Publications

On April 17, amid the renewed nuclear talks between Iran and the United States and reports of Israeli intentions to strike Iran’s nuclear sites, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman visited Iran and met with Supreme Leader Khamenei. This visit marked a significant milestone in Saudi–Iranian relations: It was the first time since 2006 that a senior Saudi official had met with Iran’s supreme leader. Khalid—brother of the Saudi crown prince and the kingdom’s de facto ruler—reportedly delivered a letter (contents undisclosed) from King Salman, his father. The visit underscored both countries’ desire to reaffirm their commitment to the 2023 agreement that renewed their diplomatic ties.

It was Saudi Arabia that pushed for the renewal of relations with Iran amid a broader shift in Riyadh’s foreign policy, which extends beyond the Iranian issue. In his first three years as de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman’s actions—both domestically and regionally—were widely seen as “reckless and adventurous.” However, he has gradually adopted a more restrained foreign policy approach, similar to the kingdom’s stance prior to his rise in status. Currently, Saudi Arabia prioritizes diplomacy over armed conflict, seeking to focus on socioeconomic modernization and attract necessary investments—goals that require security and stability, especially in relation to regional rivals and enemies.

In 2023, when the agreement was signed, Saudi Arabia followed the UAE’s lead in restoring ties with Iran after they had been severed due to the 2016 Gulf boycott—led by Riyadh—against Iran. The kingdom entered the agreement from a weakened position, following the failure of its aggressive strategy and the asymmetric power balance between the two states. Saudi leadership now prefers diplomacy and economic relations as tools to secure peace and security with its main regional rival. Iran’s military superiority was clearly demonstrated during its 2019 attack on Saudi oil production and refining facilities. The Saudis likely harbor no illusions that the agreement will stop what they view as Iran’s interference in Arab affairs. Nonetheless, through this détente, bin Salman can present himself to the region and the world as the “responsible adult.” Riyadh also hopes that China—which brokered the thaw and holds significant economic leverage over Iran—will influence Tehran to adhere to the agreement. This consideration is central for Saudi Arabia and emphasizes the importance it places on China’s role.

Yet despite renewed ties, this is not a deep or fundamental reconciliation but rather a détente—a superficial easing of tensions. The main shift in relations lies in rhetoric and the reduction of overt hostility: Both countries recognize that the current state of non-confrontation serves them better than open enmity. In the months following the agreement, Riyadh appeared to offer Iran primarily economic incentives to encourage caution in any actions against Saudi interests. More than two years after the agreement was signed, this effort seems to have failed. Reportedly, there are no Saudi investments in Iran and therefore no direct economic benefit from the agreement. According to various reports, Iran wishes to see more substantial benefits—especially in the economic and commercial realms—and hopes to realize the “potential” it believes the agreement holds.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the détente strategy is especially important as a means to insulate the kingdom from potential conflict between Iran and the United States and/or Israel, keeping it out of the “line of fire.” Saudis are deeply concerned they may become a target if Iran retaliates against an attack—warnings to this effect have even been issued by Iran, aimed at Saudi and other Gulf ears. Iran seeks to prevent Gulf states from granting the United States access to military bases on their soil, which would be used to facilitate an attack on Iran. Reportedly, the UAE, which also fears Iranian retaliation, has already limited US military activity on its territory. It is unclear whether Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman gave Iranian officials any assurances regarding US use of bases in the kingdom—but it is highly likely.

Iran also places great importance on the agreement with the Saudis. “As I told King Abdullah in the past, I now say to you—I believe that close relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia will benefit both sides. If you believe this too, then we can deepen our ties,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei said to the Saudi Defense Minister during their meeting. While this statement could be dismissed due to the deep ideological divide and mutual suspicion between the two states, in retrospect, it is clear that the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran—while undoubtedly serving the Saudi leadership—was also one of the most significant achievements in the foreign policy of Iran’s leadership under then-President Raisi. This is evidenced by the considerable investment made by Tehran in maintaining the agreement, including reciprocal visits by leaders from both countries and numerous phone conversations. Furthermore, the agreement has withstood considerable challenges in recent years: Iran’s missile attacks on Israel, the Israeli military response, and the ongoing conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.

Tehran has gained several benefits from its agreement with Saudi Arabia. Chief among them is Riyadh’s clear effort to avoid appearing as a supporter—whether openly or behind the scenes—of any attack on Iran, a stance Riyadh is likely to maintain during President Trump’s visit to the kingdom this week. In this context, the delay in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia (even though Iran still sees the potential for it to happen) is also significant. Other outcomes include an increase in the number of Saudi pilgrims traveling to Mecca and Medina and a reduction in Saudi Arabia’s pressure on its Shiite minority—both directly linked to the agreement. Moreover, even as Tehran continues to supply military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been very cautious not to violate the agreement and continues its “soft” approach toward the Houthis, who are now considered leaders in the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” as long as the Houthis themselves uphold the agreement. Given that Saudi Arabia holds a central position in the Sunni world, its rapprochement with Iran gives other Sunni states a “green light” to deepen their ties with Tehran. Saudi Arabia has also allowed Iran to bolster its status within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), headquartered in the kingdom.

The Saudi Defense Minister’s visit to Iran signals to Tehran Riyadh’s desire not to be seen as linked in any way to military threats against Iran and to stress that, if and when Iran is attacked, Saudi Arabia intends to stay out of it. In light of threats from Israel—and especially from the United States—to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, any assurance Saudi Arabia may have given Iran carries significant strategic and operational weight. Additionally, Riyadh’s bid to mediate between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue reflects its desire for a diplomatic resolution and a position of neutrality. The visit of the Iranian foreign minister, Araghchi, to Saudi Arabia, just days before a critical round of negotiations between Iran and the United States, is another indication of the countries’ willingness to coordinate their diplomatic steps and to present a joint front as negotiations come closer to their critical moment.

At the same time, Iran’s agreement with Saudi Arabia (and rapprochement with other Gulf states like the UAE) may constrain its ability to respond if attacked or subjected to intensified American economic pressure. This is because Iran’s capacity to resume aggressive actions like the 2019 attacks on tankers in the Gulf or direct strikes against Saudi Arabia has been considerably diminished due to the agreement.

While the agreement did not lead to economic prosperity between Iran and Saudi Arabia—mainly because of ongoing sanctions on Iran—a future nuclear deal that includes even partial sanctions relief could allow for deeper economic ties. In such a scenario, this could involve  Saudi investments in Iran and possibly even the creation of a bilateral free trade zone, or even a joint “nuclear fuel bank” that will be used by both nations. In general, Saudi Arabia could also play a significant role in a future nuclear agreement, as its investments would provide the Iranian leadership with tangible “dividends” from the deal. Another Iranian interest is to receive some form of Saudi commitment regarding the future of the nuclear program Saudi Arabia seeks to develop.

Implications for Israel

In the near term, the Saudi–Iranian agreement will face serious tests: potential security pacts between the United States and Saudi Arabia (including advanced American arms sales and possibly a Saudi nuclear program); the ongoing conflict with the Houthis, including threats that Saudi Arabia may be targeted by missiles and drones; a real possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities (to which Iran might respond by targeting Gulf oil infrastructure); and renewed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia. All these developments will test the durability of the agreement—but for now, it seems that only extraordinary developments would lead Tehran or Riyadh to abandon it.

Israel views the strengthening of Iran–Saudi ties unfavorably, as Jerusalem aims to deepen Iran’s regional isolation and build a bloc of “pragmatic” states—including through normalization with Saudi Arabia—that would oppose Iran. However, the Saudis take a more “sophisticated” view of regional politics, one that does not align with Israel’s. From Riyadh’s perspective, a détente strategy—engaging rivals while hedging risks—has proven effective. Other Gulf states similarly believe that regional détente has likely prevented Iran and its proxies from attacking them amid the Iran–Israel conflict. Under certain conditions, Israel could be integrated into a new regional order. Riyadh sees no inherent contradiction in maintaining ties with both Iran and Israel. Iran, for its part, is forced to accept Gulf states’ relations with Israel—for example, the UAE, which maintains close ties with both Iran and Israel.

Politically, the agreement has demonstrated the futility of trying to isolate Tehran diplomatically or build an anti-Iran bloc by rallying Arab states. It has instead served as a platform for Iran to draw closer to other Gulf nations. Amid current efforts by Iran and the United States to reach a nuclear deal, it is important to note that this time—unlike the previous agreement—Saudi Arabia supports a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and may even seek to assist in achieving it. As a result, it is highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia would support or participate in a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities and would not hesitate to exert pressure to prevent one.