Lebanon and Hezbollah Archives

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Lebanon is grappling with a three-pronged crisis. First, it is beset by an economic collapse and severe financial crisis (hyperinflation; inability to repay its large foreign debt; poverty; unemployment; commercial failures; steep price rises on basic products; and an expected reduction of GDP in 2020 of some 20 percent). Second, there is a loss of governance (a paralyzed government and corruption in all government systems, along with ongoing mass demonstrations). Third, there is a healthcare crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic (a shortage of hospital beds, medical teams, equipment, and medicines). All these were exacerbated following the destructive explosion at the Beirut port on August 20, 2020, which left some 200 people dead and some 6500 injured, and massive destruction in many neighborhoods in Beirut, with reconstruction estimated at $10-15 billion. A frustrated public continues to demand a change in the confessional political system and a replacement of the corrupt leadership, but the ruling elite is loath to concede its power and meet the demands of international elements that insist on widespread reforms in exchange for economic assistance. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy, maintains independent military power, and is a central element in the political system. The organization, which brands itself as the “resistance” to Israel and has vowed to seek Israel’s destruction, is laboring to preserve its status, and has contributed considerably to the paralysis in the decision making mechanisms in Lebanon.

INSS follows the developments in Lebanon carefully, as well as developments regarding Hezbollah, which in recent years has become a central threat to Israel. Hezbollah’s ongoing military buildup, led by its vast stockpile of rockets and missiles, threatens the Israeli home front; in addition, its closeness to its Iranian patron demands Israel’s close attention. These issues join other aspects of Israel-Lebanon relations, such as negotiations over the maritime border. Looking ahead, INSS research studies various scenarios, including the possible outbreak of a new war on the northern front, which given the developments in the theater, stands to be different from previous wars.

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INSS Insight

Hezbollah 2.0—One Year After Nasrallah’s Elimination

A Year After Nasrallah’s Elimination: Where Does Hezbollah Stand, and What Are the Implications for Israel?

16.10.25

Policy Papers

An Opportunity to Shape a New Reality with Lebanon

This policy paper proposes a strategy to translate the IDF’s achievements in the war against Hezbollah—along with the disintegration of the Shiite axis, the collapse of the Assad regime, and the consequences of the war between Israel and Iran—into a new security reality along the border with Lebanon, and to foster better relations with Lebanon’s new leadership. The strategy combines ongoing military action to weaken Hezbollah and prevent its recovery with political and economic measures designed to diminish the organization while simultaneously strengthening Lebanon’s pro-Western leadership. This approach differs from the one recently presented to Lebanon by the US administration, as it considers the constraints of Lebanon’s weak leadership and the necessity of bolstering it in light of the challenge of disarming Hezbollah. It outlines a more realistic timetable and offers Israel greater flexibility, thereby increasing the chances of success—even if progress is slow and gradual—toward establishing a new security reality and improving bilateral relations.

08.09.25

INSS Insight

After the Israel–Iran War: Hezbollah’s Decline and Israel’s Opportunity

Hezbollah’s avoidance of attacking Israel during its war with Iran highlights the organization’s weakness. What are the challenges Hezbollah is facing—and how should Israel take advantage of the situation?

01.07.25

Strategic update

Lebanon after the Doha Agreement of 2008: The Birth of the Undeclared Shiite Republic in Lebanon

This article argues that the Doha Agreement of 2008, in which Hezbollah received a veto on all Lebanese central government decisions, signaled the birth of an “undeclared Shiite republic” in Lebanon. Since then, political control of the Lebanese establishment has remained in Hezbollah’s iron fist. The agreement, which was signed after three formative events—the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and the Second Lebanon War with Israel—handed control of Lebanese politics to Hezbollah and the coalition under its leadership. Instead of trying to establish an Islamist regime, make constitutional changes, or antagonize internal Lebanese divisions, Hezbollah adopted a pragmatic policy of accepting the existing political system, while at the same time attempting to control the centers of political power and to ensure that official state policy was consistent with the dictates of “the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.” All the significant developments in Lebanon between 2008 and the signing of the natural gas treaty with Israel at the end of 2022, support the claim that Hezbollah dictated decision making in the Lebanese state. The Doha Agreement was not the product of the circumstances in the shadow of which it was signed, but rather the outcome of two deep-seated processes that began decades earlier: the militarization of the Shiite community in Lebanon, and external patronage. These processes positioned the Shiite community as the center of gravity in Lebanese politics and the Doha Agreement solidified their position. Although most senior positions in the country (except for the Speaker of the Parliament) are not held by Shiites, none of them can be appointed or elected without Hezbollah’s consent. This is the essence of the model of the undeclared Shiite republic: controlling the governing systems without needing to seize control of them by force. Hezbollah’s control of the political system does not stem from a recognition of the legitimacy of its existence. Rather, it is a measure intended to ensure that the political system does not pose a threat to the autonomy of the “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon.

04.02.25

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