to 30% expressing high confidence), and has remained stable since February (30%).

  • By political breakdown: 66% of coalition voters express high confidence in the government, compared to only 7% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 36% of the Jewish public reports high confidence in the government, compared to only 7% of the Arab public.

• 32% of the public reports high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 67% expressing low trust—a gradual decline of 6 percentage points since the beginning of Operation Roaring Lion (38% at the beginning of the campaign, 36% in early March, and 32% today). The current level of confidence is slightly lower than that measured prior to the campaign, in February (34%), but similar to the level recorded after Operation Rising Lion in July 2025 (30%).

  • By political breakdown: 72% of coalition voters express high confidence in the prime minister, compared to only 5% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 39% of the Jewish public reports high confidence in the prime minister, compared to only 5% among the Arab public.

Perception of Threats and Challenges

Public perceptions of Israel’s national security situation have weakened compared to the beginning of Operation Roaring Lion, alongside a sharp increase in concern regarding the Lebanese arena. Iran and Lebanon are currently the two arenas causing the greatest concern among the Israeli public.

• Decline in assessment of the national security situation: 29% of the Israeli public rates the national security situation as “good” or “very good,” 35% rates it as “bad” or “very bad,” and 35% rates it as moderate. This reflects a clear decline since the beginning of Operation Roaring Lion: In the first days of the campaign, 38% assessed the national security situation as good or very good, and only 27% defined it as bad or very bad. In other words, the percentage of those who rated the situation as good declined from 38% to 29%, while the share of those who rated it as bad rose from 27% to 35%. There has been a moderate decline since February (before Operation Roaring Lion), when 30% defined the situation as good or very good and 31% as bad or very bad.

  • By political breakdown: 53% of coalition voters assess the situation as good or very good, compared to only 12% of opposition voters. Conversely, 47% of opposition voters rate the situation as bad or very bad, compared to only 16% among coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 34% of the Jewish public thinks the national security situation is good or very good, compared to only 8% among the Arab public. Conversely, 59% of the Arab public rates the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 29% among the Jewish public.

Security-Political Threats and Challenges

The Various Arenas

• Lebanon is the most worrisome arena for the Israeli public: 84% reports concern about the security situation there (45% “to a great extent” and 39% “to a fairly great extent”). Compared to February, there has been a very sharp increase in the level of concern—from 51% to 84%.
• By political breakdown: 92% of opposition voters are worried about the security situation in Lebanon, compared to 84% of coalition voters.
• By sectoral breakdown: 87% of the Jewish public is worried about the security situation in Lebanon, compared to 74% among the Arab public.
• 82% of the public is concerned about the security situation vis-à-vis Iran (49% is concerned “to a great extent” and 33% “to a fairly great extent”). Compared to February, there has been a moderate increase in the level of concern—from 78% to 82%.

  • By political breakdown: 89% of opposition voters are concerned about the security situation vis-à-vis Iran, compared to 76% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: The level of concern is high in both sectors—83% among Jews and 80% among Arabs.

• 66% of the public is concerned about the security situation in Judea and Samaria, (32% is concerned “to a great extent” and 34% “to a fairly great extent”). Compared to February, the level of concern has been stable (65% then versus 66% now).

  • By political breakdown: 72% of opposition voters are concerned about the security situation in Judea and Samaria, compared to 67% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 70% of the Jewish public is concerned, compared to 50% among the Arab public.

• 63% of the public is concerned about the security situation in Gaza (29% is concerned “to a great extent” and 34% “to a fairly great extent”). Compared to February, there has been a moderate increase—from 58% to 63%.

  • By political breakdown: 70% of opposition voters are worried about the security situation in Gaza, compared to 61% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 67% of the Jewish public is concerned, compared to 47% among the Arab public.

• 35% of the public is concerned about the security situation in Syria, a rate very similar to that in February (36%).

  • By political breakdown: 38% of coalition voters and 37% of opposition voters are concerned about the security situation in Syria.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 35% of the Jewish public is worried, compared to 37% among the Arab public.

• One-third of the public (33%) is concerned about the security situation in Yemen, compared to 65% that is not. Only a slight increase is evident when compared to February—from 31% to 33%.

  • By political breakdown: 36% of opposition voters are concerned about the situation in Yemen, compared to 28% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 30% of the Jewish public is concerned, compared to 42% among the Arab public.

Iran Front

Since the ceasefire, the public has taken a critical view of the outcomes of the campaign against Iran. It expresses opposition to the ceasefire agreement, limited satisfaction with the military and political achievements, and a low assessment of the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear project, the missile arsenal, and the ayatollah regime. At the same time, a majority of the public believes that Israel will be required to resume fighting within a year and that the war’s objectives will not be achieved within the framework of the expected negotiations.

• A majority of the public (61%) opposes the ceasefire agreement with Iran: 34% “somewhat oppose” and 27% “strongly oppose.” In contrast, 29% supports the agreement: 17% “somewhat support” and 12% “strongly support.” Ten percent responded, “Don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: Opposition is higher among coalition voters (71%) than opposition voters (59%).
  • By sectoral breakdown: 70% of the Jewish public opposes the agreement, compared to only 28% of the Arab public. Conversely, 66% of the Arab public supports it, compared to only 20% of Jews.

• 37% of the public reports high satisfaction with the military achievements in Iran, compared to 26% who are dissatisfied and 30% who are moderately satisfied. Compared to a survey conducted about two weeks into the campaign in mid-March, there has been a sharp decline in satisfaction—from 60% to 37%.

  • By political breakdown: 55% of coalition voters report high satisfaction, compared to only 29% of opposition voters.
  • Sectoral breakdown: 44% of the Jewish public is highly satisfied, compared to only 11% of the Arab public.

• Only 23% of the public reports being highly satisfied with Israel’s diplomatic achievements in the campaign against Iran, compared to 45.5% expressing low satisfaction and 24.5% who are moderately satisfied.

  • By political breakdown: 44% of coalition voters report high satisfaction, compared to only 7% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 27% of the Jewish public is highly satisfied, compared to only 9% of the Arab public.

• A minority of the public (30.5%) assesses that Iran’s nuclear project was significantly damaged during the campaign: 29% think damage was done “to a great extent” and 1.5% assess that the project was completely dismantled. In contrast, 61.5% believes the project was not damaged at all or only slightly. Eight percent responded with “Don’t know.” Compared to the survey conducted at the beginning of the campaign (March 1–2, 2026), there has been a sharp decline in perceived damage—from 62.5% to 48% in mid-March, and to 30% today.

  • By political breakdown: 44% of coalition voters assess that the project was significantly damaged or completely dismantled, compared to only 19% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 32% of the Jewish public think that the project was significantly damaged or dismantled, compared to 26% of the Arab public.

• 42% of the public believes that Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal was significantly damaged: 41% thinks that the damage was “to a great extent” and 1% believes it was “completely dismantled.” In contrast, 51.5% believes it was not damaged or only slightly damaged. Here too, there has been a steady decline—from 73% at the start of the campaign, to 58% in mid-March, and to 42% today.

  • By political breakdown: 59% of coalition voters think that there was significant damage or dismantlement, compared to only 26% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 44% of the Jewish public assesses that there was significant damage or dismantlement, compared to 36% of the Arab public.

• 31% of the public believes the ayatollah regime was significantly weakened during the campaign: 30% thinks “to a great extent” and 1% believes there was a “complete regime collapse.” In contrast, 63% believes the regime was not damaged or only slightly damaged. The downward trend continues—from 69% at the start of the campaign, to 58% in mid-March, and to 31% today.

  • By political breakdown: 46% of coalition voters believe there was significant damage or regime collapse, compared to only 18% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 32% of the Jewish public thinks there was significant damage or collapse, compared to 28% of the Arab public.

• A majority of the public (63%) believes Israel’s security situation has worsened or remained unchanged following Operation Roaring Lion: 26% thinks it has worsened and 37% sees no change. In contrast, 34% believes the situation has improved (9% “improved greatly” and 25% “somewhat improved”).

  • By political breakdown: 59% of coalition voters believe Israel’s security situation has improved, compared to only 19% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 41% of the Jewish public thinks the situation has improved, compared to only 8% of the Arab public. Conversely, 52% of the Arab public believes the situation has worsened, compared to 19% of Jews.

• 73% of the public thinks Israel will need to resume the war against Iran within the coming year. This rate is higher than after the campaign in July 2025, when 61% held this view. Another 13% disagree and 14% responded with “Don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: 83% of coalition voters believe fighting will resume, compared to 73% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 81% of the Jewish public thinks the war will resume, compared to only 41% of the Arab public.

• Only 15% of the public thinks that Israel’s war objectives will be achieved in the framework of the expected negotiations with Iran: 2% believes they will be “fully achieved” and 13% “to a great extent.” In contrast, 76% believes they will be achieved only to a small extent or not at all. Another 9% responded with “Don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: 22% of coalition voters think the objectives will be achieved fully or to a great extent, compared to only 6% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown:14% of the Jewish public believes the objectives will be achieved fully or to a great extent, compared to 17% of the Arab public.

Lebanon Front

The ceasefire with Iran has not changed public perceptions regarding the need to continue fighting in the north. A majority of the Israeli public supports continuing the campaign against Hezbollah regardless of developments in the Iranian arena, while skepticism is growing regarding the campaign’s ability to ensure prolonged security calm.

• 62% of the public doubts that the current campaign in Lebanon will provide long-term security calm: 43% believes this will occur “to a small extent” and 20% “to a very small extent.” Only 29% believes it will provide calm “to a great or very great extent.” Another 9% responded “Don’t know.” Compared to late March, skepticism has increased.

  • By political breakdown: 48% of coalition voters believe the campaign will provide calm, compared to only 15% of opposition voters; 76% of opposition voters express doubt.
  • By sectoral breakdown: There is a relatively small gap—29% of the Jewish public and 32% of the Arab public believe the campaign will provide calm.

• A large majority of the public (69%) believes the campaign against Hezbollah should continue regardless of developments vis-à-vis Iran, compared to 23% who thinks efforts should be made to end the fighting as part of the ceasefire with Iran.

  • By political breakdown: 90% of coalition voters support continuing the campaign, compared to 65% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 82% of the Jewish public favors continuing the campaign, compared to only 18% of the Arab public. Conversely, 76% of the Arab public supports ending the fighting.

US–Israel Relations

• A majority of the public (57.5%) doubts Israel’s ability to act according to its own judgment when there is a gap between Israel and the United States on political-security issues. Of these, 47% believes this ability exists only to a small extent, and 10.5% thinks it does not exist at all. In contrast, 35% believes Israel can act independently to a great extent (26.5%) or fully (8%). Another 8% responded “Don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: 73% of opposition voters believe Israel’s ability to act independently is limited or nonexistent, compared to 41% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 36% of the Jewish public thinks Israel can act independently to a great extent or fully, compared to 28% of the Arab public.