Publications

On May 19, 2020, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas announced in the name of “the Palestinian leadership” (a body that is meant to include the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, and the other Palestinian factions, which has never convened in a full forum), that it “is released from all agreements, and the understandings and commitments based on them, including the security commitment” between it and the governments of Israel and the United States. He added that “the occupation authorities must now bear responsibility…before the international community as an occupation force on the land of the State of Palestine,” and fulfill the obligations imposed by international law on such a force. The announcement also placed responsibility on the United States for the situation that has developed due to “its partnership” in Israel’s steps. It called on other countries to recognize a Palestinian state, to oppose the annexation, and to punish Israel, and repeated the statement that the PLO alone is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The announcement included a clarification that the PA stands by international and regional decisions and the two-state solution, is ready to conduct negotiations under broad international sponsorship, and repeated the commitment to act against international terrorism.

Abbas’s announcement came after many weeks in which harsh criticism was heard in the Palestinian sphere against the Palestinian Authority over its weakness, fragility, and inability and/or lack of courage to act upon its decisions of recent years concerning a halt in contacts with Israel. These voices, some of which were heard in internal discussions prior to the announcement, were accompanied by expressions of derision and scorn, and show a lack of trust in the readiness of Abbas and his leadership to leave the comfort zone that the agreements with Israel provide for them. Abbas’s attempt to have the opposition factions to participate in the public occasion of the announcement encountered refusals by the heads of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who opposed taking part in decisions that they could not influence, and who demanded the formulation of a strategy for joint struggle. Ziyad al-Nakhalah, Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, clarified in an interview to the al-Mayadeen television channel that his organization would no longer agree to be a fig leaf at such gatherings.

Over the years, Abbas has done well at deflecting such criticism, but what pushed him to voice his harsh rhetoric at this time was what he heard from the Knesset when Israel’s new government was sworn in on May 17. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared again that he intends to apply sovereignty to territories in the West Bank (even though annexation is not included in the Basic Guidelines of the Government). Some of the comfort zone that the Oslo interim process created for the Palestinian Authority had to do with Israeli avoidance of officially validating the State of Israel’s hold on the West Bank, and particularly the areas of the Jewish settlements and the Jordan Valley. But now, when the Israeli government declares publicly that it intends to apply sovereignty to parts of the West Bank, relying on the allowance formulated in the Trump plan, Abbas felt he had no alternative but to issue a threatening declaration, in an attempt to avoid losing relevance both internally and in the international arena. In the view of Abbas, as well as the PLO leadership that changed the definition of the Palestinian national aspirations in 1988 from a state in place of Israel to a state alongside Israel, the scope of the annexation is immaterial. To them, Israel seeks to change the rules of the game through unilateral steps that will affect the nature of any permanent status agreement and weaken the Palestinians. Another source of concern for the Palestinian Authority is that progress toward annexation will further validate the strategy of violent struggle championed by Hamas, which aspires to be recognized as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority.

In practice, the scope and actual implementation of Abbas’s public pronouncements are unclear. Saeb Erekat stated these decisions would take effect immediately, including the halt in security coordination with Israel and the United States, but told Israeli journalists that this was not a green light to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel, and that such attempts would be met with resistance by Palestinian security forces. At the same time, Palestinian security sources told Israeli journalists that the joint meetings and the use of the hot line between field commanders are suspended, and that Palestinian forces would be removed from Area B, where they were stationed in coordination with Israel – although for the time being, the PA security forces have not been dismantled or marked for dismantlement, and the Palestinian government and ministers have not left their positions. This is contrary to the calls by aggressive Palestinian publicists to the leadership to relocate to Algeria or to announce the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and to hand over responsibility for Area A to Israel, leaving the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

With that, it seems that the Palestinian reaction to the announcements regarding annexation intentions have far greater potential for realization than previous threats voiced by the PA in recent years to cancel agreements and sever contacts with Israel. This is true even though the PA has not burned its bridges and would like to leave the international and regional communities room to maneuver at least until July 1, the date mentioned for the Israeli government to begin moving the process forward. It is a warning against the negative repercussions that annexation may have, in the hope of dissuading Israel from proceeding. Another indication of the avoidance of complete retreat from the agreements is the fact that Abbas emphasized that his remarks were directed toward the government of Israel and the United States, not the European Union, which has also signed the agreements that have been formulated over the years. Moreover, the wording of the announcement, which states that the Palestinian Authority “views itself as released” from the agreements, not as having retreated from them, is significant in its relative moderation, since adherence to these agreements is the basis for the strategy that distinguishes the PLO/Palestinian Authority from Hamas. Undermining that adherence fully may be interpreted in the Palestinian sphere as further evidence of the failure of the Palestinian Authority, and may even advance a process of internal reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, though the prospects for such reconciliation are poor.

Israel must examine whether its intention to annex indeed reflects a national interest that enjoys some consensus and would improve the security situation in general and in the area intended for annexation in particular. Similarly, it should consider whether annexation might deepen existing disputes and splits within Israeli society despite the support among parts of the population. The annexation move talked about has not been submitted to the security establishment as a task that requires staff work, and there has been no public debate about it that befits weighty political and security steps, such as was conducted before the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Even more so, the context is not one of a security threat on the part of the Palestinian Authority or its security apparatus hanging over the Jewish settlements or over freedom of action for the IDF in the West Bank. Israel should consider whether Abbas and the Palestinian security forces should be put to the test of fulfilling the announcement, or make him and the security forces the objects of scorn on the part of the Palestinians.

The situation calls for curbing Israel’s enthusiasm regarding its annexation intentions, and giving proper weight to discussions of all the implications that may result from the process within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in the regional sphere. King Abdullah of Jordan and Jordanian Prime Minister Omar al-Razzaz stated that annexation may create a confrontation between Jordan and Israel. Egypt is also prepared for the possibility that Hamas and other Palestinian factions may renew violence in the Gaza Strip in reaction to the annexation in order to demonstrate to Abbas that “the proper way” is to apply pressure on Israel. As such – and because none of the relevant parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the US administration, are interested in a collapse or dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, an escalation of the conflict, worse relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East, or an elimination of the political process – the staff work that is necessary in Israel in this context must be informed by facts, figures, and assessments that will contribute to an educated discussion. A public debate should also be encouraged, given the weighty security and social impact of the issue in both the short and the long terms.