The war between Israel and Iran has not come as a strategic surprise for the Gulf states, as they have been preparing for it for some time, both militarily and diplomatically. Nor is it a tactical surprise, since at least some of the states were privy to the developments as part of regional coordination under the auspices of US Central Command that preceded Operation “Rising Lion,” aimed at assisting in the detection and interception of Iranian missiles and UAVs.
At this stage, the conduct of the states—primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—aligns with the policy they have maintained thus far in the regional arena in general, and regarding Iran and Israel in particular: Their primary objective is to remain as uninvolved as possible in order to avoid harm.
As expected, the Gulf states quickly condemned Israel’s action in Iran, primarily to distance themselves from the events. All of them placed responsibility on Israel; expressed support for a return to the diplomatic track (in line with the Trump administration’s policy); claimed the operation constituted a violation of international law and of Iran’s sovereignty; and called on the international community to act to stop the conflict. Unsurprisingly, the condemnations also came from the countries that signed the Abraham Accords.
Alongside the condemnation of Israel, the Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia—have intensified their diplomatic engagements with Iran, apparently to “check its pulse,” stress their non-involvement, and possibly to convey messages to third parties. They also updated their positions and rapidly coordinated positions with their Arab neighbors. At the same time, numerous talks were held with Western countries, first and foremost the United States. Oman, which hosted the nuclear talks between the United States and Iran (suspended following the strike), even announced it is undertaking efforts to halt the confrontation.
The détente and reconciliation policy the Gulf states adopted toward Iran has, in their view, helped keep them out of the conflict for nearly two years. Now, however, they face their most serious test: Israel’s limited strikes so far on Iranian energy infrastructure may prompt Iran to follow through on its threats and retaliate against similar targets in the Gulf states.
Furthermore, the longer the war continues—and especially if the United States joins it directly—Iran may target American military bases located in the Gulf. According to reports, the Gulf states previously asked the United States not to use their territory for action against Iran—a request that is operationally unrealistic and primarily intended to signal neutrality. In any case, they expect US protection against any Iranian retaliation.
The war between Israel and Iran has not come as a strategic surprise for the Gulf states, as they have been preparing for it for some time, both militarily and diplomatically. Nor is it a tactical surprise, since at least some of the states were privy to the developments as part of regional coordination under the auspices of US Central Command that preceded Operation “Rising Lion,” aimed at assisting in the detection and interception of Iranian missiles and UAVs.
At this stage, the conduct of the states—primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—aligns with the policy they have maintained thus far in the regional arena in general, and regarding Iran and Israel in particular: Their primary objective is to remain as uninvolved as possible in order to avoid harm.
As expected, the Gulf states quickly condemned Israel’s action in Iran, primarily to distance themselves from the events. All of them placed responsibility on Israel; expressed support for a return to the diplomatic track (in line with the Trump administration’s policy); claimed the operation constituted a violation of international law and of Iran’s sovereignty; and called on the international community to act to stop the conflict. Unsurprisingly, the condemnations also came from the countries that signed the Abraham Accords.
Alongside the condemnation of Israel, the Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia—have intensified their diplomatic engagements with Iran, apparently to “check its pulse,” stress their non-involvement, and possibly to convey messages to third parties. They also updated their positions and rapidly coordinated positions with their Arab neighbors. At the same time, numerous talks were held with Western countries, first and foremost the United States. Oman, which hosted the nuclear talks between the United States and Iran (suspended following the strike), even announced it is undertaking efforts to halt the confrontation.
The détente and reconciliation policy the Gulf states adopted toward Iran has, in their view, helped keep them out of the conflict for nearly two years. Now, however, they face their most serious test: Israel’s limited strikes so far on Iranian energy infrastructure may prompt Iran to follow through on its threats and retaliate against similar targets in the Gulf states.
Furthermore, the longer the war continues—and especially if the United States joins it directly—Iran may target American military bases located in the Gulf. According to reports, the Gulf states previously asked the United States not to use their territory for action against Iran—a request that is operationally unrealistic and primarily intended to signal neutrality. In any case, they expect US protection against any Iranian retaliation.