In recent weeks, China’s President, Foreign Minister, and other spokespersons have repeatedly mentioned the "right of return" in the same breath as the various "rights" of the Palestinians. To be sure, since the Bandung Conference in 1955, when China began to support the Palestinians, Beijing has addressed the refugee problem. However, certainly since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and China in 1992, official China has hardly referred to this issue, and above all has almost always refrained from stating clearly and unequivocally that it accepts the Palestinian position on the "right of return." What has changed?
Three possible reasons may be part of the Chinese rationale to one degree or another. First, references by Israeli officials during the war, including in the coalition and the government, to the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza, and perhaps not only from Gaza, to other places in the world, may have caused China to escalate its specific statements on the right of return. That is, not only does China oppose the creation of new refugees; it mentions that the old ones must also return. This, of course, joins its overall pro-Palestinian position throughout the war.
Second, as the United States strengthens its position in the Middle East, and demonstrates this with aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and more, China claims that the United States destabilizes while China brings stability. China is trying to undermine the American narrative, which supports Israel, and the more Washington thinks about "the day after" with a partnership in the region, the more China tries to present an alternative. Chinese support for the "right of return" could harm the American attempt to bring Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table in the future, as this is one of the most sensitive and controversial issues and a decided threat to the State of Israel, while seemingly strengthening the Palestinian position. Thus, perhaps China hopes to obtain a greater sense of support from Arab and Muslim countries, and also to undermine American efforts.
Finally, the more China faces multiple internal problems, the more its attempt to divert domestic attention from these problems increases. The war in Gaza and the growing support for the Palestinians serve this purpose. China constructs a narrative whereby it is fighting colonialism, thus encouraging a sense of nationalism in China: support for the right of return sharpens this issue. And beyond the Chinese domestic arena, the narrative of the struggle against colonialism should, according to Beijing, likewise serve China in the so-called "global south," and as such, it can reap two benefits.
In recent weeks, China’s President, Foreign Minister, and other spokespersons have repeatedly mentioned the "right of return" in the same breath as the various "rights" of the Palestinians. To be sure, since the Bandung Conference in 1955, when China began to support the Palestinians, Beijing has addressed the refugee problem. However, certainly since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and China in 1992, official China has hardly referred to this issue, and above all has almost always refrained from stating clearly and unequivocally that it accepts the Palestinian position on the "right of return." What has changed?
Three possible reasons may be part of the Chinese rationale to one degree or another. First, references by Israeli officials during the war, including in the coalition and the government, to the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza, and perhaps not only from Gaza, to other places in the world, may have caused China to escalate its specific statements on the right of return. That is, not only does China oppose the creation of new refugees; it mentions that the old ones must also return. This, of course, joins its overall pro-Palestinian position throughout the war.
Second, as the United States strengthens its position in the Middle East, and demonstrates this with aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and more, China claims that the United States destabilizes while China brings stability. China is trying to undermine the American narrative, which supports Israel, and the more Washington thinks about "the day after" with a partnership in the region, the more China tries to present an alternative. Chinese support for the "right of return" could harm the American attempt to bring Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table in the future, as this is one of the most sensitive and controversial issues and a decided threat to the State of Israel, while seemingly strengthening the Palestinian position. Thus, perhaps China hopes to obtain a greater sense of support from Arab and Muslim countries, and also to undermine American efforts.
Finally, the more China faces multiple internal problems, the more its attempt to divert domestic attention from these problems increases. The war in Gaza and the growing support for the Palestinians serve this purpose. China constructs a narrative whereby it is fighting colonialism, thus encouraging a sense of nationalism in China: support for the right of return sharpens this issue. And beyond the Chinese domestic arena, the narrative of the struggle against colonialism should, according to Beijing, likewise serve China in the so-called "global south," and as such, it can reap two benefits.