Strategic Assessment

Keywords: China, United Arab Emirates, United States, Israel, space

Introduction

The field of space research demands enormous investment of resources, and it is therefore largely controlled by central players such as the United States, Russia, and China. Smaller countries with limited resources that seek to participate in the game must create technological collaborations with large space powers. In most cases, countries do not collaborate simultaneously with countries from both “blocs” but only with countries belonging to their “space bloc”—the European–American bloc or the Chinese–Russian bloc. An exception to this rule is the United Arab Emirates, which maintains simultaneous collaborations with the US and China. After signing the Abraham Accords, Israel, which sees itself as part of the European–American bloc, began to set up collaborations on space research with the UAE. The question arises whether these collaborations lead to the transfer of advanced technologies from Israel to China via the UAE, thus putting Israel’s collaborations with the US at risk, or could they create new opportunities for Israel and pave the way to broader collaborations in the field of space research?

China’s Space Program

During the era of the “space race,” which began in 1957 when the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 was launched, the great powers were exposed not only to the scientific, economic, and technological benefits of space research but also to its inherent security advantages. At that time, in the context of the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, China began to formulate its own space program, led by Qian Xuesen, a Chinese engineer who had studied in the US and had helped found NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, but then was arrested and deported from the US in 1955, accused of being a communist. At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, when the space race between the two powers reached its peak with the landing on the moon, Mao Zedong decided that China must not fall behind and started to accelerate the Chinese space program. In 1970, China successfully launched its first satellite (Dong Fang Hong 1); some five years later, it launched its first reconnaissance satellite FSW-0—a capability that until then only the US and the Soviet Union possessed. Since then, China successfully launched a range of satellites including communications, meteorological, and tracking systems and developed a stable infrastructure of space institutions, comprising R&D centers, launch sites, tracking stations and centers, and production facilities.

The Gulf War in 1991, considered the first war in which space played a significant role in the fighting, marked a turning point in China’s concept of using space technologies. In this conflict, the US enjoyed unfettered access to space-based technologies for tracking, communications, and navigation, while NATO placed an embargo on all satellite data for Saddam Hussein. The war clearly illustrated the advantage a country with access to developed space technology held compared to one without such access. After the war, China reassessed American capabilities and accelerated the development of its space technologies.

Until the 1990s, China’s space capabilities remained limited, but as the pace of the bilateral space race slowed down during that decade, China began to expand its space collaborations. Using the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), it began supplying relatively cheap launch services (compared to the US) to foreign clients. The success rate of these launches proved low, and a series of accidents weakened trust in Chinese technology. A particularly serious disaster occurred in February 1996 when the Chinese launch vehicle Long March 3B failed during a launch, veered off course, and collided with the American communications satellite Intelsat 708, killing six people. China received help from American companies to understand the causes of the failures and dramatically improved Chinese rockets with their assistance. However, China later used the technological information from the Americans to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technology, provoking strong criticism from US security officials and politicians. After this episode, the US Congress passed laws limiting information sharing with Chinese space companies and banned satellites with American-made components from launching on Chinese rockets.

The combination of technical failures and fears of information theft significantly damaged China’s ability to partner with Western countries in space research. Therefore, China began participating in projects with developing countries such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Laos, Bolivia, and Pakistan that wanted to access space technology benefits but could not purchase Western options. At first, China supplied satellites, launch vehicles, and other infrastructure, and then, seeking to reduce costs, it began offering launch services instead of selling the technological infrastructure it manufactured. This approach increased China’s autonomy and control of space technologies, and, as discussed below, it is still used (in one form or another) in the satellite services China supplies as part of its Digital Silk Road venture.

The Chinese space industry grew significantly in the first decade of the 21st century with advances in rockets, communications satellites, and remote sensor capability. But in January 2007, China carried out a test of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), creating extensive space debris and leading to fierce international criticism. The test exposed the vulnerability of various space systems (particularly American ones). It was perceived as a return to the aggressive space activities after the Cold War (although space was militarized during the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union avoided such tests). Following this test, the US passed the Wolf Amendment (2011), banning NASA from hosting Chinese citizens at its facilities and participating in joint scientific activity with China.

American-imposed restrictions, however, failed to halt advances in Chinese space technology, partly due to China’s economic growth. China continued to record space achievements: In 2013, it became the third country ever to land a mission on the moon with Chang’e-3; in 2019, it became the first country to land on the moon’s far side with Chang’e-4 rover; and in 2020, it successfully sent a mission to Mars with Chang’e-5.

In recent years, China has intensified its international space collaborations. Since 2016, it signed numerous space cooperation agreements and treaties with countries and international organizations. Additionally, as part of its Digital Silk Road initiative and to establish a global network of space infrastructures, including satellite navigation and communication systems, China continues supplying space solutions to developing countries and offers launch services, spacecraft, and ground support (to bypass US restrictions). Particularly noteworthy is its BeiDou system—competing with America’s Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, and Europe’s Galileo—which China uses to provide satellite services to countries (including the UAE), conferring significant security and intelligence advantages.

Although treaties and agreements limit the military’s use of space, and there are currently no known weapons in space, most achievements in countries’ civilian space programs are directly linked to the same technologies (with adaptations) in the military. Therefore, space now constitutes a “fourth environment” integral to military action after land, sea, and air. Decades after the 1966 Treaty on Outer Space fostered a relatively peaceful space environment and encouraged East–West cooperation, countries are now reviving space activities with offensive capabilities. For example, Russia and the United States engage in maneuvers close to satellites of other countries and have developed secretive dual-use systems. In 2018, America published its first national space strategy, recognizing that its rivals had turned space into a battlefield.

The UAE and Space Research

The UAE signed the Artemis Accords, a series of international agreements between several countries, including the US and Israel, which state that signatories will share scientific data, provide each other with assistance in emergencies on the moon, and will use lunar research for peaceful aims only. China did not sign the agreement, however, claiming that the US unilaterally tried to impose its will and values on the entire international system by outlining the rules of the game and its boundaries and by setting the agenda of the next era of lunar research. The UAE—a long-standing strategic partner of the US and China’s close strategic ally (in a comprehensive strategic partnership)—continues to collaborate with both powers in lunar research, education, and launching, despite having received extensive NASA aid for some space projects and the fierce competition and growing tensions between the US and China. The conduct of the UAE makes it an exception in international space collaborations since, as mentioned, countries usually only cooperate within the same bloc, either European–American or Chinese–Russian.

The 2006 UAE space program launch was part of a broad program intended to diversify the oil-based economy toward one based on knowledge and innovation. In 2014, the UAE Space Agency was established and since then, the country became the Arab world’s most important space power with achievements, including successful launchings of observation satellites, launching the Rashid Moon probe, and sending the Hope research probe to Mars in 2020, which was launched by a Japanese rocket but positioned the UAE as one of five countries successfully sending a Mars probe. The UAE was motivated not only by economic priorities but also by security considerations. Understanding that a developed space industry would serve as a technological engine and accelerate progress as well, the UAE recognized the need to establish technology, scientific knowledge, and personnel for an independent space infrastructure similar to Israel’s. However, unlike Israel, the UAE does not have independent launch capabilities and therefore has had to rely on other countries (and private companies) to develop and launch its research and communications satellites, and even for military ones. Therefore, in recent years, the UAE has been motivated to move toward greater independence in space, relating not just to prestige and competition but also to the need to address potential threats, especially from Iran. Therefore, the UAE has created academic partnerships to strengthen its scientific-human infrastructure.

In 2013, the UAE purchased from French companies two advanced French reconnaissance satellites (Falcon Eye), which provides images with at least a reported 0.7-meter resolution (after the US imposed difficulties on the deal, causing delays). In August 2022, the UAE military reportedly discussed purchasing space weapons from Turkey. The security context did not escape Israeli attention, and in 2021, Shlomi Sudri, general manager of the Space Division of the Israel Aerospace Industries claimed that the UAE–Israel military space collaboration had potential due to the shared concerns for Iranian hostility. But unlike Israel, which can independently launch and operate small, advanced satellites, the UAE relies on foreign assistance to launch larger satellites.

UAE Collaborations With China and the US in the Space Sphere

In 2015, the UAE Space Agency and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on space-related collaboration and since then have worked together on technology, education, and research projects:

Launches: The China Great Wall Industry Corporation assisted in launching several UAE-owned satellites. China’s Long March 2C rocket launched the Emirates’ first observation satellite, KhalifaSat, into space. China also provided technical manufacturing support for the DunaiSat-2 satellite.

Satellites: In 2016, the League of Arab States promoted using China’s BeiDou global navigation satellite system. China and the UAE also partnered to build a space center in Abu Dhabi to develop remote-sensing satellites for monitoring Emirati agriculture, strengthening oil and border security, and providing information services.

Regulation: In 2021, the UAE and China signed an MoU on cooperation in space law to promote collaboration in areas such as space research, satellite activity, and space debris management.

Space Education and Research: Khalifa University of Science and Technology in the UAE and the Chinese Academy of Sciences signed an agreement to collaborate on scientific research, including astrophysics and space materials. The Emirates Institution for Advanced Science & Technology (EIAST) signed contracts with Chinese space companies and institutions on various initiatives. In 2021, Dubai’s MBRSC (Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Center) hosted a joint UAE–China space research forum, bringing together experts from both countries to discuss joint space research and collaboration opportunities.

Other Areas: The UAE launched the Mars 2117 initiative to establish the first human settlement on Mars by 2117. China expressed interest in collaborating on aspects like technological R&D and astronaut training. Also, Origin Space, a Shenzhen-based Chinese company that exploits space resources (including asteroid mining), announced it was setting up an exhibition and R&D center in Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa industrial zone. In September 2022, MBRSC and the China National Space Administration signed an agreement to collaborate on lunar rover missions. The 2026 Chang’e-7 mission plans to carry the UAE Rashid 2 rover to the moon’s South Pole region to study the crater floor for potential ice reserves (an essential resource for human habitation on the moon). This mission intends to lay the foundation for a China-led international Moon research station.

The US also collaborates with the UAE in the space sphere. The first Emirati astronaut was invited to visit the International Space Station (ISS) in April 2019. In 2020, the UAE’s Hope satellite—built at the University of Colorado’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) with American-made components and extensive mission coordination and cooperation from NASA—was launched. In October 2020, the UAE Space Agency signed the Artemis Accords.

Additionally, NASA and the UAE Space Agency signed agreements to collaborate on human space flights. As part of the agreement with MBRSC, and in cooperation with it, both agencies will examine the feasibility of field studies and biology research in space. The project utilizes NASA’s Human Research Analog and the UAE’s Mars Scientific City, which are uniquely designed to investigate the effects of space flight on humans.

The UAE and the Inter-Power Struggles

The relationship between China and the UAE has been somewhat overshadowed by the competitive rivalry between China and the US. For years, the UAE, like other Gulf countries, adopted a hedging strategy to improve its status and prosperity while at the same time it has sought to gain influence over the US. Survival motivations drive this strategy, allowing the Gulf states to express their dissatisfaction with US policy. Although the UAE is critical of American policy in the Gulf, especially regarding its security alliances, it views its partnership with China positively, which it sees as stable, predictable, and dependable.

It was specifically the Houthi missile attacks on the UAE—dubbed the UAE’s 9/11—in early 2022 that led to a belated and weak American response in the eyes of the UAE. Despite the considerable differences between the attacks, the UAE compares them to the Iranian attack on Saudi facilities in 2019. Moreover, the Gulf states are worried not just about the American inattentiveness to their security problems, especially the threat posed by Iran, but also about US force reductions. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces declined by 85% from its peak in 2008, with 2023–2024 already seeing a 15% cut in forces, including in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis have strengthened the perception of some of the Gulf states that they are critical assets. Even if they are overstating their value, the growing Chinese involvement amid the competition between the great powers provides them with an incentive to intensify their hedging. Led by the UAE, some of the Gulf states are leveraging their enhanced status to promote their national interests, believing that the US will have to make the necessary adjustments.

Indeed, the Gulf hedging strategy seems to bear fruit, given the policy adjustments the US has begun to make. A change in American policy is evident, for example, in relation to the tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia during the first two years of the Biden administration. Currently, the US is discussing with Saudi Arabia about upgrading its relations, including a defense treaty, advanced weapons, and civilian nuclear collaboration, and reportedly including permission to enrich uranium. Also, in September 2023, the US and Bahrain signed a comprehensive agreement (C-SIPA), which includes prominent security components. These US policy adjustments have not yet reached the UAE, and the US may be ambivalent about these policy shifts. Although these shifts indicate US recognition of the need to change its policies toward the Gulf states and respond to their demands, at the same time, the incentives offered to Saudi Arabia—the UAE’s competitive neighbor—and especially the willingness to enrich uranium, do not sit well with Abu Dhabi, which gave up this capability to gain nuclear cooperation with Washington.

In 2023, China–UAE cooperation moved forward in security, banking, energy, trade, and diplomacy. China constitutes the UAE’s largest trading partner, with (non-oil) trade worth $72 billion in 2022, a rise of 18% since 2021. The UAE—a logistic, banking, and energy hub—also represents China’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. In 2021, the US leaked information about security ties between China and the UAE, specifically noting construction at the Khalifa Port of a military facility on a container platform managed by the Chinese shipping company COSCO. The US also identified Chinese military involvement in the construction of an airfield in the UAE. In April 2023, it was reported that work at the port continued, while activity of the Chinese military was identified at several UAE bases, where drones and rocket defense systems were operating. It should be noted that these are areas of collaboration between Israel and the UAE.

In November 2023, US intelligence agencies warned that the collaboration with the Emirati company G42 with Chinese companies, including telecommunications company Huawei, could be used to transfer technology and data on millions of Americans to the Chinese government. In 2021, the same company, G42, signed an agreement with the Israeli company Rafael to set up a joint company for artificial intelligence technology and big data for the civilian market. In the space sphere, in November 2023, the UAE’s Sharjah University signed an MoU to collaborate with China on its permanent international lunar research station that China plans to build on the moon by the 2020s. This initiative is seen as competing with NASA’s Artemis program.

Growing cooperation between the UAE and China in space and other spheres has not escaped US attention. According to reports, the agreement to fly the UAE Rover aboard the Chang’e-7 mission breached the US government’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These regulations ban the sale or export of defense-linked components, technologies, or software to limit access by certain parties, such as China, to sensitive US-made components. Following American pressure, it was reported that the UAE ultimately renounced its partnership with China on this mission.

UAE–Israel Space Research Collaborations

As part of the Abraham Accords, the UAE Space Agency signed an MoU with its Israeli counterpart to increase cooperation in space research and accelerate economic growth and human progress. Although the Israeli government has chosen at this stage to focus only on collaborations in the field of water and desertification issues, in which both countries have a mutual interest, Israel and the UAE have begun several collaborations in the sphere of space:

• The countries launched a joint Israeli–Emirati research project analyzing data from the earth observation satellite VENμS. In part, the Israel Space Agency will share with the UAE Space Agency the satellite data collected by the micro-satellite, which also serves France.
• Universities in Israel and the UAE are promoting joint projects and sharing information they have collected and discovered. For example, researchers from the Asher Space Institute at the Technion, together with the UAE’s National Space & Science Center and ImageSat International (ISI), intend to launch a satellite by the end of the decade to the first Lagrange point (L1) at a distance of about one and a half million kilometers from Earth. The aim of this project, called Cool Earth, is to demonstrate for the first time the technological feasibility of neutralizing the effects of global warming by spreading a sail in space to block some of the sun’s radiation from reaching planet Earth.
• It was agreed that the UAE will assist in developing scientific instruments for Israel’s Beresheet-2 mission.
• Apart from signing the Artemis Accords, Israel and the UAE are also members of the I2U2 group, established in 2021, which also includes India and the United States. At the group’s first summit meeting in July 2022, the countries declared their intention to cooperate in various fields, including space research (as part of the US attempt to compete with similar Chinese initiatives).
• Israel does not perceive the possibility of advanced technologies leaking through these collaborations to China or Iran as a serious risk. Adv. Keren Shachar, senior deputy to the Foreign Ministry’s legal advisor, claimed to the writers of this article that “the Ministry of Defense supervises exporting space technologies from Israel” (which takes into account fears of leaks), but “there is no hermetic assurance that can prevent leakage.” It should also be remembered that many technologies in the field of space are dual-use, like sensors and cameras.

Conclusion

In the past year, UAE–China relations have developed and progressed, reflecting the strategic preferences of the UAE, one of the leading Arab countries and one of Israel’s regional partners. Through its contacts with China, the UAE seeks to improve its status and increase its prosperity while at the same time developing leverage to pressure the US. Indeed, it appears that the hedging strategy of the Gulf states is bearing fruit, given the adjustments that Washington has begun to make in its policy toward the Gulf states; however, this is a delicate balancing act, which has its cost.

Ignoring China’s remarkable space research progress in recent years is impossible. Like other areas, China successfully attracts many countries with which China is the only option for cooperation, as the United States has refused to cooperate with them or limits the collaboration. An exception is the UAE, which simultaneously collaborates with both powers in a way that is potentially challenging for Israel: How can Israel expand its space capabilities by promoting fruitful new collaborations with a friendly state while at the same time avoiding risks associated with transferring advancing technologies to America’s greatest rival—China?

Unlike the US, which cooperates with the UAE in several space-related areas, Israel’s collaboration with the UAE focuses mainly on green energy, which China has also greatly emphasized. China has acquired control of nearly all aspects of the global green energy supply chain in recent years as it seeks to achieve zero emissions by 2060. Therefore, cooperation on the issue of green energy, as part of Israel’s cooperation with China on space research, directly or indirectly, could also benefit Israel, as it has numerous capabilities in advanced technology development in these fields.

Given the potential for cooperation in the field of space, with the UAE alone or with China, Israel must set limits to these contacts because of the sensitivity of the US and the fear that dual-use advanced technology will be leaked to China. The Ministry of Innovation, Science & Technology, through the Israel Space Agency, should hold a dialogue with its American counterparts to understand the security measures taken by the US in its collaboration with the UAE. Accordingly, the government should formulate updated regulatory rules to address the new situation based on the understanding that the collaborations with countries that have signed the Abraham Accords are expected to become broader and more significant over time. Finally, the regulator should publish updated and clear guidelines for Israeli industry and entities engaged in space research, in order to direct these collaborations to suitable areas.