The recent visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Beirut was, at least according to official rhetoric, intended to convey a message of continuity and support for Lebanon and Hezbollah. In practice, it reflected the growing challenges facing Iran in the region, particularly in the Lebanese arena.
During his visit, Araghchi met with senior Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. While he did declare that Iran supports Hezbollah, he also emphasized that Tehran respects its independence and its “national decisions.” Araghchi referred to the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament as an “internal Lebanese matter” that should be resolved through a domestic political process between the government and various factions. He noted that his discussions with Lebanese officials were constructive and led to understandings about expanding economic and political cooperation, emphasizing respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and a commitment to non-intervention in its internal affairs. Moreover, he stated that Iran expressed willingness to participate in infrastructure reconstruction projects in Lebanon, but stressed that such cooperation would take place only within an official governmental framework and according to priorities set by the Lebanese government.
During his visit, the Iranian foreign minister visited the grave of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and met with the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem. However, unlike in the past, his meeting with Qassem received relatively low coverage in the Iranian media, especially compared to his meetings with senior Lebanese officials.
In doing so, Araghchi signaled an understanding of the new rules of the game in the Lebanese arena: Iran can no longer rely solely on Hezbollah and bypass the Lebanese state as it once did. It is evident that Tehran is also being forced to acknowledge the erosion of its status and the weakening of Hezbollah, in light of increasing domestic calls in Lebanon for the group’s disarmament and the mounting pressure on it – both from Israel and the Lebanese government. Lebanese Prime Minister Salam recently expressed this trend by declaring that “the era of exporting the Iranian revolution is over” and that Lebanon will not rest as long as there are weapons not in the hands of the state.
This does not mean that Iran intends to abandon its support for the “resistance” or its efforts to maintain influence in Lebanon – including through Hezbollah, which remains its main ally in the arena. However, it appears that Tehran also understands that if it wishes to remain relevant and preserve as much influence as possible in Lebanon, it must adapt its policy to the changing circumstances, increasingly operate through the Lebanese state, and utilize levers of influence that are not limited to arms supply – but also include diplomatic and political activity and assistance in economic recovery.
The recent visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Beirut was, at least according to official rhetoric, intended to convey a message of continuity and support for Lebanon and Hezbollah. In practice, it reflected the growing challenges facing Iran in the region, particularly in the Lebanese arena.
During his visit, Araghchi met with senior Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. While he did declare that Iran supports Hezbollah, he also emphasized that Tehran respects its independence and its “national decisions.” Araghchi referred to the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament as an “internal Lebanese matter” that should be resolved through a domestic political process between the government and various factions. He noted that his discussions with Lebanese officials were constructive and led to understandings about expanding economic and political cooperation, emphasizing respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and a commitment to non-intervention in its internal affairs. Moreover, he stated that Iran expressed willingness to participate in infrastructure reconstruction projects in Lebanon, but stressed that such cooperation would take place only within an official governmental framework and according to priorities set by the Lebanese government.
During his visit, the Iranian foreign minister visited the grave of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and met with the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem. However, unlike in the past, his meeting with Qassem received relatively low coverage in the Iranian media, especially compared to his meetings with senior Lebanese officials.
In doing so, Araghchi signaled an understanding of the new rules of the game in the Lebanese arena: Iran can no longer rely solely on Hezbollah and bypass the Lebanese state as it once did. It is evident that Tehran is also being forced to acknowledge the erosion of its status and the weakening of Hezbollah, in light of increasing domestic calls in Lebanon for the group’s disarmament and the mounting pressure on it – both from Israel and the Lebanese government. Lebanese Prime Minister Salam recently expressed this trend by declaring that “the era of exporting the Iranian revolution is over” and that Lebanon will not rest as long as there are weapons not in the hands of the state.
This does not mean that Iran intends to abandon its support for the “resistance” or its efforts to maintain influence in Lebanon – including through Hezbollah, which remains its main ally in the arena. However, it appears that Tehran also understands that if it wishes to remain relevant and preserve as much influence as possible in Lebanon, it must adapt its policy to the changing circumstances, increasingly operate through the Lebanese state, and utilize levers of influence that are not limited to arms supply – but also include diplomatic and political activity and assistance in economic recovery.