The first official foreign visit of President Masoud Pezeshkian to Pakistan in early August 2025 reflects Iran’s effort to stabilize its eastern border and transform it from an area of ongoing tension into a space for partnership and economic opportunities. The border between Iran and Pakistan, particularly in the Balochistan region, has long been a source of friction due to militant separatist activity and cross-border criminal networks. In early 2024, tensions between the two states peaked when Iran launched missiles targeting Jaysh al-Adl, the Baloch separatist movement, on Pakistani soil in response to a deadly attack by its militants in Rask, eastern Iran. Pakistan responded with airstrikes, but the crisis quickly subsided.
The president’s visit fits into Iran’s broader efforts to strengthen its regional ties, especially given the significant challenges it faces in the regional arena (both in the Middle East and the South Caucasus) and the implications of its war with Israel and the United States. Tehran seeks to present itself as a constructive partner, including through its offer to mediate between India and Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan condemned the Israeli and American strikes and expressed support for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue and for Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program.
During the visit, twelve bilateral agreements were signed to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries, including in the fields of trade, energy, and infrastructure. Iran, which has already joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), views improved ties with Pakistan as an opportunity to expand cooperation within the framework of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In addition, both countries signaled their intention to advance broader regional cooperation, including around investments in Gwadar Port and Chabahar Port, which raises sensitivities given the rivalry between India and Pakistan.
In a wider context, the development of Iran–Pakistan relations can also be seen in the framework of global competition. Both states are deepening their ties with China, while Washington seeks to invest in Pakistan’s oil sector, including projects in Balochistan. Islamabad aims to strengthen its relations with the United States (as reflected by two recent visits of Pakistan’s chief of army staff to the United States) without undermining its ties with China and Iran. In this context, Pakistan positions itself as a potential mediator between Tehran and Washington.
In any case, it is doubtful whether significant economic cooperation between the two countries can advance without substantial easing of sanctions on Iran, particularly if sanctions are intensified following the reactivation of the snapback mechanism in the coming weeks.
The first official foreign visit of President Masoud Pezeshkian to Pakistan in early August 2025 reflects Iran’s effort to stabilize its eastern border and transform it from an area of ongoing tension into a space for partnership and economic opportunities. The border between Iran and Pakistan, particularly in the Balochistan region, has long been a source of friction due to militant separatist activity and cross-border criminal networks. In early 2024, tensions between the two states peaked when Iran launched missiles targeting Jaysh al-Adl, the Baloch separatist movement, on Pakistani soil in response to a deadly attack by its militants in Rask, eastern Iran. Pakistan responded with airstrikes, but the crisis quickly subsided.
The president’s visit fits into Iran’s broader efforts to strengthen its regional ties, especially given the significant challenges it faces in the regional arena (both in the Middle East and the South Caucasus) and the implications of its war with Israel and the United States. Tehran seeks to present itself as a constructive partner, including through its offer to mediate between India and Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan condemned the Israeli and American strikes and expressed support for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue and for Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program.
During the visit, twelve bilateral agreements were signed to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries, including in the fields of trade, energy, and infrastructure. Iran, which has already joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), views improved ties with Pakistan as an opportunity to expand cooperation within the framework of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In addition, both countries signaled their intention to advance broader regional cooperation, including around investments in Gwadar Port and Chabahar Port, which raises sensitivities given the rivalry between India and Pakistan.
In a wider context, the development of Iran–Pakistan relations can also be seen in the framework of global competition. Both states are deepening their ties with China, while Washington seeks to invest in Pakistan’s oil sector, including projects in Balochistan. Islamabad aims to strengthen its relations with the United States (as reflected by two recent visits of Pakistan’s chief of army staff to the United States) without undermining its ties with China and Iran. In this context, Pakistan positions itself as a potential mediator between Tehran and Washington.
In any case, it is doubtful whether significant economic cooperation between the two countries can advance without substantial easing of sanctions on Iran, particularly if sanctions are intensified following the reactivation of the snapback mechanism in the coming weeks.