President Trump’s post last night marks another step up in the campaign against Iran. The ultimatum he presented to Tehran—to open the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours—and his threat to damage Iran’s central electricity infrastructure if it fails to do so suggest that, from Washington’s perspective, the campaign is no longer focused only on Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. At this stage, it is also a matter of deterrence and presidential credibility. This threat should be taken seriously, among other reasons, because it is backed by the continued buildup of American forces in the region and by the consideration of military options to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf.
However, the ultimatum does not necessarily indicate that Trump has chosen a path of full escalation. It is more likely that he seeks, first and foremost, to maximize the threat itself to exert pressure on Iran, signal determination to his partners and rivals, and at the same time leave room for maneuvering between military enforcement, partial containment, or a limited arrangement. The American decision to allow for 30 days the sale and supply of Iranian oil already at sea—a move intended to add about 140 million barrels to the market—also suggests that the White House is acting not only according to the logic of escalation but also out of a desire to curb rising energy prices and the domestic political costs that come with them.
Iran, for its part, is not following a pattern of containment but rather one of counter-escalation. Its response to the American ultimatum included an explicit threat to damage both American infrastructure as well as that of regional allies. In recent days, it has already proven its ability to expand the arena of conflict through attacks on energy facilities in the Gulf and launches toward Israel. In this sense, the campaign is intensifying and taking on the character of a mutual struggle: every escalation by Washington or Jerusalem is met by an Iranian effort to show that Tehran also retains the ability to inflict pain, cause disruption, and exact a price.
Nevertheless, even if Trump succeeds in forcing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the campaign’s fundamental questions will remain—primarily the future of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, which is buried underground, apparently at several sites. At the same time, the accumulating evidence indicates that the regime in Tehran has not collapsed and that, even after sustaining a hard blow to its capabilities, it remains able to function, respond, and escalate.
The campaign is no longer just about the nuclear issue, freedom of navigation, or oil prices. It has also become a test of credibility, steadfastness, and coercive capability. Trump seeks at this stage to preserve all options for himself, but as long as the confrontation continues and expands, the risk increases that the struggle over deterrence and the costs it imposes will become a central component no less than the original strategic goals.
President Trump’s post last night marks another step up in the campaign against Iran. The ultimatum he presented to Tehran—to open the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours—and his threat to damage Iran’s central electricity infrastructure if it fails to do so suggest that, from Washington’s perspective, the campaign is no longer focused only on Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. At this stage, it is also a matter of deterrence and presidential credibility. This threat should be taken seriously, among other reasons, because it is backed by the continued buildup of American forces in the region and by the consideration of military options to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf.
However, the ultimatum does not necessarily indicate that Trump has chosen a path of full escalation. It is more likely that he seeks, first and foremost, to maximize the threat itself to exert pressure on Iran, signal determination to his partners and rivals, and at the same time leave room for maneuvering between military enforcement, partial containment, or a limited arrangement. The American decision to allow for 30 days the sale and supply of Iranian oil already at sea—a move intended to add about 140 million barrels to the market—also suggests that the White House is acting not only according to the logic of escalation but also out of a desire to curb rising energy prices and the domestic political costs that come with them.
Iran, for its part, is not following a pattern of containment but rather one of counter-escalation. Its response to the American ultimatum included an explicit threat to damage both American infrastructure as well as that of regional allies. In recent days, it has already proven its ability to expand the arena of conflict through attacks on energy facilities in the Gulf and launches toward Israel. In this sense, the campaign is intensifying and taking on the character of a mutual struggle: every escalation by Washington or Jerusalem is met by an Iranian effort to show that Tehran also retains the ability to inflict pain, cause disruption, and exact a price.
Nevertheless, even if Trump succeeds in forcing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the campaign’s fundamental questions will remain—primarily the future of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, which is buried underground, apparently at several sites. At the same time, the accumulating evidence indicates that the regime in Tehran has not collapsed and that, even after sustaining a hard blow to its capabilities, it remains able to function, respond, and escalate.
The campaign is no longer just about the nuclear issue, freedom of navigation, or oil prices. It has also become a test of credibility, steadfastness, and coercive capability. Trump seeks at this stage to preserve all options for himself, but as long as the confrontation continues and expands, the risk increases that the struggle over deterrence and the costs it imposes will become a central component no less than the original strategic goals.