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Home Strategic Assessment Becoming an Empire Again is not Easy: Turkey in the Erdogan Era

Becoming an Empire Again is not Easy: Turkey in the Erdogan Era

Book Reviews | March 2022
Gallia Lindenstrauss
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becoming an empire again is not easy: turkey in the erdogan era. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay’s main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan’s predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. book: erdogan’s empire: turkey and the politics of the middle east. by: soner cagaptay. publisher: i. b. tauris. year: 2020. pp: 369. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power (pp. xvii; 18-20). according to cagaptay, in many ways ankara has failed to achieve the goal it set for itself (p. 135). the title of the book, "erdogan's empire," refers to aspects of erdogan's attempt to revive elements from the ottoman empire (a policy often referred to as "neo-ottoman"), but at the same time to the personalization of turkish decision making in the erdogan era. cagaptay argues that like other countries that have had empires in the past, the imperial history nurtures present aspirations, and politicians such as erdogan use it in manipulative fashion (p. xv). for example, in its later period, the ottoman empire aspired to reform and learn from the western powers first and foremost for the sake of restoring its power (p. 9), and not because of an external artificial attempt to adopt a secular identity that, as erdogan tries to present it, is not "natural.". in general, the titles of cagaptay's books from recent years reflect many of the changes that have taken place within and in relation to turkey: from the optimism in the rise of turkey: the first muslim power in the 21st century (2014), through the new sultan: erdogan and the crisis of modern turkey (2017), and most recently, sultan in autumn: erdogan faces turkey’s uncontainable forces (2021) —a title that reflects the process that has weakened erdogan and harmed turkey's status. even in erdogan's empire it is already clear from the names of some chapters that turkey's ambitions have been met with difficult challenges: "europe’s slap," "the syrian disaster," and "erdogan's arab fall.". cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. the first four chapters of the book survey the primary characteristics of turkish foreign policy from the late ottoman period to the events of the arab spring. the book then examines more specific issues, such as turkey's bilateral relations with the united states during the obama era (with a later chapter on trump-era relations), as well as turkey-russia and turkey-iran relations. in general, the book is built chronologically from the rise to power of the justice and development party in late 2002 and is updated to the date of publication (2020). at the same time, some of the chapters deal with thematic issues and move back and forth between the years covered. for this reason, the book is less recommended for those who read it as an introduction to the period, as the leaps forward and back in time can be confusing. on the other hand, those who are familiar with the developments of the years studied will benefit from the breadth of the canvas and richness of detail. several times the book invites the question, what would have happened to erdogan's imperial aspirations had the arab spring not erupted in late 2010, or if the regime of egyptian president mohammed morsi had not fallen in 2013. cagaptay explains erdogan's support for parties across the middle east linked to the muslim brotherhood movement in his perception of them as an authentic expression of the public will, not based on ideologies coming from outside. he believed that in the end they would be the ones to rule, similar to what happened with the justice and development party in turkey (p. 185). regarding syria, the book’s approach to the negative impact of the events in syria on turkish foreign policy is striking. the civil war generated a deep crisis in relations with the united states (against the background of turkish disappointment that the united states did not do enough to overthrow the assad regime and also supported the syrian branch of the kurdish underground). in addition, russian intervention in the syrian civil war and its ability to preserve the assad regime increased moscow's bargaining power against ankara, in part following the crisis surrounding the downing of the russian fighter jet by the turkish air force in 2015. however, the book provides a number of convincing arguments that while the romanticization of the ottoman empire led to hubris in ankara (p. 193), in fact, in many countries of the region bad memories of this period remained (p. 197). cagaptay further argues that the longstanding turkish-egyptian rivalry would not have allowed for harmony in relations even if morsi had remained in power (p. 187). considering turkey's failures in the struggles for control in the middle east, in chapters 14 and 15 cagaptay discusses turkey's efforts in east africa, the balkans, the black sea, and even central asia, which he claims were more successful (p. 231). an issue examined extensively in the book is turkey's relations with western countries. with the author based in washington, it is not surprising that he delves into this issue in depth. cagaptay indicates a change in the prevailing perception of turkey in the united states—from a country that has a european identity to one that is considered a middle eastern country (p. 283). he also claims that there has been a change in turkey under erdogan's rule compared to his predecessors: from a country that saw itself politically and culturally connected to the west to a country that no longer sees it that way, but recognizes the importance of economic ties with the west and understands that without nato membership it will be russia's protectorate (p. 271). along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. in doing so, cagaptay suggests that not all is lost in the future of relations between turkey and western countries. the book also discusses extensively turkish foreign policy after the failed coup attempt in july 2016. in the context of a narrative that erdogan promoted even before the events of 2016 (and more so later), cagaptay makes an important argument that erdogan portrays himself as a victim who, for lack of choice, oppresses those who try to undermine him (p. 7). ankara's version of this narrative in relation to the international arena is that erdogan wanted to make turkey a great country again and did move in that direction, but the west, because it despises muslims and does not want to see them prosper, undermined turkey's success (p. 23). russia and iran's rapid positioning alongside erdogan after the failed coup attempt, and on the other hand, the perception in ankara that the west was hesitant in supporting erdogan after succeeding in thwarting the coup attempt, further contributed to turkey's distance from the west (p. 266). over time, and in line with the "victim narrative," conspiracy allegations have surfaced in ankara that the united states was involved in the coup attempt. along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. chapter 12 of the book, "course correction," refers to turkey's attempt to improve relations with a number of countries, including israel in the first half of 2016, given turkey’s sense of isolation in the middle east. reading the chapter in 2022, when one can once again identify turkey's attempt to improve relations with the united arab emirates, saudi arabia, egypt, israel, armenia, and greece, is important. turkey conducts course corrections when it is in a state of weakness, but just as the course correction in 2016 lasted a few years, so too should it be suspected that the current one is temporary. this is because it is not clear whether these are just tactical changes, while the aspiration, as cagaptay presents it, to become a stand-alone power remains the same. in a country like turkey, where dramatic occurrences seem like a daily event, even a relatively new book becomes somewhat dated. thus, in the period studied in the book, the sharp decline in the value of the turkish lira has only just begun—a phenomenon that accelerated significantly in 2021 with significant implications for turkey. similarly, the book does not yet include the polls showing the marked decline in support for erdogan, to the point of potentially losing the 2023 planned presidential elections. however, the book outlines well the causes of the deterioration and the failures of turkish foreign policy under erdogan. the decline in support for erdogan also signals the need to discuss the day after the end of his rule. in cagaptay’s depiction, it is not yet clear how much his legacy will subsequently be remembered as "great" (p. 302). what the book clearly presents is that erdogan's imperial aspirations were based on some shaky assumptions, and so the difficult situation that ankara faces today regarding internal and external challenges is not surprising.
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becoming an empire again is not easy: turkey in the erdogan era. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay’s main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan’s predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. book: erdogan’s empire: turkey and the politics of the middle east. by: soner cagaptay. publisher: i. b. tauris. year: 2020. pp: 369. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power (pp. xvii; 18-20). according to cagaptay, in many ways ankara has failed to achieve the goal it set for itself (p. 135). the title of the book, "erdogan's empire," refers to aspects of erdogan's attempt to revive elements from the ottoman empire (a policy often referred to as "neo-ottoman"), but at the same time to the personalization of turkish decision making in the erdogan era. cagaptay argues that like other countries that have had empires in the past, the imperial history nurtures present aspirations, and politicians such as erdogan use it in manipulative fashion (p. xv). for example, in its later period, the ottoman empire aspired to reform and learn from the western powers first and foremost for the sake of restoring its power (p. 9), and not because of an external artificial attempt to adopt a secular identity that, as erdogan tries to present it, is not "natural.". in general, the titles of cagaptay's books from recent years reflect many of the changes that have taken place within and in relation to turkey: from the optimism in the rise of turkey: the first muslim power in the 21st century (2014), through the new sultan: erdogan and the crisis of modern turkey (2017), and most recently, sultan in autumn: erdogan faces turkey’s uncontainable forces (2021) —a title that reflects the process that has weakened erdogan and harmed turkey's status. even in erdogan's empire it is already clear from the names of some chapters that turkey's ambitions have been met with difficult challenges: "europe’s slap," "the syrian disaster," and "erdogan's arab fall.". cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. the first four chapters of the book survey the primary characteristics of turkish foreign policy from the late ottoman period to the events of the arab spring. the book then examines more specific issues, such as turkey's bilateral relations with the united states during the obama era (with a later chapter on trump-era relations), as well as turkey-russia and turkey-iran relations. in general, the book is built chronologically from the rise to power of the justice and development party in late 2002 and is updated to the date of publication (2020). at the same time, some of the chapters deal with thematic issues and move back and forth between the years covered. for this reason, the book is less recommended for those who read it as an introduction to the period, as the leaps forward and back in time can be confusing. on the other hand, those who are familiar with the developments of the years studied will benefit from the breadth of the canvas and richness of detail. several times the book invites the question, what would have happened to erdogan's imperial aspirations had the arab spring not erupted in late 2010, or if the regime of egyptian president mohammed morsi had not fallen in 2013. cagaptay explains erdogan's support for parties across the middle east linked to the muslim brotherhood movement in his perception of them as an authentic expression of the public will, not based on ideologies coming from outside. he believed that in the end they would be the ones to rule, similar to what happened with the justice and development party in turkey (p. 185). regarding syria, the book’s approach to the negative impact of the events in syria on turkish foreign policy is striking. the civil war generated a deep crisis in relations with the united states (against the background of turkish disappointment that the united states did not do enough to overthrow the assad regime and also supported the syrian branch of the kurdish underground). in addition, russian intervention in the syrian civil war and its ability to preserve the assad regime increased moscow's bargaining power against ankara, in part following the crisis surrounding the downing of the russian fighter jet by the turkish air force in 2015. however, the book provides a number of convincing arguments that while the romanticization of the ottoman empire led to hubris in ankara (p. 193), in fact, in many countries of the region bad memories of this period remained (p. 197). cagaptay further argues that the longstanding turkish-egyptian rivalry would not have allowed for harmony in relations even if morsi had remained in power (p. 187). considering turkey's failures in the struggles for control in the middle east, in chapters 14 and 15 cagaptay discusses turkey's efforts in east africa, the balkans, the black sea, and even central asia, which he claims were more successful (p. 231). an issue examined extensively in the book is turkey's relations with western countries. with the author based in washington, it is not surprising that he delves into this issue in depth. cagaptay indicates a change in the prevailing perception of turkey in the united states—from a country that has a european identity to one that is considered a middle eastern country (p. 283). he also claims that there has been a change in turkey under erdogan's rule compared to his predecessors: from a country that saw itself politically and culturally connected to the west to a country that no longer sees it that way, but recognizes the importance of economic ties with the west and understands that without nato membership it will be russia's protectorate (p. 271). along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. in doing so, cagaptay suggests that not all is lost in the future of relations between turkey and western countries. the book also discusses extensively turkish foreign policy after the failed coup attempt in july 2016. in the context of a narrative that erdogan promoted even before the events of 2016 (and more so later), cagaptay makes an important argument that erdogan portrays himself as a victim who, for lack of choice, oppresses those who try to undermine him (p. 7). ankara's version of this narrative in relation to the international arena is that erdogan wanted to make turkey a great country again and did move in that direction, but the west, because it despises muslims and does not want to see them prosper, undermined turkey's success (p. 23). russia and iran's rapid positioning alongside erdogan after the failed coup attempt, and on the other hand, the perception in ankara that the west was hesitant in supporting erdogan after succeeding in thwarting the coup attempt, further contributed to turkey's distance from the west (p. 266). over time, and in line with the "victim narrative," conspiracy allegations have surfaced in ankara that the united states was involved in the coup attempt. along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. chapter 12 of the book, "course correction," refers to turkey's attempt to improve relations with a number of countries, including israel in the first half of 2016, given turkey’s sense of isolation in the middle east. reading the chapter in 2022, when one can once again identify turkey's attempt to improve relations with the united arab emirates, saudi arabia, egypt, israel, armenia, and greece, is important. turkey conducts course corrections when it is in a state of weakness, but just as the course correction in 2016 lasted a few years, so too should it be suspected that the current one is temporary. this is because it is not clear whether these are just tactical changes, while the aspiration, as cagaptay presents it, to become a stand-alone power remains the same. in a country like turkey, where dramatic occurrences seem like a daily event, even a relatively new book becomes somewhat dated. thus, in the period studied in the book, the sharp decline in the value of the turkish lira has only just begun—a phenomenon that accelerated significantly in 2021 with significant implications for turkey. similarly, the book does not yet include the polls showing the marked decline in support for erdogan, to the point of potentially losing the 2023 planned presidential elections. however, the book outlines well the causes of the deterioration and the failures of turkish foreign policy under erdogan. the decline in support for erdogan also signals the need to discuss the day after the end of his rule. in cagaptay’s depiction, it is not yet clear how much his legacy will subsequently be remembered as "great" (p. 302). what the book clearly presents is that erdogan's imperial aspirations were based on some shaky assumptions, and so the difficult situation that ankara faces today regarding internal and external challenges is not surprising.

Soner Cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary Turkey at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, has written a book of wide scope about Turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. The book is important for the Israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the Middle East, and Israel-Turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. Cagaptay’s main argument is that while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s predecessors sought to strengthen Turkey through the West, Erdogan sought to make Turkey a stand-alone power.


  • Book: Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East
  • By: Soner Cagaptay
  • Publisher: I. B. Tauris
  • Year: 2020
  • pp: 369

Soner Cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary Turkey at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, has written a book of wide scope about Turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. The book is important for the Israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the Middle East, and Israel-Turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. Cagaptay's main argument is that while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen Turkey through the West, Erdogan sought to make Turkey a stand-alone power (pp. xvii; 18-20). According to Cagaptay, in many ways Ankara has failed to achieve the goal it set for itself (p. 135).

The title of the book, "Erdogan's Empire," refers to aspects of Erdogan's attempt to revive elements from the Ottoman Empire (a policy often referred to as "neo-Ottoman"), but at the same time to the personalization of Turkish decision making in the Erdogan era. Cagaptay argues that like other countries that have had empires in the past, the imperial history nurtures present aspirations, and politicians such as Erdogan use it in manipulative fashion (p. xv). For example, in its later period, the Ottoman Empire aspired to reform and learn from the Western powers first and foremost for the sake of restoring its power (p. 9), and not because of an external artificial attempt to adopt a secular identity that, as Erdogan tries to present it, is not "natural."

In general, the titles of Cagaptay's books from recent years reflect many of the changes that have taken place within and in relation to Turkey: from the optimism in The Rise of Turkey: The First Muslim Power in the 21st Century (2014), through The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (2017), and most recently, Sultan in Autumn: Erdogan Faces Turkey’s Uncontainable Forces (2021) —a title that reflects the process that has weakened Erdogan and harmed Turkey's status. Even in Erdogan's Empire it is already clear from the names of some chapters that Turkey's ambitions have been met with difficult challenges: "Europe’s Slap," "The Syrian Disaster," and "Erdogan's Arab Fall."

Cagaptay's main argument is that while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen Turkey through the West, Erdogan sought to make Turkey a stand-alone power.

The first four chapters of the book survey the primary characteristics of Turkish foreign policy from the late Ottoman period to the events of the Arab Spring. The book then examines more specific issues, such as Turkey's bilateral relations with the United States during the Obama era (with a later chapter on Trump-era relations), as well as Turkey-Russia and Turkey-Iran relations. In general, the book is built chronologically from the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party in late 2002 and is updated to the date of publication (2020). At the same time, some of the chapters deal with thematic issues and move back and forth between the years covered. For this reason, the book is less recommended for those who read it as an introduction to the period, as the leaps forward and back in time can be confusing. On the other hand, those who are familiar with the developments of the years studied will benefit from the breadth of the canvas and richness of detail.

Several times the book invites the question, what would have happened to Erdogan's imperial aspirations had the Arab Spring not erupted in late 2010, or if the regime of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi had not fallen in 2013. Cagaptay explains Erdogan's support for parties across the Middle East linked to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in his perception of them as an authentic expression of the public will, not based on ideologies coming from outside. He believed that in the end they would be the ones to rule, similar to what happened with the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (p. 185). Regarding Syria, the book’s approach to the negative impact of the events in Syria on Turkish foreign policy is striking. The civil war generated a deep crisis in relations with the United States (against the background of Turkish disappointment that the United States did not do enough to overthrow the Assad regime and also supported the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground). In addition, Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war and its ability to preserve the Assad regime increased Moscow's bargaining power against Ankara, in part following the crisis surrounding the downing of the Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force in 2015.

However, the book provides a number of convincing arguments that while the romanticization of the Ottoman Empire led to hubris in Ankara (p. 193), in fact, in many countries of the region bad memories of this period remained (p. 197). Cagaptay further argues that the longstanding Turkish-Egyptian rivalry would not have allowed for harmony in relations even if Morsi had remained in power (p. 187). Considering Turkey's failures in the struggles for control in the Middle East, in Chapters 14 and 15 Cagaptay discusses Turkey's efforts in East Africa, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and even Central Asia, which he claims were more successful (p. 231).

An issue examined extensively in the book is Turkey's relations with Western countries. With the author based in Washington, it is not surprising that he delves into this issue in depth. Cagaptay indicates a change in the prevailing perception of Turkey in the United States—from a country that has a European identity to one that is considered a Middle Eastern country (p. 283). He also claims that there has been a change in Turkey under Erdogan's rule compared to his predecessors: from a country that saw itself politically and culturally connected to the West to a country that no longer sees it that way, but recognizes the importance of economic ties with the West and understands that without NATO membership it will be Russia's protectorate (p. 271). Along with differences from previous leaders in Turkey and in particular from Turkish Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Cagaptay insists that Erdogan is in fact a "Kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the West as an equal partner. In doing so, Cagaptay suggests that not all is lost in the future of relations between Turkey and Western countries.

The book also discusses extensively Turkish foreign policy after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. In the context of a narrative that Erdogan promoted even before the events of 2016 (and more so later), Cagaptay makes an important argument that Erdogan portrays himself as a victim who, for lack of choice, oppresses those who try to undermine him (p. 7). Ankara's version of this narrative in relation to the international arena is that Erdogan wanted to make Turkey a great country again and did move in that direction, but the West, because it despises Muslims and does not want to see them prosper, undermined Turkey's success (p. 23). Russia and Iran's rapid positioning alongside Erdogan after the failed coup attempt, and on the other hand, the perception in Ankara that the West was hesitant in supporting Erdogan after succeeding in thwarting the coup attempt, further contributed to Turkey's distance from the West (p. 266). Over time, and in line with the "victim narrative," conspiracy allegations have surfaced in Ankara that the United States was involved in the coup attempt.

Along with differences from previous leaders in Turkey and in particular from Turkish Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Cagaptay insists that Erdogan is in fact a "Kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the West as an equal partner.

Chapter 12 of the book, "Course Correction," refers to Turkey's attempt to improve relations with a number of countries, including Israel in the first half of 2016, given Turkey’s sense of isolation in the Middle East. Reading the chapter in 2022, when one can once again identify Turkey's attempt to improve relations with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Armenia, and Greece, is important. Turkey conducts course corrections when it is in a state of weakness, but just as the course correction in 2016 lasted a few years, so too should it be suspected that the current one is temporary. This is because it is not clear whether these are just tactical changes, while the aspiration, as Cagaptay presents it, to become a stand-alone power remains the same.

In a country like Turkey, where dramatic occurrences seem like a daily event, even a relatively new book becomes somewhat dated. Thus, in the period studied in the book, the sharp decline in the value of the Turkish lira has only just begun—a phenomenon that accelerated significantly in 2021 with significant implications for Turkey. Similarly, the book does not yet include the polls showing the marked decline in support for Erdogan, to the point of potentially losing the 2023 planned presidential elections. However, the book outlines well the causes of the deterioration and the failures of Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan. The decline in support for Erdogan also signals the need to discuss the day after the end of his rule. In Cagaptay’s depiction, it is not yet clear how much his legacy will subsequently be remembered as "great" (p. 302). What the book clearly presents is that Erdogan's imperial aspirations were based on some shaky assumptions, and so the difficult situation that Ankara faces today regarding internal and external challenges is not surprising.

 

 

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becoming an empire again is not easy: turkey in the erdogan era. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay’s main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan’s predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. book: erdogan’s empire: turkey and the politics of the middle east. by: soner cagaptay. publisher: i. b. tauris. year: 2020. pp: 369. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power (pp. xvii; 18-20). according to cagaptay, in many ways ankara has failed to achieve the goal it set for itself (p. 135). the title of the book, "erdogan's empire," refers to aspects of erdogan's attempt to revive elements from the ottoman empire (a policy often referred to as "neo-ottoman"), but at the same time to the personalization of turkish decision making in the erdogan era. cagaptay argues that like other countries that have had empires in the past, the imperial history nurtures present aspirations, and politicians such as erdogan use it in manipulative fashion (p. xv). for example, in its later period, the ottoman empire aspired to reform and learn from the western powers first and foremost for the sake of restoring its power (p. 9), and not because of an external artificial attempt to adopt a secular identity that, as erdogan tries to present it, is not "natural.". in general, the titles of cagaptay's books from recent years reflect many of the changes that have taken place within and in relation to turkey: from the optimism in the rise of turkey: the first muslim power in the 21st century (2014), through the new sultan: erdogan and the crisis of modern turkey (2017), and most recently, sultan in autumn: erdogan faces turkey’s uncontainable forces (2021) —a title that reflects the process that has weakened erdogan and harmed turkey's status. even in erdogan's empire it is already clear from the names of some chapters that turkey's ambitions have been met with difficult challenges: "europe’s slap," "the syrian disaster," and "erdogan's arab fall.". cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. the first four chapters of the book survey the primary characteristics of turkish foreign policy from the late ottoman period to the events of the arab spring. the book then examines more specific issues, such as turkey's bilateral relations with the united states during the obama era (with a later chapter on trump-era relations), as well as turkey-russia and turkey-iran relations. in general, the book is built chronologically from the rise to power of the justice and development party in late 2002 and is updated to the date of publication (2020). at the same time, some of the chapters deal with thematic issues and move back and forth between the years covered. for this reason, the book is less recommended for those who read it as an introduction to the period, as the leaps forward and back in time can be confusing. on the other hand, those who are familiar with the developments of the years studied will benefit from the breadth of the canvas and richness of detail. several times the book invites the question, what would have happened to erdogan's imperial aspirations had the arab spring not erupted in late 2010, or if the regime of egyptian president mohammed morsi had not fallen in 2013. cagaptay explains erdogan's support for parties across the middle east linked to the muslim brotherhood movement in his perception of them as an authentic expression of the public will, not based on ideologies coming from outside. he believed that in the end they would be the ones to rule, similar to what happened with the justice and development party in turkey (p. 185). regarding syria, the book’s approach to the negative impact of the events in syria on turkish foreign policy is striking. the civil war generated a deep crisis in relations with the united states (against the background of turkish disappointment that the united states did not do enough to overthrow the assad regime and also supported the syrian branch of the kurdish underground). in addition, russian intervention in the syrian civil war and its ability to preserve the assad regime increased moscow's bargaining power against ankara, in part following the crisis surrounding the downing of the russian fighter jet by the turkish air force in 2015. however, the book provides a number of convincing arguments that while the romanticization of the ottoman empire led to hubris in ankara (p. 193), in fact, in many countries of the region bad memories of this period remained (p. 197). cagaptay further argues that the longstanding turkish-egyptian rivalry would not have allowed for harmony in relations even if morsi had remained in power (p. 187). considering turkey's failures in the struggles for control in the middle east, in chapters 14 and 15 cagaptay discusses turkey's efforts in east africa, the balkans, the black sea, and even central asia, which he claims were more successful (p. 231). an issue examined extensively in the book is turkey's relations with western countries. with the author based in washington, it is not surprising that he delves into this issue in depth. cagaptay indicates a change in the prevailing perception of turkey in the united states—from a country that has a european identity to one that is considered a middle eastern country (p. 283). he also claims that there has been a change in turkey under erdogan's rule compared to his predecessors: from a country that saw itself politically and culturally connected to the west to a country that no longer sees it that way, but recognizes the importance of economic ties with the west and understands that without nato membership it will be russia's protectorate (p. 271). along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. in doing so, cagaptay suggests that not all is lost in the future of relations between turkey and western countries. the book also discusses extensively turkish foreign policy after the failed coup attempt in july 2016. in the context of a narrative that erdogan promoted even before the events of 2016 (and more so later), cagaptay makes an important argument that erdogan portrays himself as a victim who, for lack of choice, oppresses those who try to undermine him (p. 7). ankara's version of this narrative in relation to the international arena is that erdogan wanted to make turkey a great country again and did move in that direction, but the west, because it despises muslims and does not want to see them prosper, undermined turkey's success (p. 23). russia and iran's rapid positioning alongside erdogan after the failed coup attempt, and on the other hand, the perception in ankara that the west was hesitant in supporting erdogan after succeeding in thwarting the coup attempt, further contributed to turkey's distance from the west (p. 266). over time, and in line with the "victim narrative," conspiracy allegations have surfaced in ankara that the united states was involved in the coup attempt. along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. chapter 12 of the book, "course correction," refers to turkey's attempt to improve relations with a number of countries, including israel in the first half of 2016, given turkey’s sense of isolation in the middle east. reading the chapter in 2022, when one can once again identify turkey's attempt to improve relations with the united arab emirates, saudi arabia, egypt, israel, armenia, and greece, is important. turkey conducts course corrections when it is in a state of weakness, but just as the course correction in 2016 lasted a few years, so too should it be suspected that the current one is temporary. this is because it is not clear whether these are just tactical changes, while the aspiration, as cagaptay presents it, to become a stand-alone power remains the same. in a country like turkey, where dramatic occurrences seem like a daily event, even a relatively new book becomes somewhat dated. thus, in the period studied in the book, the sharp decline in the value of the turkish lira has only just begun—a phenomenon that accelerated significantly in 2021 with significant implications for turkey. similarly, the book does not yet include the polls showing the marked decline in support for erdogan, to the point of potentially losing the 2023 planned presidential elections. however, the book outlines well the causes of the deterioration and the failures of turkish foreign policy under erdogan. the decline in support for erdogan also signals the need to discuss the day after the end of his rule. in cagaptay’s depiction, it is not yet clear how much his legacy will subsequently be remembered as "great" (p. 302). what the book clearly presents is that erdogan's imperial aspirations were based on some shaky assumptions, and so the difficult situation that ankara faces today regarding internal and external challenges is not surprising.
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becoming an empire again is not easy: turkey in the erdogan era. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay’s main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan’s predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. book: erdogan’s empire: turkey and the politics of the middle east. by: soner cagaptay. publisher: i. b. tauris. year: 2020. pp: 369. soner cagaptay, a leading researcher of contemporary turkey at the washington institute for near eastern policy, has written a book of wide scope about turkish foreign policy over the past two decades. the book is important for the israeli audience mainly for its emphasis on the middle east, and israel-turkey relations in particular receive considerable attention. cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power (pp. xvii; 18-20). according to cagaptay, in many ways ankara has failed to achieve the goal it set for itself (p. 135). the title of the book, "erdogan's empire," refers to aspects of erdogan's attempt to revive elements from the ottoman empire (a policy often referred to as "neo-ottoman"), but at the same time to the personalization of turkish decision making in the erdogan era. cagaptay argues that like other countries that have had empires in the past, the imperial history nurtures present aspirations, and politicians such as erdogan use it in manipulative fashion (p. xv). for example, in its later period, the ottoman empire aspired to reform and learn from the western powers first and foremost for the sake of restoring its power (p. 9), and not because of an external artificial attempt to adopt a secular identity that, as erdogan tries to present it, is not "natural.". in general, the titles of cagaptay's books from recent years reflect many of the changes that have taken place within and in relation to turkey: from the optimism in the rise of turkey: the first muslim power in the 21st century (2014), through the new sultan: erdogan and the crisis of modern turkey (2017), and most recently, sultan in autumn: erdogan faces turkey’s uncontainable forces (2021) —a title that reflects the process that has weakened erdogan and harmed turkey's status. even in erdogan's empire it is already clear from the names of some chapters that turkey's ambitions have been met with difficult challenges: "europe’s slap," "the syrian disaster," and "erdogan's arab fall.". cagaptay's main argument is that while turkish president recep tayyip erdogan's predecessors sought to strengthen turkey through the west, erdogan sought to make turkey a stand-alone power. the first four chapters of the book survey the primary characteristics of turkish foreign policy from the late ottoman period to the events of the arab spring. the book then examines more specific issues, such as turkey's bilateral relations with the united states during the obama era (with a later chapter on trump-era relations), as well as turkey-russia and turkey-iran relations. in general, the book is built chronologically from the rise to power of the justice and development party in late 2002 and is updated to the date of publication (2020). at the same time, some of the chapters deal with thematic issues and move back and forth between the years covered. for this reason, the book is less recommended for those who read it as an introduction to the period, as the leaps forward and back in time can be confusing. on the other hand, those who are familiar with the developments of the years studied will benefit from the breadth of the canvas and richness of detail. several times the book invites the question, what would have happened to erdogan's imperial aspirations had the arab spring not erupted in late 2010, or if the regime of egyptian president mohammed morsi had not fallen in 2013. cagaptay explains erdogan's support for parties across the middle east linked to the muslim brotherhood movement in his perception of them as an authentic expression of the public will, not based on ideologies coming from outside. he believed that in the end they would be the ones to rule, similar to what happened with the justice and development party in turkey (p. 185). regarding syria, the book’s approach to the negative impact of the events in syria on turkish foreign policy is striking. the civil war generated a deep crisis in relations with the united states (against the background of turkish disappointment that the united states did not do enough to overthrow the assad regime and also supported the syrian branch of the kurdish underground). in addition, russian intervention in the syrian civil war and its ability to preserve the assad regime increased moscow's bargaining power against ankara, in part following the crisis surrounding the downing of the russian fighter jet by the turkish air force in 2015. however, the book provides a number of convincing arguments that while the romanticization of the ottoman empire led to hubris in ankara (p. 193), in fact, in many countries of the region bad memories of this period remained (p. 197). cagaptay further argues that the longstanding turkish-egyptian rivalry would not have allowed for harmony in relations even if morsi had remained in power (p. 187). considering turkey's failures in the struggles for control in the middle east, in chapters 14 and 15 cagaptay discusses turkey's efforts in east africa, the balkans, the black sea, and even central asia, which he claims were more successful (p. 231). an issue examined extensively in the book is turkey's relations with western countries. with the author based in washington, it is not surprising that he delves into this issue in depth. cagaptay indicates a change in the prevailing perception of turkey in the united states—from a country that has a european identity to one that is considered a middle eastern country (p. 283). he also claims that there has been a change in turkey under erdogan's rule compared to his predecessors: from a country that saw itself politically and culturally connected to the west to a country that no longer sees it that way, but recognizes the importance of economic ties with the west and understands that without nato membership it will be russia's protectorate (p. 271). along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. in doing so, cagaptay suggests that not all is lost in the future of relations between turkey and western countries. the book also discusses extensively turkish foreign policy after the failed coup attempt in july 2016. in the context of a narrative that erdogan promoted even before the events of 2016 (and more so later), cagaptay makes an important argument that erdogan portrays himself as a victim who, for lack of choice, oppresses those who try to undermine him (p. 7). ankara's version of this narrative in relation to the international arena is that erdogan wanted to make turkey a great country again and did move in that direction, but the west, because it despises muslims and does not want to see them prosper, undermined turkey's success (p. 23). russia and iran's rapid positioning alongside erdogan after the failed coup attempt, and on the other hand, the perception in ankara that the west was hesitant in supporting erdogan after succeeding in thwarting the coup attempt, further contributed to turkey's distance from the west (p. 266). over time, and in line with the "victim narrative," conspiracy allegations have surfaced in ankara that the united states was involved in the coup attempt. along with differences from previous leaders in turkey and in particular from turkish republic founder mustafa kemal ataturk, cagaptay insists that erdogan is in fact a "kemalist in the closet," in that he still aspires to be recognized by the west as an equal partner. chapter 12 of the book, "course correction," refers to turkey's attempt to improve relations with a number of countries, including israel in the first half of 2016, given turkey’s sense of isolation in the middle east. reading the chapter in 2022, when one can once again identify turkey's attempt to improve relations with the united arab emirates, saudi arabia, egypt, israel, armenia, and greece, is important. turkey conducts course corrections when it is in a state of weakness, but just as the course correction in 2016 lasted a few years, so too should it be suspected that the current one is temporary. this is because it is not clear whether these are just tactical changes, while the aspiration, as cagaptay presents it, to become a stand-alone power remains the same. in a country like turkey, where dramatic occurrences seem like a daily event, even a relatively new book becomes somewhat dated. thus, in the period studied in the book, the sharp decline in the value of the turkish lira has only just begun—a phenomenon that accelerated significantly in 2021 with significant implications for turkey. similarly, the book does not yet include the polls showing the marked decline in support for erdogan, to the point of potentially losing the 2023 planned presidential elections. however, the book outlines well the causes of the deterioration and the failures of turkish foreign policy under erdogan. the decline in support for erdogan also signals the need to discuss the day after the end of his rule. in cagaptay’s depiction, it is not yet clear how much his legacy will subsequently be remembered as "great" (p. 302). what the book clearly presents is that erdogan's imperial aspirations were based on some shaky assumptions, and so the difficult situation that ankara faces today regarding internal and external challenges is not surprising.
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