Strategic Assessment

This article surveys the literature written about these interventions with a view to understand the shift in the Middle East regional powers’ responses to the post-Arab Spring conflicts. Because this literature review is primarily concerned with events that occurred in the second half of the decade, most of the studies cited were written after 2015. Also, a significant proportion of the scholars whose studies are presented are Middle East experts (or those of Middle Eastern descent). The central question that this literature examines is what motivated these regional powers to intervene militarily in post-Arab Spring intra-state conflicts. While some of this literature still regards the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and especially the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as the main driver of these interventions, other studies suggest that the overarching motivation of these interventions was the rise of the Turkey-Qatar pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp, which changed the nature of the hitherto dyadic conflict to a tri-polar rivalry. Specifically, the rise of another power within the Sunni camp threatened the identities of the ostensible leaders of this camp, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), thus driving them to intensify their military involvements in regional conflicts. This new pole also competes with Iran for influence in Syria and Iraq. However, since this development did not compromise Iran’s identity, the Islamic Republic did not engage in any significant military intervention during the second half of the decade and relied mainly on proxy units to preserve its vital spheres of influence. 

Most of the literature on the Arab Spring, especially what addresses the intervention phenomenon, refers to the Sunni-Shiite conflict as the main fault line in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. Indeed, during the first half of the decade, most of the regional rivalry revolved around this cleavage.

The Sunni-Shia Dyad

Most of the literature on the Arab Spring, especially what addresses the intervention phenomenon, refers to the Sunni-Shiite conflict as the main fault line in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. Indeed, during the first half of the decade, most of the regional rivalry revolved around this cleavage, a rivalry dubbed by Gause (2017) as the “New Middle Eastern Cold War.” Gause argued that the outbreak of the new Cold War was not sparked by the Arab Spring, but rather Iran’s decision, in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to embark on a mission to expand its sphere of influence by exporting its revolutionary doctrine to the region. In fact, in the 1980s the Iranian regime established two bureaucratic institutions designed to implement this goal: the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and the Bureau of World Liberation Movements (which was closed in 1985). During the 1980s and 1990s, Iran sponsored various Shiite movements that rebelled against their Sunni regimes (Hunter, 1988; Kepel, 2000/2002; Matthiesen, 2010). This activity threatened Saudi Arabia’s position in the Muslim world, which was intended by the kingdom to advance its foreign policy goals and agendas (Kamrava, 2018). Hence, Saudi Arabia sought to balance, contain, and even roll back the Iranian influence in the Middle East. The most notable manifestation of Saudi Arabia’s containment policy was the establishment in May 1981 of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which included all six Arab Gulf monarchies (Chubin, 1992; Kechichian, 1985).

The  United States 2003 invasion of Iraq escalated the tension between the two regional powers and, according to Nasr (2016), “created the most significant clash between regional rivals in decades.” This trend was further exacerbated as a result of the Arab Spring, since the popular turbulence and their subsequent conflicts weakened some of the Sunni regimes, thus providing the ayatollahs with the opportunity to advance their regional influence. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Saudi Arabia and Iran carried out the only two significant military interventions from 2010 to 2015.

Iran perceived the success of the Sunni-led struggle against Bashar al-Assad’s minority rule in Syria as an intolerable threat.

Consider the Saudi intervention in Bahrain: on March 14, 2011, 1,200 troops from Saudi Arabia and 800 police officers from the UAE (the Peninsula Shield Forces) entered the island kingdom to suppress a mostly Shiite uprising against the Sunni regime before it could start a Shiite domino effect in the Gulf (Louër, 2013). Clearly, Saudi Arabia immediately perceived the Bahraini uprising of 2011 as an intolerable threat. First, as a conservative, status quo state, Saudi Arabia objects to any regime change in its immediate vicinity, especially one triggered by a popular uprising. Second, as Nuruzzaman (2013) noted, if the Shiite protesters in Bahrain would have gained any political power, the outcome might have encouraged the Shiite populations in other Gulf countries to use the same methods to challenge their regimes. 1 Bahrain is located near the Saudi al-Qatif district, home to most of the Shiite population in Saudi Arabia. Finally, the “Bahraini Spring” also threatened Saudi Arabia’s regional interests, since a Shiite-dominated government in Manama would have probably formed cordial ties with Iran, thus providing Tehran a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and compromising Riyadh’s plan of a GCC boycott of the Islamic Republic. Hence, a combination of sectarian, geopolitical, and regime security considerations drove Saudi Arabia to intervene in Bahrain.

In a similar vein, Iran perceived the success of the Sunni-led struggle against Bashar al-Assad’s minority rule in Syria as an intolerable threat. Although the ruling sect in Syria is Alawite, a faction that disengaged from Shia Islam in the 10^th century and developed the characteristics of an independent religion, Syria is an inseparable part of the Iranian-led (mostly) Shiite camp. According to Wastnidge (2017), "For Iran, Syria is a vital cog in its wider regional aims" (p. 154). Therefore, when the Assad regime was in immediate danger, Tehran was quick to intervene militarily on its behalf, first through Hezbollah in 2011, and in 2013 with its own army (Rafizadeh, 2016). 

The motives for these first generation post-Arab Spring military interventions were straightforward—a sectarian rivalry combined with geopolitical/Cold War considerations of power and spheres of influence, i.e., Iran’s attempts to expand and maintain its influence and Saudi Arabia’s efforts to contain and even weaken it—and the literature addresses them as such. But these considerations cannot account for the “new generation” of military interventions, which became more numerous and extensive as the decade progressed. Since a significant part of the literature still looks at the Middle East conflicts through the Sunni-Shiite prism, it does not acknowledge how the emergence of a new force, a Turkey-Qatar pro-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) camp, affected some of the states’ perceptions. In fact, the formation of this new pole within the hitherto Sunni camp caused other members in it, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to further protect their identity, thus pushing them to increase their military involvement in regional conflicts.

Inner Sunni Rivalry

Some scholars have argued that the last intervention carried out as part of the Sunni-Shiite dyadic power struggle was the March 2015 Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war (Operation Decisive Storm). That intervention came after the Houthis, or Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), a Shiite rebel organization, occupied Saana, the Yemeni capital (Ardemagni, 2017; Fisher, 2016; Salisbury, 2015; Zachariah, 2019). However, the claim ignores the extent of the ties between the Yemeni Shiite organization and Tehran. Indeed, Iran's support for Houthis is significantly lower than the support given to Hezbollah and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, and the Yemeni organization shows much more independence than its Lebanese and Iraqi counterparts. For example, it carried out its initial attack on Sanaa even though Iran advised it to refrain from doing so (Juneau, 2016). In addition, even though both Iran and the Houthis are Shiites, the Zaydi Islam professed by the Yemeni group is significantly different from Iran’s Twelver Shiism (Hokayem & Roberts 2016).

In light of such considerations, Darwich (2018) offers an alternative explanation for the Saudi intervention, and contends that portraying the Yemeni conflict as a proxy sectarian conflict is misleading. Rather, the intervention is best understood when examined in the framework of the Saudi struggle to assert its status as a regional power in the Middle East. Specifically, Riyadh aspired to preserve its status as the leader of the Sunni camp, after this status was challenged by the more aggressive pro-MB regional policy of Turkey and Qatar. As Salloukh (2015) noted, the MB’s populist brand of political participation threatens the tradition of political quietism and absolute obedience to the ruler—the anchor of the stability of the Saudi monarchy. El-Sherif (2014) concurred with this assertion and added that this threat became more acute following the election of MB-affiliated Mohamed Morsi as Egyptian president in 2012, since it could have triggered a potential domino effect. King Abdullah of Jordan, who in 2004 warned about the emergence of an ideological Shiite crescent from Beirut to the Persian Gulf, pointed in March 2013 to the emergence of “a Muslim Brotherhood crescent developing in Egypt and Turkey” (Goldberg, 2013).

As Akpınar (2015) noted, since assuming power in 2013, Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani aspired to boost his state’s regional role and thus adopted a proactive foreign policy. Hazbun (2018) added that Qatar used its previous ties with MB groups in the region in order to enhance its regional position. Hence, since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Qatar supported and financed MB-affiliated organizations throughout the Middle East. But this independent and sometimes daring foreign policy soon put Qatar on a collision course with Riyadh. This was reflected already during these states’ limited involvement in the Syrian civil war. As Blanga (2017) wrote, “The Saudis’ unwillingness to support the MB and organizations with a similar ideology became the nub of the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Whereas the Saudis saw the Brotherhood as a radical and dangerous rising Islamic force, Qatar sought an alliance with the organization as a way for Doha to become a significant player in the Middle East—at Riyadh’s expense.” This strain culminated on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, alongside other Sunni states, severed their diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar and imposed a land, air, and naval blockade (Khashan, 2018).

Turkey’s New Approach 

Similar to Qatar, Turkey also adopted an aggressive foreign policy in the years following the Arab Spring. As Elhusseini (2018) argued, the post-Arab Spring regional developments caused Turkey to redefine its relationship with the region. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014, declared Turkey’s new approach to the region in April 2012 as follows: “A new Middle East is being born. We will continue to be the patron, pioneer, and servant of this new Middle East” (Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2016). In fact, Walker recognized Davutoglu’s new approach already in 2011 when he wrote, "Davutoğlu argues that Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a 'Muslim superpower'” (Walker, 2011).

This change notwithstanding, Turkey’s initial involvement in post-Arab Spring conflicts was quite limited, and amounted to permitting the Syrian opposition to operate in its territory, providing material assistance to rebel organizations, and allowing them to enter Syria via the common border of these two countries (Cartalucci, 2015; Gunter, 2015; Phillips, 2016; Pamuk & Tattersall, 2015). But this limited involvement came to an end in August 2016, when the Syrian Kurds were about to achieve territorial contiguity alongside the Syrian-Turkish border, leading Turkey to invade Syria in Operation Euphrates Shield (Dalay, 2016). This operation proved to be the turning point of Turkey’s regional policy, for even after the realization of Kurdish territorial contiguity was no longer feasible, Turkey did not stop its military intervention in Syria. Some scholars even connected this interventionist policy to the Turkish regime’s domestic predicaments, and especially to the failed coup d'état against the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2016 (Altunışık, 2020; Kösebalaban, 2020; MacGillivray, 2020). That is, this proactive foreign policy, designed to return Turkey to its “natural place” in the region, was also intended to weaken or even eliminate the growing opposition to Erdogan's longstanding rule. Hence, throughout 2018-2019, Turkey conducted two large-scale ground operations in Syria (Operation Olive Branch and Operation Peace Spring), involving tens of thousands of its troops, as well as thousands of other Sunni militia fighters under its command. Most of them are MB-affiliated or adhere to a similar ideology of this Islamic organization (Enab Baladi, 2019; Hinnebusch, 2020). 

Syria was not the only arena for Turkish post-Arab Spring military activity. Erdogan also supports the Tripoli-based Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), against the anti-Islamist commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, who occupied East Libya. In November 2019, Turkey and the GNA signed agreements for military cooperation and delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction; and in January 2020, Turkish-backed forces, which comprise primarily Syrian mercenaries transferred to Libya by the Turkish navy and air force, in addition to Turkish drones, began to fight alongside the GNA forces. Sahinkaya (2020) noted that Turkey also assisted the Justice and Construction Party, a Libyan Islamist group with close ties to Egypt’s MB, to gain a foothold in the GNA. Similarly, Yaşar Yakış, former Turkish foreign minister and a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party, said in June 2020 that Turkey supports MB elements in Libya (“Former Turkish Foreign Minister,” 2020). 

Turkey’s behavior in Libya is consistent with the support it provided to Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. In addition, after the Saudi and Emirati-backed Egyptian army ousted Morsi in 2013, Turkey increased its support for the MB and related Islamist groups in the region. Hence, various scholars (Helal, 2020; MacGillivray, 2020; Quamar, 2020; Zoubir, 2020) pointed out that Erdogan’s support for the GNA is part of a wider scheme aimed at realizing his regional ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey’s growing assertiveness ultimately changed the nature of its relations with Saudi Arabia, as is evident from Saudi Arabia's limited involvement in the Syrian civil war. Early in the Syrian conflict, Saudi Arabia provided financial and material assistance to Sunni organizations fighting Assad, including those holding Salafist and even jihadist ideologies (Blanga, 2017). However, in mid-2018, Saudi Arabia established communication with the Kurdish Syrian militia People's Protection Units (YPG), and even pledged to contribute $100 million for the benefit of the American mission in the YPG-controlled Northeast Syria. Başkan (2019) argued that this kind of development was implausible early in the decade, when Turkey-Saudi Arabia relations were at their historic highs. But in the intervening years Turkey lent its support to Mohamed Morsi. Başkan found that this support given by Ankara to the MB regime in Egypt constituted a watershed in Turkey-Saudi relations. Another important phase in the deterioration of these relations was Turkey’s decision to support Qatar in the June 2017 crisis. 

For the UAE, the main perceived threat to its national security is the Muslim Brotherhood.

Therefore, the Saudi intervention in Yemen can be better understood by examining it not through the limited prism of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, but in the context of the threat it posed to Saudi Arabia’s identity as a regional power. Saudi Arabia’s regional policy suffered several setbacks during the first half of the previous decade: Iraq became increasingly close to the Iranian camp; the so-called moderate opposition to Assad’s rule in Syria became more identified with Ankara than with Riyadh; and Qatar constantly challenged its leadership of the GCC. The combination of all these events posed an intolerable threat to Saudi Arabia’s identity as a regional power; hence the kingdom’s decision makers felt that the fall of Yemen in the hands of an anti-Saudi organization was one failure too many.

UAE: Threat Perceptions and Increasing Involvement

Saudi Arabia was not the only Gulf monarchy to escalate its involvement in regional conflicts following the rise of the Qatari-Turkish camp. Another country that has become more aggressive in its behavior towards regional conflicts in the last five years is the UAE, which since 2015 has intervened militarily in both Yemen and remote Libya. According to Ragab (2017), for the UAE, the main perceived threat to its national security is the MB. The head of the Dubai police also stated in January 2012 that “the MB threat to Gulf security is equivalent in importance to the Iranian threat” (p. 41). Indeed, the UAE is a conservative, status quo state, and as such perceives the advancement of political Islam, which offers a vision of an ideal regime that is fairly inconsistent with Abu Dhabi’s attempts to preserve the region’s traditional values, i.e., its traditional authoritarian rule, as a threat to its identity (al-Zo’by & Başkan, 2015; Fenton-Harvey, 2020; Ryan, 2015). UAE’s de facto ruler, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed, is also particularly worried about the popularity of the local MB-affiliated party, al-Islah. During a meeting with a US diplomat in 2006, bin Zayed was recorded saying: “If there were an election [in the UAE] tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over” (Davidson, 2013, p . 14).

Hence, one of the reasons that drove the UAE to intervene in Yemen was to prevent the Yemeni MB party (al-Islah) from gaining too much power. For this reason, most of the UAE operations in Yemen were concentrated in the predominantly Sunni south and not in the Houthi-controlled north. The UAE is also the main supporter of the Aden-based Southern Transitional Council (STC), a 26-member council formed in 2016, which often expresses hostile attitudes towards al-Islah (Faulconbridge, 2019).

The UAE also supported the commander of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, and conducted numerous airstrikes against his opponents, the Turkish-backed GNA. In fact, the alliance between the anti-Islamist Haftar and the UAE preceded the Turkish military intervention in Libya. The UAE was particularly worried about the support given by Qatar to Islamist forces in Libya since the ousting in 2011of Libya’s strongman, Muammar Qaddafi. Those Islamist militias used the Qatari support, which included arms and money supply, in order to achieve significant gains on the field. Fearing that this trend would lead to a domino effect that will influence its Egyptian ally, Emirati aircraft started in August 2014 to bomb sites in Tripoli held by those militias (McGregor, 2014). The Turkish intervention in Libya further aggravated the Emirati threat perception, causing it to intensify its air campaign against the GNA, and even, according to Bakeer (2020), to pressure Egypt to send its army to Libya to fight alongside the LNA. 

While the “first generation” interventions—Saudi Arabia in Bahrain and Iran in Syria—were driven by an acute necessity due to what was perceived as an immediate threat to the state’s security, the “new generation” interventions are more related to these states’ identity, following the rise of another pole within the Sunni camp.

In light of these developments, Shalash (2020) said that the hostility of the UAE-Saudi-led coalition toward the MB is one of the most prominent features of the post-Arab Spring era. Ragab (2017) adds that “five years after the ‘Arab Spring’ swept through the Arab region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the most active players in the region. They are no longer concerned only with avoiding the wave of changes triggered by the Spring, but now pursue an active interventionist foreign policy in some Arab countries that they perceive as a threat to their national security and their role in the region. The increasing activism in Saudi and Emirati regional policies is no longer based on money and diplomacy alone, as it used to be, but also on military means” (pp. 40-41).

Conclusion 

It seems that the change that has taken place in the scope and nature of the military interventions of Middle East regional powers in the post-Arab Spring conflicts during the last decade indicates the change in the threat perception of these actors. While the “first generation” interventions—Saudi Arabia in Bahrain and Iran in Syria—were driven by an acute necessity due to what was perceived as an immediate threat to the state’s security, the “new generation” interventions are more related to these states’ identity, following the rise of another pole within the Sunni camp.

As long as the Sunni-Shiite struggle dominated the Middle East arena, Iran and Saudi Arabia were ready to take the immense risk inherent in a military intervention in an intra-state conflict only when there was an imminent danger to a state perceived as an essential sphere of influence. However, identity perceptions are more subjective and fluid by nature. For this reason, the transformation from a Sunni-Shiite dyadic conflict to a tri-polar rivalry, and especially the polarization of the hitherto Sunni camp, has caused the three main actors of this camp—Turkey on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other—to further define and protect their identity, in part by increasing their military involvements in the region’s intra-state conflicts.

However, this interventionist policy of the three Sunni powers stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the other pole of this struggle, Shiite Iran, which, since 2015, relies less on its own forces, and more on proxy units. The identity explanation can also account for this variation. The inner Sunni struggle does not compromise Iran’s identity as the leader of its camp, and thus did not affect its regional behavior. Hence, Iran’s perception of the region did not fundamentally alter since the beginning of the decade: Tehran’s main concern is still to maintain and bolster its vital spheres of influence. Since the stabilization of the Assad regime, there is no real danger to any of the regimes Iran perceives as its allies (or proxies). Hence, Iran feels no urgent need to use its own forces and uses proxy units in order to preserve the status quo in these states.

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