Iran: Internal Affairs

What are the implications of the recent organizational changes implemented as part of the lessons learned from the 12-day war with Israel?

Israel did not make regime change a declared objective in its recent war with Iran; however, certain Israeli actions were clearly aimed at weakening the foundations of the Islamic Republic and encouraging the Iranian public to reignite their popular protest movement. As the dust settles, not only is there no evidence that Israel’s actions advanced this goal, but it seems that they may even have had the opposite effect (at least for the time being). Currently, several main scenarios could unfold in Iran’s domestic arena: the continuation of the political status quo until the expected leadership change following the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei; regime change through a popular uprising; or internal change within the regime through a takeover (formal or de facto) by military-security elite forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), of Iran’s leadership. Although regime change remains a possibility, and perhaps even a desirable outcome for Israel, given the Islamic Republic’s continued threats against Israel’s national security, it is ultimately an outcome beyond Israel’s control. If regime change does occur, it will stem from the will and agency of the Iranian people. Regime change is a prospect that is difficult, if not impossible, to predict, but until it is achieved, Israel can take steps to weaken the regime. This should be done through applying political and economic pressure, aimed at reducing the threat the Islamic Republic poses to Israel, and by building capabilities that could be employed in the event of renewed popular protest to act as an accelerant. In addition, Israel should take care and be strategic in avoiding actions that could have the opposite effect and inadvertently strengthen the regime’s cohesion in Tehran and cause the public to “rally around the flag.” These actions include assassinating Iran’s supreme leader; cooperating with opposition groups and organizations whose capacity to bring about change is uncertain, and some of which are opposed by large segments of the Iranian public; and encouraging separatist movements among Iran’s ethnic and linguistic minorities.

Since the end of 2024 there has been growing criticism from ultra-conservative and revolutionary factions in the Islamic Republic on issues of domestic and foreign policy. Most of the criticism has focused on Iran’s lack of response to the Israeli attack on October 26, 2024, Iranian failures in Syria in view of the collapse of the Assad regime, and the decision to postpone implementation of the hijab law, which is intended to increase the severity of penalties for breaches of the Islamic dress code. Although disagreements between the main political streams in Iran are a regular feature of the system, the protest by radical groups is a subject of intense public and political interest, mainly because it centers around decisions that are not the sole responsibility of the government and that were taken by political institutions directly subordinate to the supreme leader, particularly the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, sections of the conservative camp have expressed concern that the challenges to government policy posed by the radicals could not only further undermine social cohesion but also damage the unity of the governing elite. Even if the radical elements’ growing criticism of regime policy does not constitute an immediate and significant threat to the unity of the Iranian political and security elite, it could undermine the basis of the regime’s ideological support and harm its long-term ability to deal with more important threats to its stability.