The death of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, the third caliph of the Islamic State, occurred in mid-October 2022 during a battle to capture senior operatives in the Islamic State organization in Jasim in the Daraa Governorate, without the attackers knowing that the leader was hiding there. After several days of fighting, the caliph and his associates blew themselves up, and only then did it become known that he was among the dead. Like his two predecessors, he blew himself up so as not to fall into captivity. His death was confirmed officially on November 30 by an Islamic State spokesman, who at the same time announced the appointment of Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Quraishi as the fourth caliph.
The swift announcement of a new caliph testifies to the organization’s drive to maintain organizational solidarity and the continuity of command, and the drive to maintain its ties with its affiliates across the world. Indeed, a number of organizations in some twenty states have already pledged their loyalty to the new caliph. At the same time, the death of the third caliph did not set off waves and received relatively minor media coverage – which suggests a diminished stature of the “caliph” in the Islamic State, which was once a position of the highest order. This was especially the case in the first years of the Islamic State, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi named himself the first caliph of the organization, which was then at the height of its power and controlled wide swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq.
In addition, it appears that the stature of the organization itself has diminished among its affiliates and in its network of alliances throughout the world. In tandem, the organization is deemed less of a threat by the West. Indeed, the Islamic States and its affiliates, particularly in Africa and southern and southeast Asia, commit dozens of attacks throughout the world that attract little attention among Western states, which currently do not sense an acute threat to their security. However, even if they are seemingly at a low point, the salafi-jihadi organizations remain staunchly committed to their ideology and their extremist interpretation of Islam. They continue to have trained and experienced fighters in Syria and Iraq, as well as reserves of young people growing up in displaced persons camps in Syria and elsewhere who may well embrace active terrorism, in the name of Islam and in the path of God.
The death of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, the third caliph of the Islamic State, occurred in mid-October 2022 during a battle to capture senior operatives in the Islamic State organization in Jasim in the Daraa Governorate, without the attackers knowing that the leader was hiding there. After several days of fighting, the caliph and his associates blew themselves up, and only then did it become known that he was among the dead. Like his two predecessors, he blew himself up so as not to fall into captivity. His death was confirmed officially on November 30 by an Islamic State spokesman, who at the same time announced the appointment of Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Quraishi as the fourth caliph.
The swift announcement of a new caliph testifies to the organization’s drive to maintain organizational solidarity and the continuity of command, and the drive to maintain its ties with its affiliates across the world. Indeed, a number of organizations in some twenty states have already pledged their loyalty to the new caliph. At the same time, the death of the third caliph did not set off waves and received relatively minor media coverage – which suggests a diminished stature of the “caliph” in the Islamic State, which was once a position of the highest order. This was especially the case in the first years of the Islamic State, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi named himself the first caliph of the organization, which was then at the height of its power and controlled wide swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq.
In addition, it appears that the stature of the organization itself has diminished among its affiliates and in its network of alliances throughout the world. In tandem, the organization is deemed less of a threat by the West. Indeed, the Islamic States and its affiliates, particularly in Africa and southern and southeast Asia, commit dozens of attacks throughout the world that attract little attention among Western states, which currently do not sense an acute threat to their security. However, even if they are seemingly at a low point, the salafi-jihadi organizations remain staunchly committed to their ideology and their extremist interpretation of Islam. They continue to have trained and experienced fighters in Syria and Iraq, as well as reserves of young people growing up in displaced persons camps in Syria and elsewhere who may well embrace active terrorism, in the name of Islam and in the path of God.