The Israeli attack on Iran, which triggered an all-out war between the two countries, not only dealt a severe blow to Iran's nuclear program and conventional capabilities but also further exposed the consequences of the blow sustained by Iran's proxies as a result of the war with Israel. Aside from the Houthis in Yemen, the “Axis of Resistance” organizations in the Palestinian arena, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria have limited themselves to expressions of solidarity with Iran and have refrained from fulfilling their intended role — serving as a deterrent against Israel and part of Iran’s retaliatory capability in the event of an attack on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities.
Beyond Hezbollah’s military and political weakening, which prevented the group from actively supporting Iran, the most notable shift occurred in Syria — until recently a key strategic stronghold for Iran. The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 forced Iran to withdraw its forces and military assets from the country. If not for Assad’s downfall, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which Iran would not have used Syrian territory to strike Israel, whether with or without presidential approval.
The new regime, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, not only refrained from condemning the Israeli attack on Iran — as most Arab states did — but chose to entirely ignore the extensive Israeli activity on its soil. During the war, Israel operated freely in Syrian airspace; IAF aircraft flew through the country en route to targets in Iran, and Syrian air defenses intercepted UAVs and missiles over Syria on their way to Israel. This may have been a deliberate turning of a blind eye due to the shared goal of weakening Iran, or perhaps a quiet, agreed-upon coordination between the two countries.
In addition, public expressions of joy were heard in the Syrian street at the humiliation and blows suffered by Iran, after years of hostile and destructive Iranian activity in their country. Still, Iran has not entirely given up on the Syrian arena and continues its attempts to destabilize it through local agents.
While Israel and Syria once stood on opposite sides of an active Iranian front, they now share a common interest: weakening Iran’s regional position and neutralizing its military threats. In this new reality, there is potential to strengthen the strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Damascus — perhaps even as a basis for cautious normalization in the future.
The Israeli attack on Iran, which triggered an all-out war between the two countries, not only dealt a severe blow to Iran's nuclear program and conventional capabilities but also further exposed the consequences of the blow sustained by Iran's proxies as a result of the war with Israel. Aside from the Houthis in Yemen, the “Axis of Resistance” organizations in the Palestinian arena, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria have limited themselves to expressions of solidarity with Iran and have refrained from fulfilling their intended role — serving as a deterrent against Israel and part of Iran’s retaliatory capability in the event of an attack on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities.
Beyond Hezbollah’s military and political weakening, which prevented the group from actively supporting Iran, the most notable shift occurred in Syria — until recently a key strategic stronghold for Iran. The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 forced Iran to withdraw its forces and military assets from the country. If not for Assad’s downfall, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which Iran would not have used Syrian territory to strike Israel, whether with or without presidential approval.
The new regime, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, not only refrained from condemning the Israeli attack on Iran — as most Arab states did — but chose to entirely ignore the extensive Israeli activity on its soil. During the war, Israel operated freely in Syrian airspace; IAF aircraft flew through the country en route to targets in Iran, and Syrian air defenses intercepted UAVs and missiles over Syria on their way to Israel. This may have been a deliberate turning of a blind eye due to the shared goal of weakening Iran, or perhaps a quiet, agreed-upon coordination between the two countries.
In addition, public expressions of joy were heard in the Syrian street at the humiliation and blows suffered by Iran, after years of hostile and destructive Iranian activity in their country. Still, Iran has not entirely given up on the Syrian arena and continues its attempts to destabilize it through local agents.
While Israel and Syria once stood on opposite sides of an active Iranian front, they now share a common interest: weakening Iran’s regional position and neutralizing its military threats. In this new reality, there is potential to strengthen the strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Damascus — perhaps even as a basis for cautious normalization in the future.