Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Researcher, Iran and the Shiite Axis Program: Israel’s achievements are significant, but it’s the Iranians who are in a “victory mindset”—not one of surrender. They undoubtedly understand that they have taken a heavy blow, but in their view, they managed to strike back and confront both Israel and the United States. This is also why they are unlikely to give up their conventional force-building efforts or their nuclear program. Israel may try to prevent this but doing so could lead to an endless war of attrition. The recent difficult direct missile hit in Be’er Sheva is an example of the kind of challenge the Israeli home front would need to endure in such a war. The Iranian episode is far from over.
Ofer Shelah, Director of Israel’s National Security Policy Research Program: The end of fighting in Iran, the achievement of severely damaging Iran’s nuclear project, and the unprecedented military-political coordination with the United States should serve as leverage for the next phase: a near-term end to the war in Gaza, the return of the hostages, redeployment to defensive lines with military freedom of action, and laying the foundation for a comprehensive diplomatic initiative to reshape the Middle East.
Galia Lavi, Researcher and Deputy Director of the Glazer Israel–China Policy Center: At the UN Security Council meeting on June 22, following the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, China called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. In the background are Beijing’s concerns about escalation and regional instability, whether through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. In this regard, the ceasefire declared by President Trump is expected to be welcomed in Beijing, and even a violation of the ceasefire by Iran won’t change China’s position.
Eldad Shavit, Director of Israel–United States Relations Program: Trump and his administration boast of their success in implementing their “peace through strength” policy. The administration decided to strike but also moved quickly to promote a ceasefire, even allowing Iran to attack a US base in Qatar without retaliation. The administration’s key test, assuming the ceasefire holds, will be its ability to advance an improved agreement with Iran that includes an effective monitoring mechanism. It’s not yet clear to what extent Trump will leverage the ceasefire to promote a hostage deal and end the war, as a critical component of his goal to shape a new regional architecture and expand the Abraham Accords.
Gallia Lindenstrauss, Researcher on Turkey and the Kurds: Turkey feared that the Israeli attack on Iran would lead to a range of immediate negative consequences for Turkey. Ankara was concerned about a large influx of refugees from Iran, rising energy prices, and that developments in Iran—especially among the Kurdish minority—would halt the disbanding process of the Kurdish insurgency (which also has a branch in Iran). In these respects, the ceasefire is therefore a welcome development for Turkey and aligns with its calls for regional de-escalation.
Rémi Daniel, Researcher and Coordinator of the Europe Research Program: The quick ceasefire allows the Europeans to enjoy the end of the Iranian nuclear program threat, which also endangered them, without paying any price: They didn’t participate in military activity and weren’t harmed by Iranian retaliation. The past few days have again underscored the divisions among Europe’s leaders—for example, between the German chancellor, who supported the Israeli and American bombings, and the French president, who intensified his criticism of them. These divisions will make it difficult for the Europeans to play a significant diplomatic role. If the ceasefire with Iran holds, European attention will return to Gaza—a much more sensitive arena from their perspective. It is important not to let “Operation Swords of Iron” derail the positive momentum created by the “Rising Lion” operation in Israel’s relations with several European countries.
Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Researcher, Iran and the Shiite Axis Program: Israel’s achievements are significant, but it’s the Iranians who are in a “victory mindset”—not one of surrender. They undoubtedly understand that they have taken a heavy blow, but in their view, they managed to strike back and confront both Israel and the United States. This is also why they are unlikely to give up their conventional force-building efforts or their nuclear program. Israel may try to prevent this but doing so could lead to an endless war of attrition. The recent difficult direct missile hit in Be’er Sheva is an example of the kind of challenge the Israeli home front would need to endure in such a war. The Iranian episode is far from over.
Ofer Shelah, Director of Israel’s National Security Policy Research Program: The end of fighting in Iran, the achievement of severely damaging Iran’s nuclear project, and the unprecedented military-political coordination with the United States should serve as leverage for the next phase: a near-term end to the war in Gaza, the return of the hostages, redeployment to defensive lines with military freedom of action, and laying the foundation for a comprehensive diplomatic initiative to reshape the Middle East.
Galia Lavi, Researcher and Deputy Director of the Glazer Israel–China Policy Center: At the UN Security Council meeting on June 22, following the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, China called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. In the background are Beijing’s concerns about escalation and regional instability, whether through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. In this regard, the ceasefire declared by President Trump is expected to be welcomed in Beijing, and even a violation of the ceasefire by Iran won’t change China’s position.
Eldad Shavit, Director of Israel–United States Relations Program: Trump and his administration boast of their success in implementing their “peace through strength” policy. The administration decided to strike but also moved quickly to promote a ceasefire, even allowing Iran to attack a US base in Qatar without retaliation. The administration’s key test, assuming the ceasefire holds, will be its ability to advance an improved agreement with Iran that includes an effective monitoring mechanism. It’s not yet clear to what extent Trump will leverage the ceasefire to promote a hostage deal and end the war, as a critical component of his goal to shape a new regional architecture and expand the Abraham Accords.
Gallia Lindenstrauss, Researcher on Turkey and the Kurds: Turkey feared that the Israeli attack on Iran would lead to a range of immediate negative consequences for Turkey. Ankara was concerned about a large influx of refugees from Iran, rising energy prices, and that developments in Iran—especially among the Kurdish minority—would halt the disbanding process of the Kurdish insurgency (which also has a branch in Iran). In these respects, the ceasefire is therefore a welcome development for Turkey and aligns with its calls for regional de-escalation.
Rémi Daniel, Researcher and Coordinator of the Europe Research Program: The quick ceasefire allows the Europeans to enjoy the end of the Iranian nuclear program threat, which also endangered them, without paying any price: They didn’t participate in military activity and weren’t harmed by Iranian retaliation. The past few days have again underscored the divisions among Europe’s leaders—for example, between the German chancellor, who supported the Israeli and American bombings, and the French president, who intensified his criticism of them. These divisions will make it difficult for the Europeans to play a significant diplomatic role. If the ceasefire with Iran holds, European attention will return to Gaza—a much more sensitive arena from their perspective. It is important not to let “Operation Swords of Iron” derail the positive momentum created by the “Rising Lion” operation in Israel’s relations with several European countries.