While the Lebanese front has witnessed a clear escalation since the beginning of hostilities in Gaza on October 7, the clashes on the Syrian front are much more contained. Despite improvements in relations, Assad remains suspicious of Hamas, and his response to the war in Gaza was marked by rhetoric but short of real action, due to security and political calculations (US and Israeli strikes in Syria, the UAE call, and more). Indeed, the Syrian regime is still deterred by Israel, and in his most recent speech, Nasrallah stated that Syria was already doing all it could, emerging from a global war and fighting ISIS: "We cannot ask more of Syria... Syria has been undergoing a global war for 12 years and is suffocated by the Caesar Act, facing armed groups over hundreds of km and being attacked by ISIS under US protection. Syria's position…cannot be debated. Despite its difficult situation, it supports the resistance and suffers the consequences."
Sporadic attacks from across the Syrian border persist; at least five incidents have been reported so far, with rockets and mortar shells fired into the Golan Heights, as well as a kamikaze drone attack on Eilat via Jordan. In response to these attacks, the IDF struck back at Syrian military targets, such as the 112th Brigade, and more severely following the drone attack, when Israeli airstrikes killed seven Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and four Syrian soldiers in the Homs countryside in central Syria.
In parallel, reports emerged of increased activities by the Quds Force's Unit 700, transferring more weapon systems to Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias, the redeployment of 1,500 Hezbollah fighters from Syria into Lebanon, and the movement of pro-Iranian proxies closer to Israel's borders.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has documented 17 suspected Israeli strikes on Syrian territory since October 10, with 26 allegedly killed, which indicates an increase in IDF strikes in Syria. The IDF operations included strikes on the Golan Heights but also against targets deep inside Syria, such as airports – which shut down Damascus International Airport for a month. Hezbollah fatalities in Syria may be contributing to the escalation on the Lebanese front, as witnessed in the Lebanon-Israel cross-border clashes of November 10-12.
Following Israel’s increased operational tempo in Syria and decreased coordination with Russia, pro-Iranian militia are attacking US forces in Syria. To date, the US has responded with two "mild" counterstrikes. It has also been reported that Iran has launched a campaign to recruit pro-Hamas operatives for deployment on Israel's borders. The impressive US military posture in the region and the US counterstrikes seem unlikely at this point to deter further attacks on its forces.
Thus, current hostilities are not confined to Israel and the Palestinians, but have already spilled over to Lebanon, Syria, and beyond as a proxy war, reflecting Nasrallah’s strategy of “unity of the fronts” to surround Israel with a “ring of fire.”
While the Lebanese front has witnessed a clear escalation since the beginning of hostilities in Gaza on October 7, the clashes on the Syrian front are much more contained. Despite improvements in relations, Assad remains suspicious of Hamas, and his response to the war in Gaza was marked by rhetoric but short of real action, due to security and political calculations (US and Israeli strikes in Syria, the UAE call, and more). Indeed, the Syrian regime is still deterred by Israel, and in his most recent speech, Nasrallah stated that Syria was already doing all it could, emerging from a global war and fighting ISIS: "We cannot ask more of Syria... Syria has been undergoing a global war for 12 years and is suffocated by the Caesar Act, facing armed groups over hundreds of km and being attacked by ISIS under US protection. Syria's position…cannot be debated. Despite its difficult situation, it supports the resistance and suffers the consequences."
Sporadic attacks from across the Syrian border persist; at least five incidents have been reported so far, with rockets and mortar shells fired into the Golan Heights, as well as a kamikaze drone attack on Eilat via Jordan. In response to these attacks, the IDF struck back at Syrian military targets, such as the 112th Brigade, and more severely following the drone attack, when Israeli airstrikes killed seven Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and four Syrian soldiers in the Homs countryside in central Syria.
In parallel, reports emerged of increased activities by the Quds Force's Unit 700, transferring more weapon systems to Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias, the redeployment of 1,500 Hezbollah fighters from Syria into Lebanon, and the movement of pro-Iranian proxies closer to Israel's borders.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has documented 17 suspected Israeli strikes on Syrian territory since October 10, with 26 allegedly killed, which indicates an increase in IDF strikes in Syria. The IDF operations included strikes on the Golan Heights but also against targets deep inside Syria, such as airports – which shut down Damascus International Airport for a month. Hezbollah fatalities in Syria may be contributing to the escalation on the Lebanese front, as witnessed in the Lebanon-Israel cross-border clashes of November 10-12.
Following Israel’s increased operational tempo in Syria and decreased coordination with Russia, pro-Iranian militia are attacking US forces in Syria. To date, the US has responded with two "mild" counterstrikes. It has also been reported that Iran has launched a campaign to recruit pro-Hamas operatives for deployment on Israel's borders. The impressive US military posture in the region and the US counterstrikes seem unlikely at this point to deter further attacks on its forces.
Thus, current hostilities are not confined to Israel and the Palestinians, but have already spilled over to Lebanon, Syria, and beyond as a proxy war, reflecting Nasrallah’s strategy of “unity of the fronts” to surround Israel with a “ring of fire.”