The expected meeting between US President Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House on November 18 may prove to be a formative event in shaping the new balance of power in the Middle East and could have a direct impact on Israel. Saudi Arabia, a key state in the Arab arena, holds unique weight due to its political, economic, and religious status, and because it serves as a central player in the regional system vis-à-vis Iran. Trump views Saudi Arabia as a major factor in implementing the American vision of a “new regional architecture,” and from his perspective, strengthening ties with Riyadh is an important pillar of the administration’s “big deals” policy—partnerships based on mutual benefits in security, economy, and technology. The ceasefire in Gaza and the aspiration to stabilize the Palestinian arena are seen in Washington as an opportunity to leverage cooperation with Saudi Arabia toward a new regional order.
In this context, the recent White House announcement about Kazakhstan joining the Abraham Accords is not merely a symbolic move but also an expression of a broader strategy: an American attempt to build a network of bridges between Central Asia and the Middle East under US leadership. Washington sees Kazakhstan, a moderate Muslim state with significant geostrategic and economic weight, as a connecting link between the post-Soviet space and the Arab world and as a potential partner in regional energy, infrastructure, and security initiatives. The declaration of its inclusion in the framework of the Abraham Accords is meant to signal to regional countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, that the US administration is determined to expand the “circle of stability” around Israel beyond the traditional Middle East, and that those who hesitate may find themselves left outside the new order.
At the same time, reports indicate Washington’s intention to advance a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia similar to the one recently signed with Qatar, and within this framework, it may even approve, for the first time, the sale of advanced F-35 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This American willingness is expected not only to strengthen Saudi motivation to pursue deals with Washington but also to encourage the Saudis to advance normalization steps with Israel. For now, it remains unclear to what extent the crown prince will meet US expectations during his visit. It is well known that Saudi Arabia’s willingness to move forward on this issue depends on progress toward a political framework regarding the Palestinian issue. Deepening US–Saudi cooperation at this stage may reduce Riyadh’s incentive to normalize its relations with Israel in the future, especially if the United States grants Saudi Arabia what it seeks: access to advanced technologies, defense agreements, and even a license for uranium enrichment, without political conditions related to Israel. Not only might Israel miss the normalization train, but such a move could also harm its qualitative military edge and erode the taboo regarding uranium enrichment.
In the absence of a significant Israeli political move toward the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia may achieve considerable strategic gains from Washington without paying a political price toward Jerusalem. Therefore, Israel will need to demonstrate flexible policy and a broad strategic vision—one that enables it to be part of shaping the new order rather than being left outside it. Maintaining close coordination with Washington, alongside openness to measured diplomatic initiatives, may help Israel remain a central player in the Washington–Riyadh axis and prevent the emergence of a new regional order in which its influence diminishes.
The expected meeting between US President Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House on November 18 may prove to be a formative event in shaping the new balance of power in the Middle East and could have a direct impact on Israel. Saudi Arabia, a key state in the Arab arena, holds unique weight due to its political, economic, and religious status, and because it serves as a central player in the regional system vis-à-vis Iran. Trump views Saudi Arabia as a major factor in implementing the American vision of a “new regional architecture,” and from his perspective, strengthening ties with Riyadh is an important pillar of the administration’s “big deals” policy—partnerships based on mutual benefits in security, economy, and technology. The ceasefire in Gaza and the aspiration to stabilize the Palestinian arena are seen in Washington as an opportunity to leverage cooperation with Saudi Arabia toward a new regional order.
In this context, the recent White House announcement about Kazakhstan joining the Abraham Accords is not merely a symbolic move but also an expression of a broader strategy: an American attempt to build a network of bridges between Central Asia and the Middle East under US leadership. Washington sees Kazakhstan, a moderate Muslim state with significant geostrategic and economic weight, as a connecting link between the post-Soviet space and the Arab world and as a potential partner in regional energy, infrastructure, and security initiatives. The declaration of its inclusion in the framework of the Abraham Accords is meant to signal to regional countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, that the US administration is determined to expand the “circle of stability” around Israel beyond the traditional Middle East, and that those who hesitate may find themselves left outside the new order.
At the same time, reports indicate Washington’s intention to advance a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia similar to the one recently signed with Qatar, and within this framework, it may even approve, for the first time, the sale of advanced F-35 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This American willingness is expected not only to strengthen Saudi motivation to pursue deals with Washington but also to encourage the Saudis to advance normalization steps with Israel. For now, it remains unclear to what extent the crown prince will meet US expectations during his visit. It is well known that Saudi Arabia’s willingness to move forward on this issue depends on progress toward a political framework regarding the Palestinian issue. Deepening US–Saudi cooperation at this stage may reduce Riyadh’s incentive to normalize its relations with Israel in the future, especially if the United States grants Saudi Arabia what it seeks: access to advanced technologies, defense agreements, and even a license for uranium enrichment, without political conditions related to Israel. Not only might Israel miss the normalization train, but such a move could also harm its qualitative military edge and erode the taboo regarding uranium enrichment.
In the absence of a significant Israeli political move toward the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia may achieve considerable strategic gains from Washington without paying a political price toward Jerusalem. Therefore, Israel will need to demonstrate flexible policy and a broad strategic vision—one that enables it to be part of shaping the new order rather than being left outside it. Maintaining close coordination with Washington, alongside openness to measured diplomatic initiatives, may help Israel remain a central player in the Washington–Riyadh axis and prevent the emergence of a new regional order in which its influence diminishes.