Since the outbreak of the war, Iran has led a regional and international diplomatic effort to mobilize support for Hamas and reach a quick end to the fighting in order to preserve what the organization achieved. In addition, coordination is underway, led by Foreign Minister Abdollahian and likely also Quds Force Commander Qaani, among the elements of the so-called axis of resistance. Iran is satisfied with the achievements of Hamas so far, and presents them as another manifestation of Israel's weakness and a change in the regional balance of power to Israel’s detriment and to the benefit of the Palestinians and the axis of resistance.
It seems that at this stage, Iran has no interest in Hezbollah engaging in an all-out war. This is due to the high price that will be exacted of the organization that serves as Iran's "strategic asset" in the region, the possibility of American military intervention in the campaign, and the political and possibly even military price that Iran might pay. However, the continuation of the campaign, an Israeli ground invasion, and especially Israeli military success, which will threaten the very survival of Hamas and/or its ability to maintain effective control over the Gaza Strip, may force Iran to make a decision regarding the opening of another active front.
Such a decision would confront Iran with a significant dilemma. On the one hand, refraining from actively joining the campaign (mainly through Hezbollah and to a lesser extent also through its proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen) may allow Israel to continue to focus its fighting efforts against Hamas in Gaza to the point of fatally damaging Hamas’s capabilities, damage the Iranian narrative of the "convergence of arenas," and convey weakness. On the other hand, active involvement through Hezbollah’s entry into an all-out war with Israel could also endanger the strategic capabilities of the Shiite organization, which is considered a front arm of Iran to deter Israel from attacking it, and worse, lead to damage to Iran itself in the wake of the threats sounded from Washington. In our estimation, even if Iran decides to open another front against Israel, it will refrain from direct action (for example, by firing missiles from its territory toward Israel), and will continue to rely on its proxies, as it has done so far.
Since the outbreak of the war, Iran has led a regional and international diplomatic effort to mobilize support for Hamas and reach a quick end to the fighting in order to preserve what the organization achieved. In addition, coordination is underway, led by Foreign Minister Abdollahian and likely also Quds Force Commander Qaani, among the elements of the so-called axis of resistance. Iran is satisfied with the achievements of Hamas so far, and presents them as another manifestation of Israel's weakness and a change in the regional balance of power to Israel’s detriment and to the benefit of the Palestinians and the axis of resistance.
It seems that at this stage, Iran has no interest in Hezbollah engaging in an all-out war. This is due to the high price that will be exacted of the organization that serves as Iran's "strategic asset" in the region, the possibility of American military intervention in the campaign, and the political and possibly even military price that Iran might pay. However, the continuation of the campaign, an Israeli ground invasion, and especially Israeli military success, which will threaten the very survival of Hamas and/or its ability to maintain effective control over the Gaza Strip, may force Iran to make a decision regarding the opening of another active front.
Such a decision would confront Iran with a significant dilemma. On the one hand, refraining from actively joining the campaign (mainly through Hezbollah and to a lesser extent also through its proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen) may allow Israel to continue to focus its fighting efforts against Hamas in Gaza to the point of fatally damaging Hamas’s capabilities, damage the Iranian narrative of the "convergence of arenas," and convey weakness. On the other hand, active involvement through Hezbollah’s entry into an all-out war with Israel could also endanger the strategic capabilities of the Shiite organization, which is considered a front arm of Iran to deter Israel from attacking it, and worse, lead to damage to Iran itself in the wake of the threats sounded from Washington. In our estimation, even if Iran decides to open another front against Israel, it will refrain from direct action (for example, by firing missiles from its territory toward Israel), and will continue to rely on its proxies, as it has done so far.