The deadly attack near Binyamina using a suicide drone, which carried a 20 kg warhead, demonstrates once again the destructive power and lethality of this weapon. Even though it is a weapon of past wars, experience proves that the “axis of evil” operates it with a certain degree of efficiency and consistency. It’s important to emphasize that this isn’t a game-changing weapon or an existential threat, but it certainly poses a nuisance to citizens and the security system. Hezbollah has various types of UAVs for both reconnaissance and attack purposes, in the form of “loitering munitions,” such as the long-range Samad-3 or Ababil (Mirsad)—all of which are made by Iran.
There’s difficulty in intercepting drones, mainly in terms of early detection and identification, due to their small dimensions, low radar signature, and their ability to maneuver and evade detection while moving on changing routes and over complicated terrain.
For these reasons, drones infiltrate from time to time, especially those sent from Lebanon by Hezbollah and more rarely from Iraq and Yemen.
Israel deals with the threat by using its defense array, which includes fighter jets, attack helicopters, and the Iron Dome system. In the future, it will also have radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, similar to the old Vulcan system, or a combined gun-and-laser system. In the more distant future, microwave guns capable of disrupting the electronics of the UAV will be available.
The farther a drone is launched from its target, the longer the response time, providing more time for detection and interception. For example, an interceptor, such as a fighter jet, has the time and space to carry out the interception well beyond the country’s borders, and indeed this has been done successfully.
The drones from Lebanon, however, arrive in Israel quickly so that the time for detection and interception is extremely short. Even if an interception is made, it’s done over our territory, and there may be incidental damage from drone crashes or the intercepting missile.
The tragic case in Binyamina proves that in Israel, because of its small and populated area, the margin for error is negligible. In other words, Israel doesn’t have the privilege to miss an interception, and the issue is technologically challenging.
It must be remembered that Israel’s defense layers are among the best in the world, but even they don’t guarantee hermetic protection. However, integration between the defense systems and compliance with the instructions of the Home Front Command will enable optimal protection and save lives on the home front.
The deadly attack near Binyamina using a suicide drone, which carried a 20 kg warhead, demonstrates once again the destructive power and lethality of this weapon. Even though it is a weapon of past wars, experience proves that the “axis of evil” operates it with a certain degree of efficiency and consistency. It’s important to emphasize that this isn’t a game-changing weapon or an existential threat, but it certainly poses a nuisance to citizens and the security system. Hezbollah has various types of UAVs for both reconnaissance and attack purposes, in the form of “loitering munitions,” such as the long-range Samad-3 or Ababil (Mirsad)—all of which are made by Iran.
There’s difficulty in intercepting drones, mainly in terms of early detection and identification, due to their small dimensions, low radar signature, and their ability to maneuver and evade detection while moving on changing routes and over complicated terrain.
For these reasons, drones infiltrate from time to time, especially those sent from Lebanon by Hezbollah and more rarely from Iraq and Yemen.
Israel deals with the threat by using its defense array, which includes fighter jets, attack helicopters, and the Iron Dome system. In the future, it will also have radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, similar to the old Vulcan system, or a combined gun-and-laser system. In the more distant future, microwave guns capable of disrupting the electronics of the UAV will be available.
The farther a drone is launched from its target, the longer the response time, providing more time for detection and interception. For example, an interceptor, such as a fighter jet, has the time and space to carry out the interception well beyond the country’s borders, and indeed this has been done successfully.
The drones from Lebanon, however, arrive in Israel quickly so that the time for detection and interception is extremely short. Even if an interception is made, it’s done over our territory, and there may be incidental damage from drone crashes or the intercepting missile.
The tragic case in Binyamina proves that in Israel, because of its small and populated area, the margin for error is negligible. In other words, Israel doesn’t have the privilege to miss an interception, and the issue is technologically challenging.
It must be remembered that Israel’s defense layers are among the best in the world, but even they don’t guarantee hermetic protection. However, integration between the defense systems and compliance with the instructions of the Home Front Command will enable optimal protection and save lives on the home front.