Over a week has passed since the Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory in the Kursk region. This is the first time that Ukraine decided to carry out an extensive and continuous military operation across the border, as opposed to a number of short raids that were carried out using a force between a company and a battalion at most and without taking responsibility. This time, the Ukrainians have sent forces the size of several brigades to carry out the task, took over an area of between 500 and 1,000 square kilometers (depending on who is counting), and took a large number of prisoners (several dozen at the very least). Over 100,000 Russian residents were evacuated from the area. And yet, the situation and the front line in the district have not yet completely stabilized.
At the beginning of the operation, Ukraine conducted itself with full ambiguity, but in the last days Zelensky admitted the move. Putin has also confirmed Ukrainian presence on his territory, although he is known to not usually acknowledge failures. The decision to undertake the operation was a gamble on the Ukrainian side—raising morale, proving that Russia isn’t able to control the situation, and in the event of success, thinning out Russian forces in other areas of the front and possibly even an exchange of territory. However, the deployed forces are among the few available units in the possession of the Ukrainian army, and the Russian pressure on the rest of the front is still strong.
If the Ukrainians manage to fortify and hold the territory for a long time, this will reveal a weakness in Moscow—first of all, externally—the lack of Russian deterrence, the lack of existence of red lines, and more. The establishment will probably know how to justify the situation to Russian society, possibly even while remobilizing forces against an external enemy.
In any case, it’s premature to talk about a change in the strategic balance in the war, since the new reality doesn’t give Ukraine a decisive advantage and doesn’t guarantee the success of the operation in the months ahead. The war will likely continue into 2025, when we’ll witness continued cooperation between Russia and Iran (on which Moscow relies heavily), while the West will continue to be deeply involved in the war and plan the response to Russia’s threat to Europe.
Over a week has passed since the Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory in the Kursk region. This is the first time that Ukraine decided to carry out an extensive and continuous military operation across the border, as opposed to a number of short raids that were carried out using a force between a company and a battalion at most and without taking responsibility. This time, the Ukrainians have sent forces the size of several brigades to carry out the task, took over an area of between 500 and 1,000 square kilometers (depending on who is counting), and took a large number of prisoners (several dozen at the very least). Over 100,000 Russian residents were evacuated from the area. And yet, the situation and the front line in the district have not yet completely stabilized.
At the beginning of the operation, Ukraine conducted itself with full ambiguity, but in the last days Zelensky admitted the move. Putin has also confirmed Ukrainian presence on his territory, although he is known to not usually acknowledge failures. The decision to undertake the operation was a gamble on the Ukrainian side—raising morale, proving that Russia isn’t able to control the situation, and in the event of success, thinning out Russian forces in other areas of the front and possibly even an exchange of territory. However, the deployed forces are among the few available units in the possession of the Ukrainian army, and the Russian pressure on the rest of the front is still strong.
If the Ukrainians manage to fortify and hold the territory for a long time, this will reveal a weakness in Moscow—first of all, externally—the lack of Russian deterrence, the lack of existence of red lines, and more. The establishment will probably know how to justify the situation to Russian society, possibly even while remobilizing forces against an external enemy.
In any case, it’s premature to talk about a change in the strategic balance in the war, since the new reality doesn’t give Ukraine a decisive advantage and doesn’t guarantee the success of the operation in the months ahead. The war will likely continue into 2025, when we’ll witness continued cooperation between Russia and Iran (on which Moscow relies heavily), while the West will continue to be deeply involved in the war and plan the response to Russia’s threat to Europe.