Publications

The results of the Israeli elections to the 18th Knesset will obviously have a significant impact on the political process in the Middle East and more specifically on the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks. Beyond the general trends of Israeli public opinion, the configuration of the new Israeli government will be significant as to the way Israel approaches the Iranian nuclear program and the peace process. While the political platforms of the various parties are not exclusive indications nor are political parties always loyal to them, at this stage, before serious coalition negotiations start, they are the basis for analyzing coalition prospects, at least as far as these diplomatic issues are concerned.

The Iranian nuclear effort will be at the top of any Israeli government's agenda as soon as it is sworn in. The Likud platform on this issue is straightforward: "Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons must be at the top of the next government's priorities." Kadima leader Tzipi Livni has been personally criticized for denying Iran is an existential threat.

Kadima's platform calls the Iranian threat "the most significant," saying Israel will act in any way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It emphasizes Israel will act with the international community and specifies the US as responsible for creating political and economic pressure on Iran to stop its activities.

The Labor platform approaches Likud's and labels the Iranian threat existential, saying it will act "with all legitimate means" to isolate Iran and remove the threat.

Lieberman's Israel Beitenu party is simultaneously clear and confusing. "The aim is to prevent, by any means available, Iran's nuclear armament, exacting a very high price and certainly a disproportionate one in case of an attack." The contradiction and confusion is evident. The aim is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but the second part of the sentence clearly refers to a situation in which Iran has not only obtained them, but has used them. Actually, Lieberman may not necessarily insist on a clear, preventive policy on this issue as a precondition for joining the government. However, he may very well leave a government if he thinks it has been too soft in dealing with the threat.

Shas has no reference to this matter in its platform.

It is unlikely that any of the coalition's potential partners will make the Iranian threat and Israel's policy towards it a precondition for entering the coalition. It is, however, quite possible that at a certain point the future Israeli government would experience a crisis if it is split on the issue of an Israeli military operation against Iranian nuclear installations.

More problematic are the significant gaps by the various potential coalition partners on issues relating to the peace process with Israel's neighbors.

Likud adamantly opposes further unilateral withdrawals such as those from southern Lebanon and Gaza. At the same time, the platform is that "Likud is ready for concessions for peace," and the peace with Egypt was "genuine and reliable." Likud views the Annapolis process as missing the objective. In their view, the Palestinians are not ready for an historical compromise. They rejected a compromise proposal eight years ago (Camp David? Clinton's proposals?) and they have not become any more moderate.

Likud's specific red lines include: Israel is responsible for the security of its citizens and its borders; no return of Palestinian refugees; and Jerusalem will remain united under Israeli rule as Israel's capital: the worst scenario for Jerusalem is to divide Jerusalem, and only the whole of Jerusalem under Israeli rule will enable regional peace.

While the two central issues of refugees and Jerusalem are quite clear, there is very little unequivocal reference to the territorial aspect, including the settlements. In the final days of the electoral campaign, Likud leader Netanyahu expressed his opposition to concessions that will put Israel's main airport at risk. He further said that the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley will remain under Israel's control.

Missing also is even lip service to the principle of two states for two peoples. This is the main point in the Labor and Kadima platforms and it could become a serious stumbling block if the three parties show interest in forming a coalition. If reference to this principle is absent from the next government's platform, this could also become a source of contention in Israel's relations with the new US administration and the EU.

The Labor and Kadima platforms on Jerusalem are vague enough to enable them to agree, if need be, on certain concessions in the city. This is also the case with the settlements. In the context of a comprehensive agreement both Kadima and Labor call for the large settlement blocs to be included in Israel's borders, with others to be removed.

The Shas political platform refers only to Jerusalem, saying it is not open for negotiation and division. Lieberman's platform goes further, saying that Jerusalem is not a subject for negotiation and that the city should be linked to Ma'ale Adumin in the East and Gush Etzion in the South by more Jewish neighborhoods. Again, if the platforms are indicative of the possibility of coalition-forming and assuming the issues pertaining to the political process with the Palestinians are crucial, it will be easier to form a Likud-Shas-Israel Beitenu coalition rather than one shared by Likud-Labor-Kadima.

Slightly more ambiguous is the Israel-Syria track issue. The Likud platform avoids reference to it. Just 48 hours before the polls opened Netanyahu said "Gamla will not fall again," referring to the ancient Jewish city on the Golan Heights that was besieged and destroyed by Rome in 68 C.E. Was Netanyahu attempting to woo right wing voters or was this an indication he will not pursue peace talks with Syria? If he brings Israel Beitenu into the coalition, it is difficult to see how peace talks can be squared with that party's platform, which stipulates "peace for peace" (i.e., not in exchange for returned territory) with Syria, and with Labor's platform on peace with Syria based on "territorial concessions and security arrangements." While Netanyahu has already negotiated on a similar equation, Lieberman is diametrically opposed to negotiations with Syria and this may be unbridgeable. Kadima will be the easiest to handle as it avoids the territorial aspect, emphasizing the need "to preserve Israel's security and its essential interests" and for Syria to end its aid to terror organizations and its relations with extremist forces. As on other issues, when it comes to Syria, Lieberman's Israel Beitenu poses the most difficult problems for any coalition leader.

If Iran and peace processes with Syria and the Palestinians are the major security and external policy issues, then almost any configuration between Likud, Kadima, and Labor and Shas is possible. If Israel Beitenu insists on its platform as a member of a governing coalition, its potential partners could be Likud and Shas and it could pose a serious challenge to any future prime minister. Furthermore, a government aligned with Israel Beitenu and its policies may catapult Israel into a diplomatic confrontation with the new US administration and the international community. While only in Labor's platform is there a direct reference to the Arab initiative, Kadima could also presumably accept the initiative as a reference point. The Labor party is unlikely to make a reference to the Arab initiative a precondition to joining a coalition, as Likud is unlikely to accept even any reference to it.

Given the results of the elections, it is for Likud to choose between leading an ultra-right government and sharing a more centrist government with Kadima. The first spells a potential collision with the US and the international community. The second involves giving up, at least partially, the chance of heading the government. Netanyahu, however, even as a leader of a right wing government, could prevail on his minor coalition partners and push an agenda of partial agreements. This would allow him to work with the US administration on a range of issues from bolstering the economic viability of the West Bank to increasing the area in the West Bank under complete Palestinian Authority civilian and security control.