Strategic Assessment

Keywords: resilience, urban resilience, emergency, Tel Aviv, mass disasters

Theoretical
Introduction

In the contemporary urban environment, the relationship between the
environment and its inhabitants is mediated by socio-technical networks
composed of infrastructure, information, and institutions (Portugali, 2012).
The essential function of the urban system under the official responsibility of
the local authority is defined by Da Silva, Kernaghan, & Luque (2012) as
support for the wellbeing of a city's residents. The local authority is meant
to furnish this support by providing basic services that are grounded in a sense
of belonging, social cohesion, and freedom of choice and action (Alcamo et al.,
2003).

Routine management of the urban systems also dictates the role of the local authority in an emergency,[1] which at that time becomes more significant, both because it is the main governmental entity in the theater where the event takes place and because it is more accessible to the population and the local economy than any other authority. The local authority will therefore usually be involved in the initial response to a mass disruption or to any other kind of emergency (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008; Alexander, 2005; McLoughlin, 1985; McEntire, 2007; Eriksson, 2010).

Even though government bodies are commonly involved in severe emergencies,
in many places around the world the local authorities are also active in
varying degrees. Responsibility is not confined to actions during an emergency
situation; it also extends to the preliminary stages of preparation for it, and
to the subsequent stage of recovery (Murphy, 2007; Eriksson, 2010). For this
reason, broad reference to the role of the municipalities can be found in the
literature dealing with disaster management in the domains of planning, risk reduction,
mitigation, and promotion of effectiveness of the systems providing services to
the city (Huq, Kovats, Reid, & Satterthwaite, 2007; Da Silva et al., 2012;
Bulkeley, 2011; Jabareen, 2013).

One common assertion in the literature is that the key role of the
local authority in the initial response mandates ongoing preliminary action on
its part to enhance preparedness for extreme disruptions. “Preparedness” is
defined as the array of actions before an emergency in order to prevent the
event or limit the damage and losses it might cause (Cutter et al., 2008). This
preparedness refers to the set of tools needed for the purpose of coping with the
emergency and for the development of strategies that further the components of
organizational and public resilience.

“Resilience,” a leading term in the professional literature on disaster management, refers to the capacity of any system, such as a municipal system, to face a severe disruption or disaster and the consequences that challenge its functional continuity, recover from it quickly, and return to the original level of conduct (bouncing back), or to a higher level of operation (bouncing forward), following systemic processes of organization and learning. Flexibility is a critical element in this process

It is important to take into account the magnitude of the disruption and the extent of the damage caused, as well as the level of preparedness for an emergency, as these are significant factors affecting the level of resilience (Padan & Elran, 2018).

There are many different approaches and models for implementing the
resilience concept in an urban system. Among these, the engineering, the evolutionary,
the ecological, and other approaches are discussed at length. For example,
according to the engineering approach, it is possible to prepare for physical
threats, handle them, and overcome them through advance planning (Coaffee,
2013). According to the evolutionary approach, areas of damage cannot be
analyzed separately and neutrally, and must be seen as complex and connected
socio-spatial systems (Davoudi & Porter, 2012). Some of the resilience experts
adopt an expanded approach. This entails a holistic handling of a city's
social, economic, and infrastructure components, not necessarily in the context
of deliberately promoting preparation for an emergency, but as part of a basic
concept designed to generate growth that can also support society in the case of
an emergency. Others adopt an intermediate approach that focuses on preliminary
public investment in organizational, infrastructure, and social aspects as
fundamental elements in advancing the preparedness for a relevant emergency. In
contrast, others prefer the functional approach, which focuses mainly on preparing
tools that will facilitate proper management of the system during and following
an emergency. The leading principles of the three approaches are recognized in
the research literature, and share a common denominator (Desurbs, 2014).

According to a comprehensive UN document, urban resilience can be
defined as "the measurable ability of any urban system, with its
inhabitants, to maintain [functional] continuity through all shocks and
stresses, while positively adapting and transforming toward sustainability" (UN-Habitat, 2018). Another definition is offered
by the 100 Resilient Cities supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, which defines
urban resilience as "the capacity of individuals, communities,
institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow
no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience” (100
Resilient Cities).

The perception of the city as a system is prominent in the literature
dealing with urban resilience (Hatuka, Rosen-Zvi, Birnhack, Toch, & Zur, 2018).
The distinction between the local authority and its organs and other bodies
operating in the city, such as the local communities, the business sector, and
civil societies, is not always clear. In many cases, when the focus of interest
is on local governance, researchers focus on the necessary connection between
various sectors as an element that furthers urban resilience (Murphy, 2007). In
this context, the necessary connection between the municipal management and
local initiatives reflects different aspects of emergency management, which is
designed to generate the systemic whole. The difficulty in creating a clear
distinction between these two levels¾the providers and the receivers of services¾results
from the city being a complex system containing sub-systems with dynamic and
evolving reciprocal relations between them. In emergencies, it becomes even more
difficult to isolate the way each sub-system handles the consequences of the
emergency.

The resilient city approach emerged from the ecological approach,
which also perceives the city as a system that must deal with threats and
risks, and as such, the need of people and communities to adapt to crises
(Murphy, 2007). This assertion is linked to the notion of the "risk
society" presented by Ulrich Beck, who characterizes the current period as
a "second modernity," in which we no longer deal only with physical natural
risks but also with human induced hazards, which are impossible to predict.
While the likelihood of some of these risks will materialize is relatively low,
their consequences are highly destructive. Examples of risks listed by Beck are
terrorism, nuclear weapons, and global warming (Beck, 2009). This might pose
challenges at several levels: from the spatial perspective, it obliges society
to ensure urban planning, which plays a key role in making cities more
resilient, by designing both the physical environment through forecasting and
anticipating risks and uncertainties, and by ways of coping with them
(Jabareen, 2013). From the physical perspective, resilient cities are perceived
as ecosystems that further flexibility and adaptability (Pickett, Cadenaso, &
Grove, 2004). According to this concept, man-made or natural risks must be
taken into consideration in developing physical systems and infrastructure
(Godschalk, 2003), including through resilience-oriented planning. From a social
perspective, the resilience concept represents a change in the division of
responsibility for crisis management: although the central and local
governments are still considered key players in building resilient communities,
the resilient city approach supports decentralization of authority, and demands
that the community rely on itself (Beck, 2009). In this framework, the
contribution of social capital to societal resilience is critical, particularly
elements such as trust, social cohesion, volunteering, and inclusive leadership
(Paton, 2008). Inclusive leadership assigns its highest priority to the
interests of the lead sectors (Randel et al., 2018). Finally, it is commonly suggested
that communities with a great deal of social capital are also resilient, which
enables them to handle severe disruptions better and subsequently to bounce
back more quickly (Aldrich, 2012).

In order to enhance urban resilience, the literature commonly proposes
principal organizational elements. The most important treat the emergency as
part of the agenda of the decision makers and ensure that planning processes
for an emergency are part of the organizational routine, while maintaining constant
learning processes on emergency. Part of this entails developing new capabilities
for flexible handing of new and unknown crises (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). At
an individual level, the literature also proposes:

1. Active and inclusive urban management of the disruption, based on accurate assessments and readiness to initiate and take responsive actions (Stewart, Kolluru, & Smith, 2009).
2. Quick monitoringand identification of the risks and the vulnerable groups, granting priority to the disadvantaged on the one hand, and to interventions designed to reduce vulnerability of the public, infrastructure, and urban assets on the other hand (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008).
3. Development of communication systems for transmitting information and warning messages before, during, and after the disruption; taking action to reduce damage and to enhance public benefit, such as providing aid and carrying out rapid mass evacuation if necessary (Tanner et al., 2009), while maintaining the residents' trust in the municipality and the transmitters of the information (Comfort & Zagorecki, 2003).
4. Redundancy: Construction and maintenance of parallel systems capable of providing services and facilitating service continuity in the event of damage to one of the systems. Redundancy will not be confined to the physical domain, but will also extend to the social systems and response mechanisms (Bruneau et al., 2003).

Based on this theoretical background, the main questions of this
article are how the complex urban systems in Israel deal with severe man-made
disruptions¾various types of war and terrorism¾and what is and should be the role of resilience in managing such dire
situations. These questions will be considered here through an analysis of
urban resilience in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, with reference to historical, conceptual,
and organizational aspects.

The Israeli
Case: Resilience in Face of a Severe Security Disruption in the Urban Domain

The
Security Context

The urban population in Israel constitutes 92 percent of the total
population, among the highest rates in the world. More than a third of Israel's
population lives in the country's ten largest cities. Israel has four major metropolitan
areas, which together are home to over 60 percent of its population. A third of
Israel's population lives in the greater Tel Aviv metropolis alone.

This picture has clear security significance, given the security-related
scenarios regarding the "strike on urban space" by high-trajectory
weapons (Elran & Padan, 2017; Laish & Amir, 2012). The main new feature
in this scenario lies in the qualitative component introduced by the precision-guided
missiles, which enable the adversary to switch from its previous strategy of
harassment, based primarily on unguided weaponry, to a strategy of severe disruption,
based on targeting military and civilian quality targets. The Home Front
Command referred to this change by stating that the new capabilities "have
led to the development of a concept by which fire will not be used merely for the
purposes of terrorism and intimidation, but also in order to paralyze the
home front" (emphasis added) (Yadai, 2019).

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah spoke of his intentions
in a forthcoming conflict with Israel in an interview with the Lebanese
television station al-Manar, when he stated, "We can attack
northern Israel…but most important is the Israeli coastal plain…from Netanya
to Ashdod. First, a large part of Israel's population is in this region…all
of the country's centers are in it¾the army command, government offices…Instead of wasting the
missiles on the north, we will go for thisregion" (Salami,
2019, emphasis added). Presumably the Tel Aviv area will have high priority in
this context. In previous conflicts, Hezbollah lacked long range ammunition to
reach Tel Aviv, while Hamas did target the city in 2012 as part of its attack
against Israel (Operation Pillar of Defense), in 2014 (Operation Protective
Edge), and in March 2019, by launching unguided rockets that in recent years
have been intercepted with great success by the Iron Dome system. Thus far,
Israel's adversaries have not made use of precision-guided missiles; Hezbollah still
possesses only small quantities of such weaponry. It apparently possesses several
hundred non-precision rockets with a range extending to central Israel and
warheads with 600-1200 pounds. Israel has regarded this threat by Hezbollah and
Hamas to the home front as its main immediate security challenge since the
Second Lebanon War, which caused large scale civilian paralysis in the northern
part of Israel.

Israel's security concept, which developed during this period, was
designed to create the conceptual framework for dealing militarily with the
developing military challenge (Dekel & Orion, 2016). This was strongly reflected
in the two versions of the IDF Strategy published by the IDF General
Staff, headed by then-Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, in August 2015 and April
2018. These defining documents conceptually address the necessary responses to these
threats against Israel (Elran et al., 2016), but they focus primarily on the
military aspects, and far less on the means of defense. They do not provide the
required response to the civilian challenges (Elran & Padan, 2019).

The Home
Front Response to a Security Disruption

The Israeli conceptual response to the threats against the home front
is mainly military, comprising three interlocking components. The first is deterrence,
designed to postpone the next expected military disruption by instituting and
maintaining the adversaries’ awareness that they had better refrain from launching
an attack on the home front. The second is quick and lethal offense based on
ground maneuvering and large scale use of precision fire, aimed at a decisive Israeli
victory that will renew and enhance deterrence. The third is defense of the
home front elements through advanced physical means, primarily the three-layer active
defense system designed to safeguard both the IDF bases essential for conducting
the offensive, the critical national infrastructure designed to ensure
operational continuity in an emergency, and densely populated areas (in that
order) (Elran, 2016). As stated in the minutes of the Knesset Subcommittee for
the Examination of Home Front Preparedness on May 15, 2018 regarding the local
authorities in emergency scenarios, the government has established a plan for sheltering
105 critical infrastructure facilities, 50 of them in the first stage. As of
now, this process has been completed for 10 facilities, and another 19 are in
the advanced planning stages.

The Israeli approach to the response regarding threats to the home
front is questionable on two counts. The first, based on Israel's experience in
the four recent conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas, questions the likelihood
of the assumption (or the hope) on which the concept is based¾that Israel
can indeed achieve a quick victory against its adversaries. As to the critical
question on the duration of a future conflict, the relation between the ability
to achieve a quick victory and the fortitude of the civilian home front is
clear. We have witnessed predictions of a short war that were proven false: the
Second Lebanon War lasted 33 days; Operation Protective Edge against Hamas
continued for 51 days.

The other question concerns the IDF's investment in the order of
battle of the Iron Dome air defense batteries¾to what extent will it be a sufficient
response for protecting densely populated areas. Thus, Maj. Gen. Yoel Strick,
on the occasion of his departure as Home Front commander in February 2017, suggested
in an interview with Yoav Limor (Limor, 2017) that "we won’t be able to
intercept everything that is launched against us. Many more rockets will hit
the ground than before. This means that the idea that you have a dome on your
head that hermetically protects and covers you, and isolates the home front,
has to change." In these circumstances, despite the goal to conclude the next
round of conflict quickly, and despite the excellent capacities of Iron Dome,
the other side will likely try to challenge this paradigm with its own
capabilities, thus prolonging the hostilities, with broad damage to the home
front.

Of particular interest in this context are remarks by the current head
of the Home Front Command, Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai: "There is a gap between
the threat and the way we are currently organized in the context of the battle
front and the home front…Therefore, more than ever, the IDF's performance and
achievements depend to a large extent on Israel's operational continuity, and
vice versa…The ability of the civilian front to cope with emergencies has a
direct and important impact on Israeli deterrence(Yadai, 2019, emphasis
added). This is a wakeup call for understanding the connection in the current defense context between the
military front and the home front, because the longer the duration of the
hostilities beyond what is expected, and the difficulty perforce in achieving a
quick military victory, the greater will be the challenge to the home front. At
the same time, difficulty and broad restriction of the operational continuity
and resilience of the home front are liable to affect the IDF's ability to
achieve the expected/hoped for victory. The problem is that the home front's
readiness for a large scale conflict is insufficient for the challenges
expected in future conflicts. As Strick said, "On the whole, the state of
home front preparedness is more than a glass half full, but it has to be clear:
the next war will be an experience of a different and very challenging kind,
with substantial operational disruptions." What is involved here is a very
complex non-linear fabric of civilians, individuals, and communities, some of
them disadvantaged, with first response organs, local authorities, civil societies,
the national economy, and the relevant government ministries. In an emergency,
these systems are supposed to depend on and prepare with the Home Front
Command, the National Emergency Management Authority, Israel Police, and other
organizations. The introduction of precision-guided missiles to the arsenal of
Hezbollah (and Hamas?) is liable to prove a game-changer for the defense of the
home front, as suggested by the current commander of the HFC: "Targeting barrages
of projectiles together with precision-guided capacities of the adversary are
expected to enable it to systematically and deliberately challenge and
penetrate our air defense layers and reach quality targets with accurate missiles."
Such capability enables the enemy "to think about ideas such as 'closure,'
'curfew,' and 'economic paralysis' in Israel…in order to disrupt civilian and
military operational continuity and negatively affect the mindset, thus disrupting
the resilience of Israeli society in the long term" (Yadai, 2019).

The City as
a "Basic Building Block" in a Security Emergency

The HFC leadership is well aware that defending the home front in a
future large-scale conflict is a difficult task. The challenge consists of simultaneous
local disruptions in a large number of locations, which makes it very difficult
to provide the necessary rapid and quality response. Over the years, the HFC has
devised a well-ordered doctrine regarding home front defense, to include
provisions for what must be done by whom in order to implement the approach. However,
in this context it is understood that one of the main obstacles to preparation
for a vast emergency on the home front is the absence of legislation in Israel addressing
the central question of responsibility and accountability in the sphere of emergency
management (Elran & Altshuler, 2012; 2013). In this context, Yadai writes
that "the separation between the agencies preparing for earthquakes and
those preparing the forces to operate in an emergency will create total
chaos" (Yadai, 2018). In this legal and bureaucratic void, as stated in HFC
documents as early as 2008,

The local authority, in military terms,
is the “basic unit” whose functioning and support are of supreme importance in
an emergency…in order to enable it to function independently and effectively in
an emergency. The expectation from the local authority is to function even in
the most severe circumstances, while providing a response to the great and
small distresses liable to occur. The local leadership is expected to
demonstrate fortitude (i.e., the ability to manage the crisis in a competent
way while limiting damage to facilitate rapid recovery), determination,
patience, and imagination in finding adequate solutions for people whose daily
routine has been disrupted (Home Front Command, 2008).

This raises the question of what it means to expect the local
authority to function independently and effectively in an emergency. The official
answer relies on a number of sources: the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry
of Defense, the HFC, the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), and
the Center of Local Authorities in Israel.

1. A 2009 HFC document states that "the main purpose of the local authority in an emergency is to maintain the emergency routine for its residents, while serving as the main interface between the population and all of the state agencies operating in its territory" (Home Front Command, 2009).
2. In a 2010 document, NEMA states that "the local authority constitutes a governing body that provides services and products to its residents in order to maintain an orderly fabric of life…while the head of the local authority…is responsible to the residents in ordinary times and in an emergency…continuously, as in the transformation from routine to an emergency" (NEMA, 2010, p. 86).
3. A 2013 HFC document suggests that "the local authority is responsible for making all of the preparations necessary to ensure its proper operation in an emergency, and to guarantee essential services for its residents in an emergency. It is also responsible for issuing orders that will ensure that individuals and the community are prepared" (including issues of protection and shelters) (Home Front Command, 2013, p. 7).
4. A 2017 document of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defense (NEMA) asserts that "the local authority is the basic building block in providing a response in an emergency…the HFC is responsible for preparing the local authority for an emergency, without derogating from the responsibility of other government ministries…[while] in peaceful times, the HFC, in cooperation with NEMA, provides the local authorities with a reference scenario, on whose basis the local authority devises a plan for preparing for an emergency" (Prime Minister's Office round table, 2017).

These guidelines indicate that the local authority has ostensibly been assigned a key role in preparing for an emergency, managing it, and conducting the subsequent necessary reconstruction and recovery. At the same time, the guidelines listed above do not stipulate in binding fashion what is the local authority's responsibility and what are the legal obligations of the head of the local authority in an emergency (not just a security-related emergency). The difficulty in implementing these definitions becomes greater, not only because the 257 different municipalities, local councils, and regional councils in Israel differ greatly from each other, but also because there are major differences within each of the local governing systems. There are major differences between the large municipalities and the small and medium-sized ones, between strong and weak local authorities, between Jewish and Arab local authorities, and between the sense of independence and functional autonomy of each local authority head. In any case, an indication of the dismal state of the local authorities in an emergency is the lack of a national long range plan for ensuring the preparedness of the local authorities for an emergency, as stated by the HFC commander to the Knesset Subcommittee for the Examination of Home Front Preparedness on May 15, 2018. This is the key to a local authority's functioning in an emergency.

Since quite a few of the local authorities have trouble fulfilling their needs in ordinary times and even more so in an emergency, two important questions arise: what is the function of the state in managing an emergency in a local authority, and what is the role of the state and its agencies (the HFC? another organ?)

if a local authority collapses as the result of a severe security or other disruption. Amir Yahav, head of the doctrine and exercises division in the Ministry of Defense, raised these questions in a letter to the Knesset Research and Information Center, dated November 23, 2016 (the letter appears in a study of preparations and readiness for earthquakes in the local authorities). In the Municipalities Ordinance, there are a number of provisions making the mayor personally responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Ordinance, including the duty to prepare for and operate the emergency economy. In addition, as the chairman of the Emergency Economy Committee one of the functions of the head of the local authority is to set the goals and priorities for operating the various systems in an emergency. Neither NEMA nor the HFC has legal authority over the heads of the local authority that do not fulfill their duty in this matter. There is no adequate system-wide solution for these questions, or an authorized, up-to-date, and public document describing the state of the local authorities' preparedness for an emergency.

It can thus
be concluded that the cities in Israel do not necessarily represent the optimal
model for the generic urban system, because each of them is situated in a different
environment and circumstances and at a different stage of development. In order
to analyze the city as a complex system and the effect of its characteristics
on urban resilience, the next section looks at Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a case study.

Tel Aviv as
a "Basic Building Block" in an Emergency

Tel
Aviv-Jaffa (TA) will serve as a case study of the concept of urban emergency
(Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, Center for Economic and Social Research, 2019;
Hasson, 2017). TA was chosen because it is the urban core of the home front in
Israel, and can therefore serve as a model for other local authorities in
preparing for an emergency, even if like all other cities, it has its own singular
characteristics. This section comprises three parts: the first sketches the
special historical background of TA; the second addresses the conceptual and
practical patterns promoted by the TA municipality in preparation for an
emergency; and the third presents the resilience concept as it is reflected in
the city. From a conceptual and theoretical standpoint, there is a close
connection between the three parts, because the historical background shapes
the city’s threat mindset and the response to it, while these in turn affect
the doctrine of managing severe defense disruptions. Together they constitute the
basis for applying the resilience concept as a key component in dealing with hazards
and disruptions.

Historical Background

Tel Aviv,
which by the late 1940s was already the main metropolitan city in Israel,
suffered repeated attacks by Egyptian and other aircraft on military and
civilian targets in the War of Independence. These attacks saw 172 soldiers and
civilians killed and 321 injured (out of 213,000 civilians, then comprising
approximately one third of the country's population). In this challenging
situation, classes in the elementary schools were halted, the opening of the beaches
was postponed, and there was a sharp drop in the number of people attending movie
theaters and spending time in cafes. The general atmosphere, however, featured
a degree of complacency, especially in comparison with besieged Jerusalem and
other communities regarded as being in the frontline. This attitude was described
by Prime Minister Ben Gurion as "steadfastness" on the part of the residents,
comparable to that of Londoners during the Blitz and Russians in the
"Great Patriotic War," both regarded as exemplary models of societal
behavior in wartime. According to Ben Gurion, "Superiority in the air
gives the enemy a great advantage, but our public is not afraid…it is
impossible not to note its steadfastness…I was astonished by the self-control
our public exhibited" (Naor, 2009).

Greater TA
experienced another severe defense disruption at the time of the Iraqi Scud
missiles attacks during the First Gulf War (January-February 1991). The lessons
of 1991 can be summarized in five main points. First, the initial shock
affected the behavior of civilians and the feeling of anxiety. On the other
hand, the expectations that chemical warheads would be used against Israel,
which gave rise to a complex improvisational measure at the national and
personal level (sealed rooms, the order to drink water, gas masks) did not
materialize. Second, the initial number of casualties was very low, even if in
retrospect, the number of fatalities reached 95 recognized as victims of
hostile action, mostly from heart failure or stroke, or from misuse of the gas
masks (Bar-Mocha, 2001). Third, most of the city's residents remained
relatively calm during the attacks. A total of 1,059 people went to hospital
emergency rooms, 22 percent of them as the result of a hit, most of them during
the first stage of the offensive. A clear process of adjustment and learning
took place among those hospitalized. Most of those exposed to traumatic events
were sufficiently resilient to overcome the experience without long-term
adjustment difficulties (Neria et al., 1998). Fourth, many people left the city
at night and returned to work during the day. They were labeled
"deserters" by then-TA Mayor Shlomo (Chich) Lahat. Today, this would
be perceived as a natural coping reaction to a disturbing constraint, and a
flexible response indicative of social resilience on the part of individuals
and the community. Fifth, following the lack of advance municipal preparedness at
the time, subsequent lessons were learned concerning municipal organizations that
today serve as a basis for the civil defense system.

The most
recent period of security disruptions experienced in TA involved 22 suicide
attacks by Palestinian terrorists between 1996 and the end of the second intifada
(2005); 116 people were killed in these deadly attacks. No study was found that
analyzed the effects of these terrorist attacks on the city and its residents.
In the absence of such research, the following main conclusions can be drawn
from a study on the effect of the second intifada on Israeli society (Elran,
2006). The first is that the intifada failed in its drive to undermine the stability
of Israel society, which was consistent through most of the indicators examined
in the study. The second conclusion is that in its immediate responses, the
Israeli public demonstrated sensitivity to terrorist actions; these responses
featured clear and immediate expressions of fear and anxiety. Usually, however,
acute stress was relieved shortly after the incidents, and public conduct reverted
to normal patterns. Second, the flexibility in the public responses showed a
strong coping capacity. The third conclusion is that even during the worst
periods, optimism prevailed, and the public demonstrated that it can withstand
the terrorist assaults and expressed its hope for a better future for the
individual and society. It was thus concluded that at that dire period, Israeli
society manifested a high level of survivability and significant capacity of
steadfastness, indicating high national resilience. Even the negative effects
of the lethal terrorism during the five years of the second intifada on the
Jewish public's positions concerning national security issues was far from unequivocal.
If the intifada's horrific events had any real effect on public attitude, it
was generally short term, mostly ebbing as the intifada subsided (Ben Meir,
2010). Isolated indications also point to the existence of this significant
trend in Tel Aviv. For example, the data (Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, 2017) regarding
the number of visits to cultural institutions in the city since the intifada
(2000-2004) shows a steady upward trend in visits to museums and theaters, with
a temporary decline in 2009-2010, followed by a return to the ongoing increase.

Past cases show the success of TA and its residents in overcoming difficult security threats, based on the military's role in defeating the threats, improvisation of local civilian responses, reasonable operational continuity, and above all, the demonstrated capacity to bounce back rapidly and maintain growth in the long term. Together these form the dominant trend characterizing TA¾a continued trajectory not halted by security disruptions. All of this reflects a high degree of societal resilience in the city up until now

Preparing the Municipal System in Tel Aviv-Jaffa for an Emergency

Since the second
intifada ended in 2005, TA has enjoyed a long period of relative security
tranquility. Nevertheless, the municipality, according to its website, has advanced
its preparations for a severe security event. In a September 12, 2019 interview,
David Aharoni, director of TA's Security and Emergency Services Branch, outlined
the city's preparations (as published in the "Tel Aviv-Jaffa: A Smart City¾From
Peacetime to Emergency, Preparation for an Emergency" municipal booklet) for
a future emergency as follows:

1. According to the leading municipal directive for an emergency, the municipality is to continue providing the same services as in ordinary times, with an emphasis on giving the public information and guidance; absorbing evacuees when necessary; ensuring the availability of water; providing essential services; taking care of vulnerable groups and people at risk; and assisting in rescue operations. This directive reflects a concept of active and comprehensive municipal involvement in an emergency; providing information before, during, and after an emergency; and monitoring risks and vulnerable sectors.
2. Following lessons learned from past wars and terrorist attacks, a professional municipal apparatus has been established, with the task of providing residents and visitors with essential services in an emergency, caring for them, and returning quickly to routine life, in coordination with the national emergency agencies.
3. The organizational structure of the municipality in an emergency is based on a municipal war room (including a command system with advanced remote monitoring capacity, and a substitute war room in Jaffa) adjacent to the HFC's district war room, teams of forward command, and seven staff units (welfare, education, community, information, administration, engineering, and operations). These units operate with 25 professional branches in various spheres, and with seven community regions responsible to provide immediate support for residents in an emergency.
4. In building reinforcement and shelters, the municipality is geared to provide professional assistance for family shelters for about 50 percent of the residential units; 240 public bomb shelters; 100 renovated multi-purpose school bomb shelters; and 100 underground parking lots with 4 million square feet to accommodate up to two million people (designated mainly for non-residents). The municipal apparatus also plans to upgrade schools for bomb emergencies, in accordance with the HFC standard.
5. Exercises according to an annual plan designed to improve urban preparedness for an emergency are conducted by the municipal apparatus in cooperation with relevant external agencies, such as the HFC and NEMA. These exercises include the participation of residents, particularly of school pupils. The municipality strives to develop mechanisms for emergencies based on the patterns of conduct in routine times. At the same time, while TA organizes for emergencies in the common framework practiced by other towns in Israel, it also designs unique features in reference to some of the specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the city. These include mechanisms designed to deal with the social gaps between wealthier groups and disadvantaged groups. Included in the latter are groups like the Arabs living in Jaffa and the many foreign workers (constituting approximately 10 percent of the city's residents). In addition, TA serves as a center of employment and leisure for more than a million non-residents. These have direct significance in an emergency, as the city's leadership seeks to maintain municipal and metropolitan operational continuity even in conditions of severe disruptions.
6. Public mindset: Notwithstanding these extensive preparations, TA also features a great degree of complacency, evidenced by a low level of prior personal and public awareness of hazards. This results in less than sufficient individual and family preparedness, reflected also in a tendency to rely on the municipal authorities and the HFC to provide the necessary response in an emergency. The municipality also prefers not to give much conspicuous public presence to its emergency preparations. This is a known fault. In the past there were some attempts to deal with this challenge by initiating proactive advances (such as "Resilience for People" program) to make residents, community leaders, neighborhood committees, activists, and volunteers more familiar with and better prepared for emergencies. However, these programs failed to stir the public's interest and participation. Consequently, and based on past experience, the municipality works on the assumption that when an emergency occurs, the public will rapidly awaken and function at a reasonable level, even in the absence of adequate advance preparation. It is unclear to what extent this hope will be borne out in the event of severe disruptions.
7. Economic operational continuity depends to a large extent on non-municipal components, such as electricity, public transportation, communications, and the private sector. The municipality also has limited influence on critical spheres, such as food supply, consumer goods, fuel, and others, and therefore intends to design a basic plan for ensuring continuity in the supply of goods and services from the outside. At the same time, difficulties arise in the advancement of this needed process, due to the dependence on numerous external parties. Inability to complete this process is liable to cause difficulties in this critical sphere, and certainly in the event of prolonged disruptions. If and when this plan does materialize, the municipality will have a redundancy resource in an emergency to facilitate operational continuity in a prolonged disruption. Another critical question in this context is the provision of services that depend on digital networks, which are liable to be threatened by a disruption of the electrical system (Weinstock & Elran, 2016) or large-scale cyberattacks. There is a major gap in this area at the municipality, which should be addressed at the national level as well, as this is a challenge not restricted to TA. For example, as recently as September 2019 the Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy, and Water Resources issued a tender (no. 20/2019) for consulting services in the sphere of preparations for an emergency, cyber, and operational continuity for its systems. Nor is the municipality responsible for the continuity of public services in areas such as health and education, or¾generally speaking¾for making the decisions on the initiation of an emergency situation, or for early warning on rockets attacks on its territory or regarding any other type of security disruption.

These issues
brought forth by the municipality highlight the considerable systemic obstacles
to preparing the city for an emergency. The assertion that the local authority
is the "basic building block" in managing an emergency ostensibly
makes it the main governing organ responsible in an emergency, at least vis-à-vis
its residents. In practice, however, regardless of how strong,
well-established, organized, and prepared for an emergency a local authority
is, such as Tel Aviv and others in Israel, its actual capacity to provide a
complete response to severe hazards, especially prolonged ones, is limited.
Beyond this, it is difficult to assess credibly the connection between Tel
Aviv's preliminary preparation for a crisis and its actual ability to meet
future security risks. Both past experience and current systemic preparations
do not necessarily indicate how the city, the municipality, the residents, and others
present will respond to a future conflict, which is likely to involve an unprecedentedly
high level of risk.

Functions
of the Local Authority in Promoting and Preserving Resilience: The Case of Tel
Aviv-Jaffa

The TA municipality recently joined the 100 Resilient Cities international network. The basic principles of the resilience concept in Tel Aviv reflect the expanded concept that goes beyond a mere response to disruptions, toward perceiving resilience as a lever to handle the challenges facing the city in the 21^st century, including immigration, climate change, and a city branded as one that is positioned on the track of growth and prosperity. These principles were incorporated in the strategic plan for Tel Aviv-Jaffa Urban Resilience in June 2019. The expanded concept of resilience was reflected in the introduction by the mayor to the publication of the urban resilience concept:

The reality and the
processes around us pose such challenges to the city that require advance
preparation…TA still needs to stand in the front…regarding urbanism in
Israel…in this situation, it is imperative to confront challenges such as
density… multiculturalism, and immigration crises…economic gaps, social segregation,
alienation…and extreme climate change. The resilience plan for Tel Aviv…offers solutions
that connect residents to each other, to local businesses, and local
infrastructure. These connections are designed to enhance trust between the
different groups, and to generate new opportunities¾social and
economic¾while improving the quality of life for the residents…in order to facilitate joint alignments to stand up to the challenges…we
are submitting…practical proposals…for connecting population groups and
communities¾at ordinary times and in emergencies (Tel
Aviv-Jaffa municipality, 2019, emphasis added).

These
emphases represent the objective of strengthening social capital, which is the
foundation of societal resilience (Aldrich, 2012), as suggested by the expanded
approach presented in the theoretical preface. Integrated and comprehensive
systemic planning, based on these principles, is a basis of a policy that
ensures¾assuming careful long-term implementation¾a robust society
with a high level of resilience that can better withstand disruptions,
challenges, and perils of various types, including severe security risks.

In this
framework, one can see the priority assigned by the TA municipality to enhancement
of social resilience in general and increased trust between the Arab residents
of Jaffa and the municipality as part of its vision (December 2017), through
cooperation and enrichment of the community fabric, and the social order in
particular. Trust in the individual's independent capabilities, trust in other
people, and trust in the social and municipal systems are among the components of
social capital that contribute to a resilient community.

This expanded
concept also affects and is reflected in the messages appearing in the vision
of the municipal Social Services Administration. Inter alia, it refers to
development of personal, family, and community resilience, as stated by Sharon
Blum Melamed, head of the municipality's Welfare, Public Health, and Human
Administration, in an interview conducted on December 4, 2019. Here again, the
seminal idea is to improve the quality of life in the city, including social
justice and equal opportunities for all of its residents, thereby also
furthering societal resilience in the face of security and other disruptions.
This systemic concept also extends to other municipal units, such as the
Education Administration and the Community Administration, and was recently translated
into the particular platform that links resilience to the municipality's
preparation for an emergency. A 2019 document (unpublished) written by the Security
and Emergency Services Branch contains the following guidelines:

1. Resilience begins with attention to the residents’ needs and the connection with them, adequate management by the municipality, and public order. Community strengthening, through creation of a cohesive and supportive society, is also essential. As part of this concept, the municipality is now creating an administration to empower the local community and improve the connection with the residents.
2. Another level is perceived to be the continuous preparation for an emergency¾creating effective interfaces between the municipality's units, the government ministries, and the security forces. Activity should be ongoing and cyclical.
3. Public activity should be continued in an emergency in accordance with the emerging specific risks, thereby delivering an important message of coping and capability and the expectation that routine life can go on during an emergency.
4. There should be cooperation with other agencies dealing with emergencies, assistance provided to the rescue units, information and support disseminated to the population, lessons learned, and dialogues conducted, while taking concerted action to restore the city's ordinary life.
5. There should be ongoing learning from rapid dramatic changes in the reality of the city and its surroundings, while setting a clear policy to meet needs, even in conditions of uncertainty.

This
outline of principles, which the TA municipality is trying to implement, still without
the necessary synchronized organizational envelope, corresponds to the
principal elements presented in the literature as central ingredients in urban
resilience, in accordance with the resilient city model. At the same time,
considerable additional progress is needed in order to achieve the level of
resilience required by foreseeable risks, even if the expanded (revised) urban
resilience concept already creates a basis for success in future severe
security challenges. It appears that the still missing element is the rational construction
and careful operation of an integrated municipal apparatus closely connecting
the preparations for a security¾or other¾emergency with the enhancement of societal resilience, which can
possibly be better achieved in collaboration with the national government
agencies and civil society. Such a connection is likely to create the necessary
synergy between "hard" inputs (in the sphere of organization,
infrastructure, and the connection with non-municipal bodies) and
"soft" inputs (promoting individual, community, and urban resilience,
including the recruitment of groups the civil society). Such an integrated system,
which is still far from completion, should perform according to municipal policy,
in a way that it will be ready to function before the next major crisis occurs.

Conclusions
and Systemic Recommendations

This
article analyzes the nexus between urbanism and emergency security situations,
and the response of urban resilience. The study focuses on how the complex,
dynamic, and multidimensional municipal system in Israel manages severe man-made
disruptions¾war and diverse types of terrorism¾and what role the resilience concept plays in this context. The
theoretical chapter presents a generic framework of the city as a complex
system facilitating its continued existence and the implementation of its
diverse functions, even in conditions of severe crises and emergency security
situations. The characteristics of the local authority influence the way the
resilience concept is applied in practice, since the conceptual framework must be
filled with different content in different cities, including in Israel,
according to the local vision and the extent of the capacity of the local
authority to further it.

TA is
classified as one of the cities in Israel with the most robust preparedness for
an emergency. As a likely target for a large-scale missile attack, it has taken
steps to integrate municipal investments in construction of a response system
with an expanded and updated concept of enhancing resilience. The aim of this
integration is to create a basis for devising a synergetic system that will
facilitate a reasonable level of disaster management during a large-scale
challenging security disruption. Such a system, however, is designed to deal
not only with emergency security events, but also with other kinds of crises
resulting from natural disasters. The tragic death of a young couple in TA's Hatikvah
neighborhood when they were trapped in a flooded elevator during heavy rains in
early 2020 illustrates that the construction of such a system is no guarantee for
optimal integrated action by the authorities vis-à-vis the diverse communities
and residents in the city. It appears that the municipality was not properly
prepared for possible floods in the city, even though such floods occurred occasionally
even before Israel gained independence (e.g., in 1935), especially in the
poorer neighborhoods of southern TA. Furthermore, the municipality should also
take into account the methods employed by national agencies, such as rescue units,
for which the municipality is not directly responsible, but on whose services
it depends. For example, an interior investigation by the National Fire &
Rescue Authority found that at the time when the couple was trapped in the
elevator, the call center received thousands of calls, but could handle only 200
(Yarkechy, 2020).

In
conclusion, several main issues are raised here for national consideration in
preparing for a future severe and prolonged emergency security scenario, as
well as conclusions and systemic recommendations:

Israel has no orderly and accepted defense concept in the critical sphere of the home front. Most of Israel's conceptual management models of this matter are from a military perspective, while the civilian dimension is addressed only marginally in both the national and local frameworks as well as in actual force buildup. Such a comprehensive civilian doctrine should be formulated, with the local authority and societal resilience model placed at its center. The local authority should be assigned the formal responsibility and the required resources to exercise this responsibility in an emergency

Every local authority is a unique microcosm. Communities in Israel differ greatly from each other. This is also true within the cities, some of which¾like Tel Aviv-Jaffa¾are highly heterogenic. Every local authority, therefore, needs to specify its own needs, including for security and civilian emergencies, based on known basic principles and its own characteristics.

Local authorities usually give preference to current and immediate needs, which they always regard as urgent. The system-wide attitude toward (often unfamiliar) future scenarios, which may not materialize in the near future or during the term of a particular serving mayor, requires distributive leadership that foresees future processes, is aware of the public's needs, and internalizes them in a rational manner. The societal resilience approach, whose main construct is presented here from TA's perspective, illustrates how systemic municipal strategy, aiming at building a flourishing community, can also provide a response to urgent needs, to include trust and linkage between agencies and people. It can give rise to an urban resilience fabric that will greatly improve the city's capacity to cope successfully with the ominous threats of a future disruption, including a dire security event.

Public documents portray the local authority as the "basic building block" in the defense of the home front. However, as of now, the practical meaning of this principle is unclear. It is not supported by binding legislation, budgetary allocations, continual government control and monitoring, and other measures needed in order to implement it. In particular, the question of the attitude toward disadvantaged local authorities unable to muster the necessary capabilities by themselves should be seriously addressed. Some local authorities are more capable of taking care of themselves than others. Local authorities that are strong in routine times are usually also robust in managing a crisis. Some are blessed with leaderships capable of devoting focused and adequate attention to the challenges of emergency; too many others, especially at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale, remain marginalized and subject to daily pressure. A functional long term national plan is therefore required to enhance the ability of every local authority, according to its risk scenarios, the characteristics of its residents, and its own capabilities.

Even the more effective local authorities with better preparedness for an emergency are liable to find themselves subject to a challenging crisis with dire consequences in the form of damage and casualties. The local authority has only limited resources to protect itself and its residents. The IDF is responsible for most of the defensive measures against security scenarios. The IDF's effect on the extent of the damage and the enemy's ability to inflict damage serve as the central factor.

For this reason, the local authority's main contribution is the enhancement of societal resilience that will make it possible, given severe and prolonged security disruptions, to maintain a reasonable degree of emergency routine and thereafter to bounce back rapidly. This is no trivial expectation. Although it was evident in the past that the Israeli public is capable of mobilizing and uniting at times of security distress and of demonstrating functional resilience, it must be remembered that every disruption is local, and thus the response is commonly local. Consequently, resilience too must be tested from a local perspective. It should therefore be fostered at the local level according to familiar guidelines, whose essence is strengthening the local social capital. This should be the main role of the local authority in preparing for an emergency.

Hence, it should be ensured that each of the local authorities designs and executes a long-range multifaceted resilience plan, in line with its needs and qualifications, that is well integrated with all of the relevant agencies in the city, and is supported differentially by the government and the HFC in both planning and execution.

The article presents an example of a model for a local authority in promoting societal resilience and preparedness for an emergency. There are other local authorities with other models that stand out in this sphere. Learning from success is a powerful tool that needs to be used in organizing a viable network of local authorities, perhaps through the Ministry of the Interior and the Union of Local Authorities in Israel, to serve as centers for learning and joint implementation for emergencies.

One of the most obvious defects in public preparation in Israel for a security crisis involves inadequate awareness. The indifference and the assumption that difficulties will work themselves out detract from the minimum level of preparation required from the public. The assumption that it will be possible to shift from the daily routine to an emergency immediately and effectively is not well founded, and depends greatly on the extent of the crisis. A rational national messaging plan that will present to the public the severity of the security threats should therefore be promoted. Such a plan should state what the individual, family, and community can do in order to cope successfully with these threats. It is possible, and necessary, to add to this deployment of volunteer groups, such as teenagers, who will be trained to function in an emergency in their neighborhood.

Theory provides appropriate models for furthering societal resilience as an important lever for dealing with security disruptions at the municipal level. This article presents a rather successful Israeli model, and there are others. Every local authority can choose the right model for itself. As always, the main benchmark is to be found in the sphere of implementation, which is based on awareness and mindfulness of the issues; understanding of the relevant threat, whether security or otherwise, that requires informed advance municipal preparation as part of its principal tasks; and translating this understanding into relevant planning, and especially strict implementation. This article was written before the COVID-19 outbreak, but its principal concepts, arguments, and recommendations apply to responses to a pandemic and any other major disruption.

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