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In January 2018, IDF Military Intelligence presented its assessment for 2018 to Israel’s political echelon. The central message of this assessment was that Israel’s enemies (Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas, Iran) have no interest in a war with Israel this year, although the chances of war indeed erupting this year have risen significantly, due to the potential for deterioration into war – potential that was illustrated by recent events in the north. This was likewise the conclusion of the net assessment written by INSS Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin that concludes Strategic Survey for Israel 2017-2018, published recently by INSS.

This article discusses the possible reasons for the outbreak of a war that neither side wants, and what can be done to prevent this deterioration.

Situation Assessment

On January 3, 2018, at a conference in memory of Lt. Gen. Amnon Lipkin Shahak, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot said that Israel's strategic balance had improved greatly, but nevertheless "volatility is growing and the margins of security are greatly reduced," and therefore the possibility of reaching rapid escalation on each of the respective fronts is close at hand. Operations Protective Edge, Pillar of Defense, and Cast Lead, the Second Lebanon War, and smaller outbreaks indicate the potential for broad escalation from tactical events (such as kidnappings). The Chief of Staff stressed the multi-dimensional Iranian threat, which includes the effort to achieve nuclear military ability, the ambition for regional influence, and the drive to create a Shiite crescent from Iran to Iraq through Syria and on to Lebanon, which can thereby influence the Gaza Strip. He described five fronts, where the biggest threat to Israel is on the Lebanese front, followed by the Syrian front, which has changed over the past year. The third front is Judea and Samaria, where there have been prominent efforts by Hamas to foment attacks, while keeping the Gaza Strip as quiet as possible. According to Eisenkot, the fourth front is the Gaza Strip, where some two million Palestinians live in very difficult economic circumstances, and the fifth front is against the Islamic State proxy in Sinai.

Alongside the basic hostility of Israel's enemies to its existence, over the past decade the arena has witnessed multiplying causes of instability and increased complexity, in view of the activities of numerous actors and the weak control of central government on most fronts. Among the current possible elements that may prompt military deterioration:

1. Efforts by Israel's enemies to establish facts that will make it difficult for Israel to refrain from responding, such as: Hezbollah's efforts to increase its power with precision missiles; Iran's attempts to establish itself in Syria by means of its militias and move closer to the Golan Heights; and Iran’s intentions to build infrastructures in Syria as well as weapons factories in Lebanon. The regime in Damascus may also try to impose new game rules in order to show signs of sovereignty by lowering the threshold of response to Israeli actions in its territory. In addition, Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue their attempts to strike at Israel.
2. The high level of tension on most fronts, which could lead to escalation following an isolated incident on the ground  such as the February 10, 2018 penetration of an Iranian drone over the northern border, which led to responses and counter-responses. There is a high risk of deterioration in the event of multi-casualty incidents, even unintentional, such as severe damage by weapons (rockets, mortars) launched from Gaza, or an inaccurate response by Israel to attacks.
3. Attempts by secondary actors to fan the flames in areas that are hard to govern, such as the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon.
4. The possibility of severe Palestinian violence, arising from disappointment with the absence of a political process, escalation following an incident in Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria, incitement in the Palestinian street, friction with the IDF, and even an economic collapse in the Gaza Strip.
5. The possibility of escalation on the Lebanese border, for example following the construction of the fence/wall and the dispute over economic waters.
6. Increasing numbers of active military fronts, where an outbreak of fighting on one front will lead to outbreaks in other arenas.

Prevention as a Component of Israel's Perceived Defense Doctrine

In these circumstances, preventing deterioration into war is a difficult challenge for Israel, and depends to a large extent on its behavior. Prevention is one of the foundations of the perceived defense doctrine (as opposed to the formal defense doctrine that is not up-to-date), and it includes two elements: preventing the outbreak of war, and preventing the enemy from acquiring strategic military capabilities, if war does erupt. Both are part of the "campaign between wars."

The outbreak of war can be prevented by political efforts, deterrent or calming messages, alliances, passive military deterrence (building strength and demonstrating capabilities), and active deterrence through military responses to provocations, which makes deterrence more credible. All these also involve risks: political efforts may end in disappointment leading to hostilities, such as the second intifada; messages can be perceived as a threat requiring a response; and the use of force resulting from the fear that failure to use it can erode deterrence – all leading to war. Prevention of the second kind can be achieved through political efforts or military actions (secret, covert, and overt), designed to prevent the enemy from achieving strategic weapons and crossing red lines. Again, such use of force can prompt a downward spiral to war.

Both types of prevention serve the perceived defense doctrine, which maintains that Israel seeks to extend the intervals between large rounds of fighting, while also ensuring that it enters any hostilities that may erupt with an advantage. However, between these two objectives there is structural tension, because military moves to frustrate an attack could ignite the flames and shorten the interval, while their absence could lead to even worse fighting in future, and this is a dilemma for political leaders. The current illustration of this issue can be seen in Hezbollah's attempts to equip itself with precision missiles and Iran's military establishment in Syria, both elements that could change the nature of warfare in the north, if and when it starts. On January 29, 2018 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that Israel will not accept Hezbollah’s possession of precision missiles, and if it needs to take action in Lebanon – it will. He also stated that he told Putin that if Iran's growing influence in Syria is not stopped, Israel will take steps to stop it, and is actually already doing so. In this case there is strong awareness of the potential for deterioration and the need to manage risks. However, many situations of deterioration are not foreseen and not managed, until they reached widespread hostilities.

Strategies for Preventing Deterioration into War

The responsibility for preventing the downward slide to war rests with the political and military leaderships, and in some cases with commanders on the ground. There must be a strategy for preventing war based on lessons from the past and steps that Israel is already taking. These include:

1. The definition of clear, conservative red lines that can be maintained without the necessity of either retreating or fighting over them frequently.
2. Credible deterrence, through measured military responses and strategic logic. For example, on January 3, 2018 the Chief of Staff stated that the calls heard from outside the IDF, "to respond immediately with maximum force to rockets sent from the Gaza Strip" are irresponsible; indeed, this would not be the correct approach at present. In this context, it is important to beware of being dragged along by secondary forces that seek to fan the flames in situations where punishment of the "sovereignty" on the ground is not always effective and can also be harmful.
3. The reliance of political and military echelons on an intelligence assessment that includes reference to the question of how the enemy assesses Israel's intentions and responses, in order to avoid a miscalculation and points of no return. This is in addition to validation, from time to time, of the intelligence assessment that the enemy is not seeking war, in order to provide concrete deterrence, if and when the situation changes.
4. Exhausting possible moves in the political arena and consciousness arena, in part by sending deterrent or calming messages, to avoid miscalculations by the enemy and other influential parties. This includes acting quickly with friendly parties acting as mediators while limiting the risk of friction with them (for example, Russia).
5. Close coordination between the political and military leadership in the event of a local incident with the potential for deterioration, including stopping in order to think strategically: where could such deterioration lead, how can it be stopped, and how to prepare for a possible unavoidable escalation. It would be advisable for senior political and military leaders, including the political-security cabinet, to examine simulations of possible scenarios, so that the risks can be properly managed.
6. Reducing risks by managing them, such as: taking action below the enemy's response threshold, while assuming the threshold could go lower; reducing the risk of causing damage that is worse than planned and could lead to escalation; and making commanders aware of the need to avoid deterioration, by taking proportional action on the ground. This includes a broad cost-benefit calculation of the use of force. An operational opportunity is not necessarily also a political opportunity, and the rules of the game may change. It must be remembered that actions designed to exact a heavy price from the enemy in a deteriorating situation could in fact lead to longer and superfluous hostilities, due to the tendency of all parties not to refrain from the round of responses without an achievement, when "prices" have already been paid. In this context, steps should be taken to reduce social/ economic crises that could lead to escalation, for example, by halting the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, heightened by the sanctions imposed on the Strip by Abu Mazen.

Ultimately, the decline into an unwanted war is a lose-lose situation, deriving from gaps in information and mutual distrust. The increased risk of such a war and the history of such situations in the Middle East stress the need for prevention. The ability to prevent such escalation is based on an understanding by each of the players of the intentions of the other player, and how they in turn see its intentions, the exchange of credible information between the parties, and rapid management of the process of containing the deterioration early on. This is both a political and a military challenge.