Strategic Assessment

Introduction

Hamas’ murderous attack from Gaza on October 7, 2023, reignited the debate over the role of revolutionary ideology in the decision-making processes of radical Islamist actors. The public and academic discourse that followed the attack repeatedly raised the question of whether intelligence agencies, commentators, and academic researchers had underestimated the importance of religious ideology in the conduct of Islamist entities, movements, and organizations. To explore this issue, a forum was held on November 6, 2024, with the participation of academic researchers, aiming to address three main issues:

• Does the October 7 attack and the lessons learned from the multi-front campaign over the past year necessitate a reassessment of the influence of religious and ideological conceptions in the conduct and decision-making processes of Islamist actors, as opposed to pragmatic interests and considerations?
• Can we identify shared characteristics and/or differences in the conduct of various regional actors, with a focus on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, concerning the role of ideological or religious conceptions in their decision-making? What accounts for these differences?
• What policy recommendations can be made to effectively address Islamist actors operating within a religious and revolutionary worldview?

The meeting was held virtually (on Zoom) and facilitated by myself. Prof. Meir Litvak, Dr. Dina Lisnyansky, Dr. Sarah Feuer, Dr. Daniel Sobelman, Dr. Michael Milshtein, and Yohanan Tzoreff participated.

Methodological Issues

One of the key issues that emerged during the meeting was the methodological dimension. Some participants emphasized that there is no inherent contradiction between ideology and pragmatic conduct based on interests—it’s a matter of “both,” not “either-or.” They argued that ideology and pragmatism cannot be treated separately, as the interests of a particular actor are always influenced by that actor’s ideological worldview.

Furthermore, framing the distinction between ideological conduct and pragmatic or rational conduct does not necessarily help us understand the reality. When we encounter behavior that does not fully align with ideological elements, we might be tempted to categorize it as pragmatic. However, this is not always an accurate interpretation of the actor’s true nature. For example, on several occasions, the Hamas movement declared changes in its definition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leading some to label it a pragmatic movement. This conclusion, however, overlooked the fact that Hamas continued to operate according to a firm ideology, the significance of which was not fully understood. An ideological movement can be pragmatic without abandoning its ideological principles, simply waiting for the opportunity to implement them. Pragmatism, in this sense, refers to finding the most effective means to achieve a goal—an approach that can, in itself, be ideologically motivated and morally reprehensible. Some of history’s most notorious murderers were also pragmatic, which shows that the term “pragmatic” has little intrinsic moral value.

Some participants in the discussion pointed out a methodological flaw within both academia and intelligence agencies in failing to take ideological ideas seriously. One researcher even expressed regret for having misunderstood the significance of the ideological worldview. It was noted that many academics and intelligence researchers struggle to understand ideologically driven individuals. Academia, in particular, has been overly influenced by Marxist and postmodern conceptions, which often lead to the mistaken assessment that people do not genuinely believe in the ideas they espouse, viewing these beliefs instead as mere pretenses for pursuing material interests and power.

Furthermore, the difficulty in deciphering Hamas reflects deeper issues within Israeli society, as fewer and fewer Israelis—including those in academia, the media, and even the intelligence community—possess a strong command of the region’s languages, a deep understanding of its culture, or solid knowledge of its history. This decline is set against the background of the diminished status of the social sciences and humanities, the collective reverence for fields that promise quick financial rewards, and the idolization of technological advances like the information and cyber revolutions, Google Translate, artificial intelligence, and big data. In today’s environment, those who set the agenda in government, academia, and defense are often analysts who rely on Western logic. They present supposed “objective” quantitative data and are usually without fluency in the language, culture, or history of the “other.” As a result, the influence of “Arabists” is steadily waning, with experts who hold the keys to deciphering the logic of those outside our own culture being sidelined. The truth is clear: those who are not proficient in the language and cultural intricacies of their research subjects cannot claim to truly understand them, and should feel uneasy presenting analyses of them. This position also led to disagreements at the forum, with some arguing that several highly regarded researchers of Islamic movements lack proficiency in Arabic.

Furthermore, many secular researchers find it very difficult to comprehend religious ideology. For example, some struggle to understand the conduct of the Islamic Republic, whose fundamental need for deterrence is deeply rooted in ideology—specifically, a Shiite worldview in which Iranian Islamic culture is perceived as threatened by the West, particularly the United States. This ideological framework has influenced Iran’s reluctance to engage in cooperation with the Americans, driven by a constant fear of Western influence. Similarly, Hezbollah and Hamas have made enormous investments in military infrastructure over the years, driven by ideological motivations. Even when these actors take pragmatic steps, it does not mean that they have abandoned their ideological vision—such as the long-term vision of destroying Israel. This is not mere rhetoric; it must be taken seriously.

According to some participants, the Israeli analysis of the reasons behind the October 7 attack reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Hamas. One prominent misinterpretation is the attempt to frame the motivations in terms of Western political realism: For example, the claim that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sought to prevent normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia (even though the idea of invading Israel had occurred to him a decade before discussion about normalization began), to strengthen Hamas’ internal standing, and to secure the release of prisoners. In reality, his actions were driven by an ideological motive: Jihad was at the core of his mission. The campaign was seen as his life’s calling, a divine command that could not be avoided. This stands in contrast to views of some Israeli figures who wondered whether Hamas could have been deterred from its plans through political initiatives or economic incentives. At the root of the October 7 debacle is an inability to grasp Hamas’ logic, particularly the central role of its ideology in shaping its decisions. There is also a tendency to assume that extremists in power will gradually become more moderate. While history shows that moderation is possible—such as the shift from Stalin to Brezhnev in the Soviet Union—this process is not inevitable. Figures like Hitler and Saddam Hussein, for example, did not become moderate over time. In fact, extremists often move in the opposite direction: Accumulating more resources allows them to escalate violence and pursue their ideological goals more aggressively. While governance forces them to provide public services and improve the population’s quality of life, it also enables them to amass weapons, shape public perception, and mobilize society for the struggles they wage. In contrast to this view, one participant in the discussion argued that the trigger for Hamas’ decision to launch the October 7 attack was not solely ideological but also tied to the failure of Operation Guardian of the Walls and the eventual implementation of Iran’s “convergence of the arenas” strategy. Thus, even ideological movements weigh their capabilities and are not always committed to fulfilling their ideological objectives at all costs.

In trying to understand the methodological failure, it was suggested that the blindness to ideological motivations is partly a psychological issue: We struggle to accept the idea that there are those who genuinely want to destroy us. As a result, even when signs emerge that Islamist actors truly mean what they say, there is a tendency to downplay the significance of these statements and to argue that they lack the ability to carry out their ideology-driven intentions. The refusal to accept the idea that the “other” wants to destroy you is, in part, a coping mechanism for dealing with feelings of helplessness. In contrast, it was argued in the discussion that, over the years, the Arabs have given Israel many reasons to dismiss their threats—primarily because they often made exaggerated or unfounded claims, and at times became objects of ridicule and scorn in the eyes of their own people. As Fouad Ajami put it, there were “inflated clichés.” Therefore, not every statement should be taken literally.

Does the October 7 Attack Necessitate a Paradigm Shift?

The discussion about the significance of the October 7 attack and the need to reassess the role of ideology among Islamist actors sparked debate. Some researchers argued that, even today, the actions of these actors are primarily driven by strategic, rather than ideological, considerations. While there was consensus that ideological conceptions should not be ignored—especially among actors with a revolutionary religious worldview—those operating within the pro-Iranian axis (the “resistance front”) also make decisions based on cold, utilitarian, strategic calculations. According to this view, even Sinwar acted according to a strategic plan, one that ultimately failed but could have succeeded under different conditions. Hamas believed that if it did not act soon, Israel’s policies would create irreversible facts on the ground. From this perspective, the decision to act in October 2023 was a rational, strategic one. The motives behind the October 7 attack, therefore, were largely nationalist, aimed at creating a shock that would reassert the centrality of the Palestinian issue on the global agenda. It is uncertain whether these motives were tied to an ideological commitment to destroy Israel, as Hamas itself did not believe it was capable of achieving that goal. In contrast, some participants pointed to evidence from the past year suggesting that Sinwar did, in fact, believe that Hamas was capable of realizing that goal.

According to this approach, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s decision to join the campaign against Israel was also driven by strategic and pragmatic considerations. While he steadily built up his organization’s military capabilities over the years, unlike Sinwar, he would not have carried out the plan to “conquer the Galilee” unless he believed that victory over Israel was a real possibility. Moreover, the actors within the “resistance axis” are motivated by a strategy of asymmetric deterrence, a common theme in the discourse of all of these actors. This strategy reflects a deep understanding of rules of the game, cycles of conflict, deterrence equations, and the notion of “winning on points.” The struggle over the regional order is also rooted in the strategic calculations aimed at reshaping the Middle East, which could even reflect “Kissingerian” thinking based on realpolitic. This does not imply that the ideological dimension is irrelevant, but according to some participants, there is no need to reassess its relative importance. If such reassessment is warranted, however, it would also require a reevaluation of how ideology figures into Israel’s own decision-making process.

In contrast to this approach, some argued that the events of the past year require us to take the role of ideology among regional Islamist actors more seriously. One participant argued that the history of Western engagement with Islamic fundamentalism has been marked by a profound lack of understanding, which has, at times, led to strategic disasters. This deficiency has persisted for half a century and stems from various characteristics of Western culture, especially within the political, military, academic, cultural, and media establishments. The lack of understanding arises from a tendency to interpret foreign realities without grasping their unique characteristics—or even recognizing the conceptual gap—and from the influence of worldviews and wishful thinking. As a result, for decades, the discussion has been framed around conceptualizations that fail to align with the unique realities of the Islamic world. A clear distinction between extremists and pragmatists, for example, is presented as an idealized dichotomy, when, in practice, there is no inherent contradiction between them. Pragmatism, in this context, is not synonymous with moderation. This has been demonstrated over decades by the calculated behavior of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, who prioritize ideological interests but remain flexible in the face of constraints and dangers. Another misconception is the confusion between messianism and irrationality. Intelligence agencies in Israel, prior to October 7, described Sinwar and Iran’s former president, Ebrahim Raisi, as out of touch with reality, without understanding that their yearning to fulfill an apocalyptic vision is, in fact, their logic.

In this context, the conflict between Israel and Hamas serves as a unique case study of the Western difficulty in understanding foreign cultures in general, and modern Islam in particular. It highlights a variety of fundamental problems, including the tendency to project one’s own logic onto the “other”—specifically, the belief in a universal human desire for a “good life”; analyzing new challenges through old paradigms and criteria based on past experiences and familiar worlds; the difficulty for a society where ideologies are waning to comprehend a society in which ideologies still hold significant power and influence; and the inability to interpret a society whose fundamental conceptions—such as time, the value of life, the relationship between the individual and the collective, and the concept of the “other”—are fundamentally different. The conflict with Hamas over the years has reflected an inability to interpret the structural ambiguity inherent in many Islamic movements. The questions regarding Hamas that have arisen in Israel over the past 35 years, as well as the basic assumptions that have been formed about the movement, reveal the deep gaps between Israel’s perception of reality and that of the Palestinian side. Is Hamas a terrorist organization, a political party, or a social movement? (It is all three, of course). Is it more Palestinian or Islamic? (It is both equally). What is the difference between “political Hamas” and “military Hamas”—a misleading distinction that the movement itself helps to create?

According to this approach, Hamas’ updated 2017 charter should be viewed as an act of deception. As the events of October demonstrate, the movement has never truly been interested in shaping Palestinian society or in its welfare. When the updated document was published, Hamas’ television station was still preaching the killing of Jews. The document did not reflect a genuine desire for gradual change and reconciliation, but rather an intention to supplant the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, Nasrallah’s decision to join the war can only be understood through an ideological lens. Hezbollah’s leader was fully aware that joining the conflict would come at a cost, yet he chose to participate because of his deep ideological commitment.

Differences Between Actors

The participants in the discussion agreed, regardless of whether ideological conceptions influence different actors to a greater or lesser extent, that there are clear differences between them. Each actor—whether a state or a sub-state actor—operates according to its own rationale. In general, non-state actors are more willing to make sacrifices and pay higher prices because they are more strongly influenced by ideology than state actors.

Furthermore, even when actors share a common interest, their interests do not fully align. For example, there are clear differences between Hamas and Hezbollah: Hamas views Palestine as a territory that is almost entirely occupied, while Hezbollah, in its view, has already succeeded in liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation. For an actor like Iran, there is more time to realize its ideological goals, whereas Hamas, believing that it could not afford to wait, was pushed to action with the October 7 attack due to the diminishing importance of the Palestinian issue on the global stage.

Other Issues

In the discussion, it was argued that pragmatism can sometimes signal the beginning of ideological change. Ideologies are often written with utopian goals in mind and are meant to define a long-term vision. One participant suggested that Hamas is an example of a pragmatic movement that adapts its policies and ideas according to changing realities. Islamic movements worldwide face harsh persecution and suppression, which sometimes forces them to downplay the religious aspect of their ideology. Hamas, for instance, attempted to engage with the Palestinian Authority and even integrate into the Oslo process, despite its opposition to the process itself. While pragmatism does not necessarily indicate an ideological shift, it can reflect a desire to integrate and alter the broader reality over time. This, one participant argued, is evident in Hamas’ 2017 document, which redefined the conflict in a much more nationalist and less Islamist framework. However, other participants rejected this interpretation.

It was also argued in the discussion that it is a mistake to categorize Hamas as part of the Muslim Brotherhood camp. While Palestinian nationalism has certainly played a role in Hamas’ ideology (similar to other Muslim Brotherhood movements in the region), its orientation is much closer to that of jihadist movements. In contrast, one participant argued that after the fall of former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, Hamas largely abandoned its Islamic identity in favor of a more distinctly Palestinian focus.

Another issue discussed was the need to reassess the Sunni-Shiite rift as a primary factor shaping the region. For example, the Houthis are not a typical Shiite group—they exhibit characteristics reminiscent of Sunni jihadist movements, including a strong emphasis on Palestine as a religious cause, not just a nationalist one. Turkey’s actions since the onset of the war also align more closely with the Shiite axis than one might expect, challenging the assumption that the Shiite-Sunni rift is a dominant force in shaping regional dynamics.

Policy Recommendations

The participants in the discussion noted that struggles with ideological movements can persist for many years. As a result, Israel must continue to defend itself until a hoped-for ideological shift occurs. This does not mean that diverse forms of action should not or cannot be taken against ideological actors, but it is important to recognize the limitations of arrangements with them. In the meanwhile, Israel should engage with alternative actors, such as the Palestinian Authority, as this could help weaken Hamas.

Some participants argued that recognizing the importance of ideology requires urgent action, given the threats posed by Islamist actors, while also striving to eliminate the military capabilities of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The Iranian ideological vision of destroying Israel should not be underestimated, even if it may not be on the immediate or short-term agenda. To this end, Israel should take advantage of the current opportunity and the rapidly changing dynamics in the region by pursuing both military and political measures in Lebanon and in the Palestinian arena.

However, other participants cautioned that it is too early to draw definitive operational conclusions from the October 7 attack and the subsequent multi-front campaign, given the insufficient understanding of the events and developments of the past year. Moreover, Israel cannot afford to focus solely on the intentions of its adversaries without a sober assessment of their capabilities. Failing to do so could lead to unchecked defense spending, which could impose an untenable economic and social toll.

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[1] The author wishes to thank Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss and Revital Yerushalmi for their assistance in organizing, managing, and notating the meeting.