President Putin conveyed his condolences over Khamenei’s death to Iranian President Pezeshkian—but without mentioning who was actually behind the elimination.
Putin avoided criticizing Trump. Over the past year, the Kremlin’s strategy has been to preserve dialogue with the administration in Washington in order to ensure that its practical support for Ukraine (and Europe) remains limited. This allows Russia to continue its war effort against Kyiv, despite long-term negative domestic trends of a weakening economy and a shrinking pool of human resources available for mobilization.
In the short term, Russia can benefit from the war in Iran, as oil and gas prices rise, attention and resources are diverted to the Middle East at the expense of the Ukrainian front (the number of interceptors available on the market remains limited, and supply to Ukraine could be affected), and the Russian–Ukrainian negotiations are currently not at the top of the US president’s agenda. However, if the war ends in the coming weeks, all these advantages will dissipate.
Conversely, the elimination of a sovereign state’s leader—one that, in Putin’s view, refuses to cooperate with the “Western hegemon”—especially following the American operation in Venezuela, further reduces Russia’s network of global partners. Moreover, Putin himself appears to carry a lasting trauma from the downfall of authoritarian leaders (which he also projects onto himself). The killing of Gaddafi in 2011 was the first, and since then, Putin has taken care to provide refuge to friendly leaders who lose power, such as Ukraine’s Yanukovych and Syria’s Assad. It should be noted that toward his enemies, Putin does not apply the same principle. According to testimonies from Kyiv, Russia attempted several times to assassinate Ukrainian President Zelenskyy during the war.
In any case, Russia’s reputation as a defender of independent states continues to erode. As we saw last year during the previous operation against Iran, it is unable to save its allies, certainly not to assist them militarily. Planned arms deliveries under long-term contracts have indeed continued in recent months, but these do not constitute the allocation of emergency resources for immediate assistance. What remains is the international diplomatic stage, including the UN Security Council, which for now has no impact on developments on the ground.
Russia will likely continue rhetorical condemnations at levels below Putin against the conduct of the United States and Israel, such as framing the operation by Foreign Ministry officials as “aggression,” a “dangerous adventure,” and even “recklessness” toward international law. At the same time, Moscow will seek to exploit opportunities and present itself as a mediator between the sides (as evidenced by its promise to convey to Iran the “concerns of the Gulf states for their security” following Putin’s talks with Arab leaders in the region), although the United States and Israel have so far expressed no interest in this. In addition, it should be taken into account that if and when the regime in Tehran weakens or falls, Moscow will likely adapt itself to the new reality in Iran—similar to what happened with the new Syrian authorities.
President Putin conveyed his condolences over Khamenei’s death to Iranian President Pezeshkian—but without mentioning who was actually behind the elimination.
Putin avoided criticizing Trump. Over the past year, the Kremlin’s strategy has been to preserve dialogue with the administration in Washington in order to ensure that its practical support for Ukraine (and Europe) remains limited. This allows Russia to continue its war effort against Kyiv, despite long-term negative domestic trends of a weakening economy and a shrinking pool of human resources available for mobilization.
In the short term, Russia can benefit from the war in Iran, as oil and gas prices rise, attention and resources are diverted to the Middle East at the expense of the Ukrainian front (the number of interceptors available on the market remains limited, and supply to Ukraine could be affected), and the Russian–Ukrainian negotiations are currently not at the top of the US president’s agenda. However, if the war ends in the coming weeks, all these advantages will dissipate.
Conversely, the elimination of a sovereign state’s leader—one that, in Putin’s view, refuses to cooperate with the “Western hegemon”—especially following the American operation in Venezuela, further reduces Russia’s network of global partners. Moreover, Putin himself appears to carry a lasting trauma from the downfall of authoritarian leaders (which he also projects onto himself). The killing of Gaddafi in 2011 was the first, and since then, Putin has taken care to provide refuge to friendly leaders who lose power, such as Ukraine’s Yanukovych and Syria’s Assad. It should be noted that toward his enemies, Putin does not apply the same principle. According to testimonies from Kyiv, Russia attempted several times to assassinate Ukrainian President Zelenskyy during the war.
In any case, Russia’s reputation as a defender of independent states continues to erode. As we saw last year during the previous operation against Iran, it is unable to save its allies, certainly not to assist them militarily. Planned arms deliveries under long-term contracts have indeed continued in recent months, but these do not constitute the allocation of emergency resources for immediate assistance. What remains is the international diplomatic stage, including the UN Security Council, which for now has no impact on developments on the ground.
Russia will likely continue rhetorical condemnations at levels below Putin against the conduct of the United States and Israel, such as framing the operation by Foreign Ministry officials as “aggression,” a “dangerous adventure,” and even “recklessness” toward international law. At the same time, Moscow will seek to exploit opportunities and present itself as a mediator between the sides (as evidenced by its promise to convey to Iran the “concerns of the Gulf states for their security” following Putin’s talks with Arab leaders in the region), although the United States and Israel have so far expressed no interest in this. In addition, it should be taken into account that if and when the regime in Tehran weakens or falls, Moscow will likely adapt itself to the new reality in Iran—similar to what happened with the new Syrian authorities.