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In recent months and in the absence of any achievements, the Hamas leadership finds itself on the horns of an intensifying dilemma manifested on a number of levels that are at once parallel and intertwined: (a) the difficult humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the popular protest it has incited against the Hamas leadership; (b) internal tensions among Hamas factions; (c) militant elements operating in the Gaza Strip; (d) the rivalry with the Palestinian Authority; and (e) Israeli policy.

a. The serious humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has sparked protests against the cost of living. The Hamas leadership is eager to have the closure on the Strip lifted and thereby bring about a significant improvement in living conditions, but at the lowest price possible. In other words, along with willingness in principle to suspend rocket fire, they are prepared to stop the mass protests on the border only in exchange for the complete removal of the closure. This is the policy that Yahya Sinwar, head of Hamas in the Strip, has pursued so far, albeit with limited success and at a heavy cost to the local population.

It appears that throughout the Gaza Strip, the ultimate fear of Hamas has been breached. Citizens with uncovered faces took to the streets in mass demonstrations, shouting “We want to live.” The wave of protests was quashed with an iron fist, while Hamas tried to deflect the anger and the accusations about the high cost of living and high rates of unemployment toward the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas, who has imposed harsh sanctions on Gaza, and toward Israel, which is blamed for the ongoing closure. Hamas has deflected the anger toward Israel for approximately one year by means of the weekly March of Return along the border, and nightly harassment via explosive devices and incendiary and explosive kites and balloons.

The criticism of the Hamas leadership in the recent demonstrations differs from previous waves of protest in the Gaza Strip in several ways: in terms of the number of participants; in the use of blunt language against the leadership as well as the heads of the security apparatuses; and in the quiet support of other factions in the Strip. The protests, which reveal the further erosion of Hamas’s legitimacy among the Gazan public, are also the background for public criticism of the violence used to suppress them. Concerns over the development of a dynamic like that of Tahrir Square in Egypt, which could lead to the loss of control and of government, might push Hamas leadership to resort to tactics such as rocket fire into central Israel. Unless the leadership can find a way to quell the protests, it might well have difficulty recruiting participants for additional March of Return events, and might even have to deal with desertion by security mechanism activists given the violence against civilians. On the other hand, in order to contain and suppress the protests, the Hamas leadership might prefer an agreement that includes a significant response to the humanitarian distress, even under terms that at present are not acceptable to it, provided that the arrangement offers something it can present to the public as a strategic achievement.

b. The second level is internal. Inside the organization, criticism of the Hamas leadership has increased, on the one hand due to its helplessness in face of the difficult humanitarian situation and its inability to promote order, and on the other hand, from militant elements in the political leadership who favor closer ties with Iran rather than Egypt. The Rafiah crossing, the lifeline for the Gaza Strip and its link to the outside world, is used by Cairo to pressure Hamas as part of its efforts to broker a deal with Israel. In the absence of any effective broker other than Egypt, the Hamas leadership must take Cairo’s demands into consideration – which prompts its critics to see it as squeezed and under pressure. Sinwar is also dealing with militant elements in the military wing and activists on the ground. As they see it, his policy reflects submission to pressure by Egypt and Israel, and in their estimation will not lead to an improvement in living conditions in the Strip, will not strengthen the status of Hamas at home and in the struggle against the Palestinian Authority, and will not maintain the organization’s deterrent ability against Israel.

c. On the third level is Islamic Jihad, which operates as an Iranian proxy and challenges Hamas by demonstrating a more militant approach, often in contrast to Hamas policy. Islamic Jihad and elements from other militant factions, as well as Hamas leaders and members of its military wing, have previously sabotaged efforts to reach a settlement, and even today are likely to seek to frustrate any progress in a settlement process with Israel brokered by Egypt. Thus, for example, it is possible that the rocket fire into the Gush Dan region, which was described by Hamas leadership as a mistake, was a deliberate action by elements in the Hamas military wing. This kind of challenge is not a precedent (Ahmed Jabari, for example, organized the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit in opposition to the views of the political leadership at that time and what Jabari saw as its policy of appeasement).

d. Fourth is the policy of the Palestinian Authority: as well as the severe sanctions imposed on the Gaza Strip by the PA and the effort to heighten them, against a background of a dead end in the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, Abbas recently appointed a central Fatah figure, Mohammad Shtayyeh, as Prime Minister, following the resignation of Rami Hamdallah. This appointment is a challenge to Hamas and another sign of Abbas’s strategic choice to disengage from the organization and from the Gaza Strip.

e. Israeli policy: The terms stated by the Israeli government for an arrangement place the Hamas leadership in a situation where it is unable to show the public, including its opponents and critics, any meaningful achievement. They are afraid that acceptance of the Israeli terms will not bring about sufficient improvement in the humanitarian situation of the Strip and will limit their ability to improve the terms of the settlement, partly due to the obligation to Egypt. This outcome would cause a crisis of expectations among the Gazan public and could also lead to resumption of the demonstrations against Hamas and stronger criticisms from within the organization, as well as the challenges posed by other organizations, and ultimately undermine its status in Gaza and the Palestinian arena, and thereby endanger the stability of its government.

At the same time, the Hamas leadership identifies Israel’s conduct, which is characterized by containment and avoidance of massive military action in the Strip, as an advantage it seeks to leverage in order to reap maximum achievements at what it considers the lowest price. Thus the rocket fire into Gush Dan can also be explained as a planned move by the Hamas leadership, which feels that the Israel government is reluctant to engage in fighting in Gaza, particularly just before elections. Explaining the incident as an error can be understood as room for denial that Israel can also accept, in view of its unwillingness to be drawn into a wider conflict. In this case it is a matter of adopting the “flight forwards” strategy, which Hamas has previously used. The decision by the security cabinet after the rocket incident to increase the amount of money transferred each month by Qatar, expand the fishing zones, and grant other civilian relief could back up this explanation, at least as Hamas sees it.

Confronted at these several levels, Hamas has two main options: one is to continue the current policy to deflect pressure toward Israel through initiated, controlled escalation, by exploiting the various memorial days (“Land Day,” “Naksa Day”) to recruit the masses for marches to the border. But continuing or even intensifying this approach based on the assumption that it is possible to keep challenging and embarrassing the Israeli government may turn out to be mistaken, and lead to a broader military operation. The second option is to respond to Egypt’s efforts to broker a settlement and move toward an acceptance of Israeli terms, in order to bring about a swift improvement in the humanitarian situation in Gaza and present this to the people as a substantive achievement.

Israel would prefer the second Hamas option. However, this must emerge as a Hamas choice, rather than a course imposed on it; otherwise it will be challenged by spoilers from within the organization and other groups that oppose its rule in the Gaza Strip. For Israel, the best alternative is not to highlight its influence on Hamas to take this strategic choice, and not to boast about forcing its conditions on Hamas. The temptation to push a weakened Hamas into a corner is very great, and some will say that this is an opportunity to topple Hamas with a combination of support and creative encouragement for the demonstrations, together with a military blow. However, it must be assumed that the vacuum left by Hamas, if it loses control of the Strip, will not necessarily be filled by the Palestinian Authority or any other element that is easier for Israel to deal with.

In the cost-benefit analysis that compares this scenario with a toppling of the Hamas government or a reoccupation of Gaza, Israel should accept the existence of a hostile state entity controlled by Hamas on its southern border - although ironically in that case it would itself be the element that saves Hamas from disintegration, just as the PLO was saved from disintegration following the Oslo process. The more this entity is prepared to adopt logical political conduct, the easier it will be for Israel to deal with it. Over the years Israel has dealt successfully with hostile entities while maintaining and developing deterrence against them, together with various forms of required cooperation. The option of dealing with a hostile state entity in Gaza while maintaining military deterrence on the one hand, and developing essential cooperation in civilian fields and allowing life in the Gaza Strip under reasonable conditions on the other hand, is the least worst option for Israel, even when it is clear that this future reality will also involve violent crises from time to time.

Israel’s national security concept recognizes that rounds of hostilities are part of the country’s security reality. As such, Israel should seek to extend the intervals between rounds while helping to ease the humanitarian plight in Gaza, but strike hard in each round in order to strengthen its deterrence in the spirit of the “iron wall” that can successfully blunt Hamas aggression.