Publications

Key Findings:

Key Findings:

• About half of the Israeli public (47.5% of the Jewish public and 61% of the Arab public) supports the ceasefire agreement recently signed by Israel and Lebanon, while 22.5% oppose it (27% of the Jewish public and 5% of the Arab public). However, it is clear that a majority of the Israeli public is pessimistic and does not believe the agreement will ensure many years of tranquility in northern Israel. For example, 61% of the Israeli public (67% of the Jewish public and 38% of the Arab public) has little or very little confidence that the agreement with Hezbollah will lead to calm in the long term. Only 23% of the Israeli public (21% of the Jewish public and 31% of the Arab public) expressed a high or very high degree of confidence that the agreement would be maintained over time. A supplementary question showed that 47% of the Israeli public believes that the current situation in the north does not allow the residents to return to their homes, compared with 37% who believe that it does.
• Less than half (45%) of the Israeli public is concerned or very concerned about the implications of the recent developments in Syria for Israel’s national security, compared with 46% who are either not so concerned or not concerned at all. Furthermore, it seems that a majority of the Israeli public (59.5%) believes that Israeli actions in the northern theater significantly contributed to the fall of the Assad regime. Regarding the pattern of IDF activity in Syria, 45% of the Israeli public (51% of the Jewish public and 20% of the Arab public) supports the Israeli stance that the IDF should retain control over the demilitarized buffer zone and the Syrian section of Mt. Hermon until the new government in Syria is consolidated. Only 28% (34% of the Jewish public and 5% of the Arab public) believe that the IDF should permanently retain control of this territory, while 14% (6% of the Jewish public and 46% of the Arab public) believe the IDF should leave Syrian territory and comply with the ceasefire agreement signed by Israel and Syria in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War.

Key Findings:

• A majority of the Israeli public (65%) is confident or believes that the IDF will win the war in the Gaza Strip. This figure remained stable compared to the previous month, but it should be noted that there is a downward trend among the Jewish public compared to the beginning of the war and a significant difference in this response between the Jewish public (74%) and the Arab public (29%) in Israel. In addition, 52% of the Israeli public believes that the war goals in the Gaza Strip have been fully or largely achieved (50% of the Jewish public and 22% of the Arab public).
• Given the reports of talks on an agreement for the return of the hostages, the survey shows that a large majority (68%) of the Jewish public (71% of the Jewish public and 56% of the Arab public) believes that victory will be achieved in the Gaza Strip after all the hostages are returned. In contrast, 12% of the Israeli public (15% of the Jewish public and 2% of the Arab public) believes that victory will be achieved through annexation—the assumption of Israeli sovereignty in the Gaza Strip and the restoration of the Jewish communities there. Another 8% of the Israeli public (8% of the Jewish public and 7% of the Arab public) thinks that victory will occur when a moderate Palestinian government excluding Hamas is established in the Gaza Strip. Another 4% (3% of the Jewish public and 11% of the Arab public) maintain that victory will be achieved in the Gaza Strip only after the residents of the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip return to their homes. It should be emphasized that these findings were obtained after it became clear in the public discourse that an agreement to return all the hostages—both the living and the dead—would also necessitate ending the war.
• Among the various options after the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip is eliminated, 32.5% of the Israeli public (37% of the Jewish public and 15% of the Arab public) believes that international or regional responsibility for the Gaza Strip is the best option. 19.5% of the Israeli public (14% of the Jewish public and 39% of the Arab public) thinks that governance by a moderate Palestinian group that excludes Hamas is the best option. Another 18% (22% of the Jewish public and 3% of the Arab public) supports annexation, the application of Israeli sovereignty, and the return of Jewish settlements to the Gaza Strip, while 15% (17% of the Jewish public and 5% of the Arab public) supports occupation and a military government in the Gaza Strip.

Key Findings:

• A majority of the Israeli public—54% (64% of the Jewish public and 12% of the Arab public)—opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state. Another 30% (23% of the Jewish public and 59% of the Arab public) support the establishment of a Palestinian state under certain conditions. Among those Israelis expressing support for a Palestinian state, 25% believe the most important condition to be a regional settlement that includes a defensive alliance with Israel, moderate Arab countries, and the United States. Another 10% think that the most important condition is the provision of guarantees that Israel will maintain operational freedom to prevent terrorism. An additional 5% believe that reforms and deradicalization in the Palestinian Authority are crucial, while 3% support the provision of guarantees to Israel that Hamas will not be part of the Palestinian government. In contrast, 46% of those supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state believe that all of these conditions are equally important.
• Another question in the survey addresses the statement by Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich that 2025 will be the year Israel assumes sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Some 34% of the Israeli public (29% of the Jewish public and 56% of the Arab public) opposes any annexation of territory in Judea and Samaria. Another 21% (24% of the Jewish public and 7% of the Arab public) supports annexing the entire territory, including that of the Palestinian Authority, while 21% (26% of the Jewish public and 5% of the Arab public) supports annexation of only the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria.

Key Findings:

• About 35% of the Israeli public believes that the IDF conducts proper investigations of events in which soldiers are suspected of legal violations, while 22% think that the IDF is not strict enough about investigations, and another 22% maintain that the IDF investigations of suspected violations are excessive.

Key Findings:

• Motivation to perform reserve duty is 6% higher than in the previous month. According to the findings, 56% of the Jewish public say that they would encourage a family member who has already performed combat reserve duty during the war to report for additional reserve duty if summoned. Another 21% would not encourage a family member under these circumstances, while 23% state that they “don’t know.”

• Approximately 35% of the Israeli public believes that the sense of solidarity in Israeli society has become stronger or much stronger, while 32% feel that solidarity has diminished or greatly diminished. Another 19% perceive no change in the level of solidarity. While the sense of solidarity is slightly higher than in the previous month, it remains lower than at the beginning of the Swords of Iron war.
• A majority of the Israeli public (62%) is greatly troubled or quite troubled about the social situation in Israel when the war ends. At the same time, 59% of the Israeli public is optimistic about the ability of Israeli society to recover from the crisis and grow, while a third of the public (32%) is pessimistic.
• Some 29% of the Israeli public reports a high or very high sense of security, 46% report a moderate sense of security, and 21% report a low or very low sense of security. Significant differences were observed between the Jewish and Arab publics, with the latter reporting a lower sense of security.