Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the most significant powers in the Arab Gulf, have been perceived by many as allies and as the foundation of an Arab–Sunni “camp.” Reality is far from this description. Outwardly, the two countries seek to maintain the appearance of partnership, but over the past decade, their relations have been characterized by competition for influence and leadership in various arenas.
In Yemen, the gap is most evident. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve a unified and stable state, viewed as a cornerstone of its national security, while the UAE has promoted the Southern Transitional Council, which aspires to establish a state in southern Yemen. In recent weeks, tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have further escalated: Saudi Arabia attacked Emirati weapons shipments intended for separatists (after these seized several provinces in the east of the country), concentrated forces along the border, and issued an ultimatum to the UAE, who in response announced the end of their military presence in Yemen. Despite the apparent Emirati “retreat,” many questions remain open, including whether the UAE will cease its support for the separatists and whether the latter will withdraw from the territories they seized and from their demands. Either way, it is now clear how great the gap is between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and how the Arab coalition that is supposed to fight the Houthis in fact does not exist.
In Sudan as well, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi support rival sides in the civil war: The former backs Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the latter supports Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. The result is prolonged instability that thwarts efforts to advance a political solution—and indirectly even challenges the realization of Khartoum’s normalization with Jerusalem. The gap is also evident vis-à-vis Qatar: While Saudi Arabia is working vigorously to tighten its relations with Qatar, the UAE remains cautious, fearing Qatar’s renewed strengthening. Riyadh also perceived Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as Israeli alignment with Abu Dhabi, which has close economic, political, and security ties in Somaliland.
For Israel, the competition—bordering on rivalry—between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi presents a complex test. Israel’s relationship with the UAE has become strategic and is also expressed in the Gaza Strip, where the Emiratis are the most active Arab player and partners in most of Israel’s objectives there. However, Israel must not close the door to the Saudis. A preference, even an implied one, in favor of Abu Dhabi would harm Israel’s strategic flexibility and would not benefit the relations Israel seeks to develop with the Saudis. In a Middle East rife with conflicts, Israel must act as a maneuvering power: maintaining ties with both countries and avoiding explicit identification in this competition
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the most significant powers in the Arab Gulf, have been perceived by many as allies and as the foundation of an Arab–Sunni “camp.” Reality is far from this description. Outwardly, the two countries seek to maintain the appearance of partnership, but over the past decade, their relations have been characterized by competition for influence and leadership in various arenas.
In Yemen, the gap is most evident. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve a unified and stable state, viewed as a cornerstone of its national security, while the UAE has promoted the Southern Transitional Council, which aspires to establish a state in southern Yemen. In recent weeks, tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have further escalated: Saudi Arabia attacked Emirati weapons shipments intended for separatists (after these seized several provinces in the east of the country), concentrated forces along the border, and issued an ultimatum to the UAE, who in response announced the end of their military presence in Yemen. Despite the apparent Emirati “retreat,” many questions remain open, including whether the UAE will cease its support for the separatists and whether the latter will withdraw from the territories they seized and from their demands. Either way, it is now clear how great the gap is between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and how the Arab coalition that is supposed to fight the Houthis in fact does not exist.
In Sudan as well, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi support rival sides in the civil war: The former backs Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the latter supports Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. The result is prolonged instability that thwarts efforts to advance a political solution—and indirectly even challenges the realization of Khartoum’s normalization with Jerusalem. The gap is also evident vis-à-vis Qatar: While Saudi Arabia is working vigorously to tighten its relations with Qatar, the UAE remains cautious, fearing Qatar’s renewed strengthening. Riyadh also perceived Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as Israeli alignment with Abu Dhabi, which has close economic, political, and security ties in Somaliland.
For Israel, the competition—bordering on rivalry—between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi presents a complex test. Israel’s relationship with the UAE has become strategic and is also expressed in the Gaza Strip, where the Emiratis are the most active Arab player and partners in most of Israel’s objectives there. However, Israel must not close the door to the Saudis. A preference, even an implied one, in favor of Abu Dhabi would harm Israel’s strategic flexibility and would not benefit the relations Israel seeks to develop with the Saudis. In a Middle East rife with conflicts, Israel must act as a maneuvering power: maintaining ties with both countries and avoiding explicit identification in this competition