The escalation in the exchange of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah following the assassinations of senior Hezbollah officials and the organization’s relatively measured but unusual responses reflect that Hezbollah is sticking to its chosen strategy: a war of attrition below the threshold of war, while trying to create clear response equations with Israel.
However, based on the current action and response on the ground, it’s clear that the IDF is dictating the scope and intensity of the war against Hezbollah. Despite Nasrallah’s fiery speeches about his organization’s readiness for war, there is noticeable caution and deliberation in the response policy, apparently to avoid escalation into a full-scale war that the organization does not seek at this stage. This was evident following the assassination on July 3 of a very senior member of the organization (Abu Naama, commander of the western sector in southern Lebanon, equivalent in rank to a brigadier general in the IDF), and the assassination on July 6 of an important source of knowledge in the organization’s air defense system deep in Lebanese territory.
For example, in the week preceding the assassination of Abu Naama, there was a decrease in the extent of attacks by the organization. Even in the nature of the attacks following the assassination (launching hundreds of rockets and dozens of UAVs on July 3–4, which significantly decreased on July 5), it’s clear that, despite the desire to respond on an unprecedented scale to maintain the response equations, the organization refrained from attacking new targets at a longer range than it had previously. In response to the July 6 assassination deep in Lebanon (about 100 km from the border), the organization chose to respond accordingly, in a more limited scope, but deeper into Israeli territory (in the Lower Galilee up to the Tiberias and Sea of Galilee area).
In addition to Israel’s control over the pace and scope of the fighting, in looking at the balance of the results of the war so far, it’s evident that the IDF continues to have the upper hand. Hezbollah has suffered severe blows and damage both to its capabilities and its central command echelon, along with extensive damage in villages in southern Lebanon, increasing the opposition among the Lebanese population to Hezbollah’s involvement in the war for Hamas and in the service of Iran, while also exposing Lebanon to the devastating results of a large-scale war.
However, despite the IDF’s impressive intelligence and operational achievements in the conflict, Hezbollah’s determination to continue fighting in the north and tie its end to an Israeli agreement to a ceasefire in Gaza creates a strategic dilemma for Israel, as it’s difficult to stop the ongoing attacks and create a security situation that would allow the evacuated residents of the north to return home.
Hope for resolving the strategic “entanglement” in the north appears with Hamas’s shift in its position regarding the “hostage deal,” which could lead to at least a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. Reports of Nasrallah’s support for Hamas’s new position, if accurate, reflect Hezbollah’s desire to exploit the ceasefire in Gaza during the deal’s implementation to stop the fighting in the north. This development only strengthens the recommendation for Israel to postpone, for now, its plans to expand the war in the north and prioritize advancing a deal with Hamas, which would also create an opportunity to achieve a parallel resolution in the north.
The escalation in the exchange of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah following the assassinations of senior Hezbollah officials and the organization’s relatively measured but unusual responses reflect that Hezbollah is sticking to its chosen strategy: a war of attrition below the threshold of war, while trying to create clear response equations with Israel.
However, based on the current action and response on the ground, it’s clear that the IDF is dictating the scope and intensity of the war against Hezbollah. Despite Nasrallah’s fiery speeches about his organization’s readiness for war, there is noticeable caution and deliberation in the response policy, apparently to avoid escalation into a full-scale war that the organization does not seek at this stage. This was evident following the assassination on July 3 of a very senior member of the organization (Abu Naama, commander of the western sector in southern Lebanon, equivalent in rank to a brigadier general in the IDF), and the assassination on July 6 of an important source of knowledge in the organization’s air defense system deep in Lebanese territory.
For example, in the week preceding the assassination of Abu Naama, there was a decrease in the extent of attacks by the organization. Even in the nature of the attacks following the assassination (launching hundreds of rockets and dozens of UAVs on July 3–4, which significantly decreased on July 5), it’s clear that, despite the desire to respond on an unprecedented scale to maintain the response equations, the organization refrained from attacking new targets at a longer range than it had previously. In response to the July 6 assassination deep in Lebanon (about 100 km from the border), the organization chose to respond accordingly, in a more limited scope, but deeper into Israeli territory (in the Lower Galilee up to the Tiberias and Sea of Galilee area).
In addition to Israel’s control over the pace and scope of the fighting, in looking at the balance of the results of the war so far, it’s evident that the IDF continues to have the upper hand. Hezbollah has suffered severe blows and damage both to its capabilities and its central command echelon, along with extensive damage in villages in southern Lebanon, increasing the opposition among the Lebanese population to Hezbollah’s involvement in the war for Hamas and in the service of Iran, while also exposing Lebanon to the devastating results of a large-scale war.
However, despite the IDF’s impressive intelligence and operational achievements in the conflict, Hezbollah’s determination to continue fighting in the north and tie its end to an Israeli agreement to a ceasefire in Gaza creates a strategic dilemma for Israel, as it’s difficult to stop the ongoing attacks and create a security situation that would allow the evacuated residents of the north to return home.
Hope for resolving the strategic “entanglement” in the north appears with Hamas’s shift in its position regarding the “hostage deal,” which could lead to at least a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. Reports of Nasrallah’s support for Hamas’s new position, if accurate, reflect Hezbollah’s desire to exploit the ceasefire in Gaza during the deal’s implementation to stop the fighting in the north. This development only strengthens the recommendation for Israel to postpone, for now, its plans to expand the war in the north and prioritize advancing a deal with Hamas, which would also create an opportunity to achieve a parallel resolution in the north.