Recently, the X platform (formerly Twitter) launched “About This Account,” a feature that displays when an account was opened, the history of username changes, the country/region from which the account is operated according to the platform’s assessment, and the location where the app was downloaded. The stated purpose is to make impersonation, coordinated campaigns, and bots more difficult, and to provide users and researchers with an immediate indication of the authenticity level of accounts—part of growing regulatory pressure on the platforms.
The feature makes identifying foreign actors much easier. For example, an account presenting itself as Israeli but marked as operating from Tehran or Moscow constitutes an immediate “red flag.” Indeed, just days after the feature was launched, popular accounts that claimed to be Israeli were exposed as being operated from countries such as Russia, Nigeria, and Thailand.
The move has implications for dealing with foreign influence:
• Even if the feature can be bypassed, doing so will require significant resources and sophistication, forcing attackers to invest heavily in creating high-quality deception;
• The feature provides an open repository of geographic anomalies that can be cross-referenced with content patterns to map foreign networks and influence operations;
• The feature may help identify AI-based fictitious entities that until now have enjoyed relative credibility due to visually polished profiles.
However, this is an arms race. Hostile actors are expected to quickly adopt circumvention methods and new impersonation solutions, meaning the “window of opportunity” created by the feature may shrink over time.
Democratic states face inherent limitations in collecting information about their citizens due to commitments to privacy and freedom of expression. By exposing information about users, X provides the state with critical indications about foreign actors without requiring the state to collect sensitive data itself, thereby easing the challenge of confronting the threat. On the other hand, the move deepens states’ dependence on private tech corporations, which are becoming de facto regulators of the public sphere and intelligence providers, without adequate public oversight mechanisms.
In conclusion, the new feature adds a layer of transparency that serves democracies and is part of a broader trend of demanding accountability on platforms. For Israel, which is in the midst of a battle over public perception against intensive Iranian and Russian networks, this is an opportunity to improve “digital hygiene.” If this information is integrated into public outreach efforts and advanced monitoring tools, it could serve as an additional protective layer against hostile cognitive manipulation.
Recently, the X platform (formerly Twitter) launched “About This Account,” a feature that displays when an account was opened, the history of username changes, the country/region from which the account is operated according to the platform’s assessment, and the location where the app was downloaded. The stated purpose is to make impersonation, coordinated campaigns, and bots more difficult, and to provide users and researchers with an immediate indication of the authenticity level of accounts—part of growing regulatory pressure on the platforms.
The feature makes identifying foreign actors much easier. For example, an account presenting itself as Israeli but marked as operating from Tehran or Moscow constitutes an immediate “red flag.” Indeed, just days after the feature was launched, popular accounts that claimed to be Israeli were exposed as being operated from countries such as Russia, Nigeria, and Thailand.
The move has implications for dealing with foreign influence:
• Even if the feature can be bypassed, doing so will require significant resources and sophistication, forcing attackers to invest heavily in creating high-quality deception;
• The feature provides an open repository of geographic anomalies that can be cross-referenced with content patterns to map foreign networks and influence operations;
• The feature may help identify AI-based fictitious entities that until now have enjoyed relative credibility due to visually polished profiles.
However, this is an arms race. Hostile actors are expected to quickly adopt circumvention methods and new impersonation solutions, meaning the “window of opportunity” created by the feature may shrink over time.
Democratic states face inherent limitations in collecting information about their citizens due to commitments to privacy and freedom of expression. By exposing information about users, X provides the state with critical indications about foreign actors without requiring the state to collect sensitive data itself, thereby easing the challenge of confronting the threat. On the other hand, the move deepens states’ dependence on private tech corporations, which are becoming de facto regulators of the public sphere and intelligence providers, without adequate public oversight mechanisms.
In conclusion, the new feature adds a layer of transparency that serves democracies and is part of a broader trend of demanding accountability on platforms. For Israel, which is in the midst of a battle over public perception against intensive Iranian and Russian networks, this is an opportunity to improve “digital hygiene.” If this information is integrated into public outreach efforts and advanced monitoring tools, it could serve as an additional protective layer against hostile cognitive manipulation.