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On the night of June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation “Rising Lion”—a comprehensive military campaign aimed at striking Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. The operation involves precise attacks deep within Iranian territory and on additional fronts, marking a significant escalation in the long-standing strategic struggle between the two countries.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) conducts round-the-clock, multidisciplinary research on the war and its implications. This page features all INSS publications on the topic that have been made publicly available.
Publications
All PublicationsChanges in Iran’s Supreme National Security Council: Systemic Overhaul or Cosmetic Adjustment?
What are the implications of the recent organizational changes implemented as part of the lessons learned from the 12-day war with Israel?
26.08.25The ISNAD Campaign in the Israel–Iran War
How does the campaign that aims to undermine stability in Israel through online influence operations work—and how can it be countered?
26.08.25The Iran–Israel War and the Stability of the Islamic Regime
Israel did not make regime change a declared objective in its recent war with Iran; however, certain Israeli actions were clearly aimed at weakening the foundations of the Islamic Republic and encouraging the Iranian public to reignite their popular protest movement. As the dust settles, not only is there no evidence that Israel’s actions advanced this goal, but it seems that they may even have had the opposite effect (at least for the time being). Currently, several main scenarios could unfold in Iran’s domestic arena: the continuation of the political status quo until the expected leadership change following the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei; regime change through a popular uprising; or internal change within the regime through a takeover (formal or de facto) by military-security elite forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), of Iran’s leadership. Although regime change remains a possibility, and perhaps even a desirable outcome for Israel, given the Islamic Republic’s continued threats against Israel’s national security, it is ultimately an outcome beyond Israel’s control. If regime change does occur, it will stem from the will and agency of the Iranian people. Regime change is a prospect that is difficult, if not impossible, to predict, but until it is achieved, Israel can take steps to weaken the regime. This should be done through applying political and economic pressure, aimed at reducing the threat the Islamic Republic poses to Israel, and by building capabilities that could be employed in the event of renewed popular protest to act as an accelerant. In addition, Israel should take care and be strategic in avoiding actions that could have the opposite effect and inadvertently strengthen the regime’s cohesion in Tehran and cause the public to “rally around the flag.” These actions include assassinating Iran’s supreme leader; cooperating with opposition groups and organizations whose capacity to bring about change is uncertain, and some of which are opposed by large segments of the Iranian public; and encouraging separatist movements among Iran’s ethnic and linguistic minorities.
29.07.25Between A Nuclear Agreement and Active Containment: Israel and Iran’s Nuclear Program after the War
The war between Israel and Iran, known as Operation Rising Lion, significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is no longer a nuclear threshold state as its status was prior to its war with Israel. It would take Iran at least one to two years to regain threshold status, assuming a decision by Supreme Leader Khamenei to pursue nuclear weapons. However, the war did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities entirely. Iran maintains residual capabilities that could eventually enable the rebuilding of its nuclear program and the development of nuclear weapons. Although Iran’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapons may have increased after the war, its future course of action will ultimately depend on its remaining capabilities and its evolving risk calculus. Iran faces several options: complete abandonment of the nuclear program (highly unlikely); agreement to a new nuclear deal (either to ease sanctions and buy time, or to covertly continue its nuclear progress); gradual restoration of its threshold status without a formal agreement or weaponization; or covert break out toward a nuclear weapon. From Israel’s perspective, preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons remains a central national security objective. As a result of the war, Israeli policy must push for a restrictive agreement—including intrusive and strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections—while maintaining the ability to actively enforce and disrupt to counter any Iranian nuclear breakout. Additionally, to effectively deter an Iranian nuclear breakout, Israel must make it clear that such a move would pose a direct threat to the regime’s survival.
22.07.25