The solution for reopening the Rafah Crossing is an immediate and feasible implementation of the “day after” model, which can already be put into practice. Its application at Rafah may serve as the first recognition that this is the appropriate framework for transferring civil control from Hamas to an alternative governing authority.
The model consists of three levels of operation:
- Practical on-the-ground operations—In the case of Rafah, the entity responsible for inspecting cargo, luggage, and people, as well as having the authority to approve their entry and exit.
- Governmental authority—A bureaucratic governmental body that locally administers sovereign and legal authority. In the case of the Rafah Crossing, a representative of the Palestinian Authority would fulfill this role. What would this representative do? According to the Israeli government, they would primarily “stamp passports,” and according to the Egyptians, it resembles a mechanism similar to the 2005 arrangement in which the Palestinian Authority managed Gaza’s border crossings.
- International cabinet—Arab and international involvement that ensures the transfer of funds, monitors budgets, provides technological solutions, and implements the international legitimacy required.
Was its publication accidental, was it leaked, or is this a pilot for testing a model that could be applied across the entire Gaza Strip? That remains an open question. Even if it happened by chance due to Egyptian pressure, it’s still worth examining the effectiveness of the model being implemented at the Rafah Crossing over time. Why?
On the one hand, because this is the only model that does not entertain illusions of a new Palestinian Authority that will come, take control, organize, and fight Hamas. On the other hand, it’s a model that doesn’t leave control of the Gaza Strip in Hamas’s hands as the sovereign and pushes out any competition in the civilian sphere.
An important reminder: Both in the Rafah Crossing model currently being implemented and in all proposed models for the “day after,” the security authority for threat analysis and preventing Hamas’s resurgence remains in Israel’s hands.
The solution for reopening the Rafah Crossing is an immediate and feasible implementation of the “day after” model, which can already be put into practice. Its application at Rafah may serve as the first recognition that this is the appropriate framework for transferring civil control from Hamas to an alternative governing authority.
The model consists of three levels of operation:
Was its publication accidental, was it leaked, or is this a pilot for testing a model that could be applied across the entire Gaza Strip? That remains an open question. Even if it happened by chance due to Egyptian pressure, it’s still worth examining the effectiveness of the model being implemented at the Rafah Crossing over time. Why?
On the one hand, because this is the only model that does not entertain illusions of a new Palestinian Authority that will come, take control, organize, and fight Hamas. On the other hand, it’s a model that doesn’t leave control of the Gaza Strip in Hamas’s hands as the sovereign and pushes out any competition in the civilian sphere.
An important reminder: Both in the Rafah Crossing model currently being implemented and in all proposed models for the “day after,” the security authority for threat analysis and preventing Hamas’s resurgence remains in Israel’s hands.