Despite the short-term effect of “rallying around the flag” that the war appears to have produced, there is no guarantee that this sentiment will persist over the long term. The 12-day war did not bring about any fundamental changes to Iran’s key domestic issues and even exacerbated the hardships faced by the Iranian public. Moreover, the regime’s failures during the war could increase the public’s skepticism about its priorities, particularly the government’s massive investments in its nuclear program, missile systems, and regional proxies, potentially leading to a resurgence of public criticism and protest against the regime. What currently appears as internal mobilization could dissipate in the coming months, as the public might redirect its sense of humiliation and anger toward the government, blaming it for dragging Iran into an intense, albeit short, confrontation with severe consequences.

In recent years, the Iranian public’s trust in state institutions has eroded, alongside despair over the dire economic situation and a widening gap between the public and the government. These trends may intensify in light of the regime’s failures and the damage caused by the war. Furthermore, the Iranian public continues to be plagued by internal disagreement and deep polarization. Already in the days following the ceasefire, the internal debate between hardliners and pragmatists resumed, focusing on both foreign and domestic issues. On the foreign policy front, disagreements emerged over whether to resume negotiations with the United States and pursue a political settlement. Domestically, the debate centered on the regime’s intensified repression, including waves of arrests, executions, and the treatment of political prisoners. Public protest may also resume as a result of Iran’s ongoing economic crisis, which could worsen due to the war in the event that no nuclear deal with the United States is reached.

Iran is caught in a strategic bind. Rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs would likely come at the expense of addressing mounting economic and social hardships and urgently needed investment in collapsing national infrastructure, particularly in critical sectors such as water and electricity. At the same time, such a move could drag Iran into a costly strategic arms race with Israel, further depleting its already strained resources and deepening civilian suffering, even though Israel, too, faces limits on its military and economic capabilities. Conversely, deteriorating economic conditions may, at some point, pose an even greater threat to the regime’s survival. Faced with that prospect, the leadership could double down on the pursuit of nuclear weapons, calculating that a nuclear arsenal would serve as an existential insurance policy. This logic mirrors the Pakistani model, famously expressed as: “we’ll eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we’ll get the bomb.”

Iran’s Domestic Arena: Four Possible Scenarios

At this stage, the war does not appear to have caused any significant changes in Iran’s internal dynamics or in the deep-rooted nature of the Islamic Republic. However, the war may serve to accelerate existing processes of internal change. It is therefore incumbent upon us to examine the main possible scenarios in Iran’s domestic arena in the coming years, as a basis for discussing the potential for political transformation and for formulating policy recommendations for Israel. The four main scenarios of what may unfold domestically in Iran are:

Continuation of the political status quo until leadership transition. In the absence of regime change, the Islamic Republic is likely to maintain its current trajectory until the eventual death of its supreme leader and the transition of leadership in the future. The regime is expected to continue facing a series of major internal challenges. These include an intensifying crisis of legitimacy, growing economic strains, and additional problems such as government mismanagement, difficulties in decision-making on critical economic matters, systemic corruption, ecological issues, water and electricity shortages, and a demographic crisis due to an aging population. The continuation of these problems, both in the period leading up to and following Khamenei’s eventual death, could push the Islamic Republic into a gradual decline. This process could ultimately result in internal collapse, similar to the final years of the Soviet regime, when the ruling system formally remained in place but had ceased to function effectively.

Khamenei’s death, or the end of his tenure under other circumstances, may lead to the appointment of a conservative or hardline successor who continues his path. Alternatively, a more pragmatic or reformist figure, such as former president Hassan Rouhani or Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, could come to power. This could occur either as a deliberate attempt to preserve the Islamic Republic through reform and moderation or due to a shift in the new leader’s positions, similar to the evolution seen under Khrushchev or Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union.

Regime change through a popular uprising. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out and may depend on an unpredictable trigger, there is currently no indication of an immediate or significant threat to the regime’s stability. As previously discussed, the intensification of repression following the war may further reduce the likelihood of political change via a popular uprising. Regime change in Iran is only possible through a shift in the balance of power between those advocating for revolutionary change and those seeking to preserve the political status quo at all costs. This process could lead to the regime’s gradual erosion until it collapses, if the circles surrounding the regime lose faith in its vitality and its ability to use its repressive tools to maintain its long-term survival. Currently, the regime still enjoys significant support from its security and law enforcement apparatus, particularly the IRGC, the Basij, and law enforcement forces. However, the question of loyalty of these forces to the regime will become critical as its erosion accelerates. A turning point may occur if it becomes clear that parts of the security apparatus refuse to participate in acts of repression.

In addition, it should be noted that recent waves of protests in Iran have not relied on organized leadership or formal opposition structures but rather on a deep shift in the consciousness of the younger generation. This generation is defined by both a new personal and national identity that distances itself from both religious and state institutions and poses a continuous challenge to the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. These deep-rooted trends, relating to gender, authority, personal freedoms, and exposure to global influences, cannot be suppressed through traditional methods alone. In the future, they could form the foundation of a broad, cross-sectoral movement that is not necessarily based on an alternative ideology but rather on a new language of belonging and protest.

Power shift within the regime through military-security takeover. Such a change, led by the country’s military-security establishment, particularly the IRGC, could involve removing the supreme leader or appointing a weak figurehead intended to provide legitimacy while remaining fully controlled by the IRGC. This scenario is more likely to emerge if the regime perceives growing instability or following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. From Israel’s perspective, this would not necessarily be a positive development. A regime dominated by the IRGC could become even more authoritarian, aggressive, and hardline than the current leadership.

Many members of the IRGC, especially veterans of the Iran–Iraq war who were not significantly exposed to Western education or influence, are identified with Iran’s conservative-hardliner camp. When it comes to foreign policy, they often adopt a hawkish, nationalist, and defiant approach toward the West, which could affect Iran’s policy on key foreign policy issues, including the nuclear program, regional ambitions, its stance toward the United States and its Arab allies, and Israel.

Conversely, it can be argued that the IRGC may be more committed to the pragmatic interests of their organization rather than to ideological and revolutionary ideals. Additionally, the IRGC, which is not a monolithic entity, may be more prone to internal power struggles and conflicts compared to the current regime, which generally enjoys a relatively high level of internal cohesion. A change within the regime may catalyze a series of events that would eventually lead to regime change, as occurred during the third wave of democratization in Latin America in the 1980s. In several cases, military-led regimes that replaced authoritarian governments were also eventually replaced, at least temporarily, by democratic rule. In addition, a military regime led by the IRGC might not enjoy the same legitimacy among the Shiite communities outside of Iran as does the current Supreme Leader Khamenei, potentially weakening the so-called “axis of resistance.”

De facto leadership shift without formal regime change. Another possible scenario, which can be seen as a variation of scenario 1 or 3, involves the de facto rule of another actor who takes over the leadership of the state without officially changing the regime’s structure. In this scenario, the supreme leader ceases to function effectively due to physical decline, cognitive ailments, or a political decision. In an effort to preserve political stability, avoid a succession struggle, and prevent the appearance of weakness both internally and externally, de facto control passes to another actor (a senior IRGC commander, a senior politician, or some form of collective leadership) who manages the country behind the scenes. Outwardly, the appearance of political continuity and functioning institutions is maintained, but the center of gravity shifts to actors who are not elected and operate outside the constitutional framework. Strategic decisions are then made by other forces, without public accountability or institutional oversight. This scenario could pose a challenge in understanding the decision-making processes in Tehran, as the visible power structure would no longer reflect the actual centers of power.

Strategies for Overthrowing the Regime

Several key strategic approaches can be identified for overthrowing the regime in Iran. These will serve as a basis for the discussion going forward:

1. Decapitation of the ruling elite, involving a swift military operation aimed at eliminating senior regime officials, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, his inner circle, and senior political and military leaders. The elimination of several dozen top officials in the opening phase of an operation could destabilize the regime in Tehran and create conditions that may lead to political change.
2. A covert campaign to promote regime change, led by military, security, or political actors in Iran in cooperation with other power centers such as civil society organizations, labor unions, and ethnic and linguistic minorities, with external financial, organizational, logistical, and even military support to promote regime collapse.
3. Encouragement, organization, and support of opposition groups in exile, preparing such groups for a rapid return to Iran and a takeover of the regime’s power centers should a revolutionary movement emerge within the country.
4. Provision of assistance and support to ethnic and linguistic minorities, including encouraging separatist tendencies and internal fragmentation in Iran to undermine the regime and promote political change.

Guiding Principles for Formulating Policy

1. It is impossible to predict a regime change in Iran, especially in the case of a popular revolutionary movement. Therefore, continuous monitoring of internal developments in Iran is necessary, alongside extensive research and understanding of the underlying processes within Iranian society.
2. The term “regime change” in Iran does not necessarily mean the rise of a democratic, liberal, or pro-Western government. Rather, it refers to the end of the current regime structure of the Islamic Republic, which is based on the concept of the guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (velayat-e faqih). This distinction is especially relevant when taking into account greater global shifts, the power struggle between the liberal-democratic Western bloc and its opponents, mainly Russia and China, and the erosion of the liberal-democratic model worldwide.
3. The Iranian regime views the preservation of its survival and stability as its highest priority. Its security doctrine, including the nuclear program and the “proxy strategy,” stems from this fundamental objective. Accordingly, changes in Iran’s security perception in response to regional developments over the past two years (especially since the summer of 2024) and the war with Israel may present new opportunities to shift the internal reality in Iran and destabilize the regime.
4. Given the nature of governance in the Islamic Republic, the religious and ideological dimensions play a crucial role in any future scenario and must be taken into account in the overall considerations when shaping policy toward the Iranian regime.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Regime change in Iran is a possible solution, and perhaps the only sustainable way forward, given the series of threats posed by the Islamic regime to Israel, the region, and the international community. Overthrowing the Islamic regime is thus a worthy goal not only for the State of Israel, the region, and the West but also for the citizens of Iran themselves. However, regime change largely depends on factors outside of Israel’s control and on a catalyst whose prediction is elusive and may never materialize.

A change in the regime, or an internal shift such as the rise of more pragmatic elements or a takeover by the IRGC, would not necessarily alter Iran’s core strategic objectives. These include the pursuit of regional hegemony, support for non-state actors in the Arab Middle East, and the advancement of its nuclear goals that, in some cases, predate the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, such a change could lower the priority of hostility toward Israel in Iran’s overall strategy, reduce the regime’s ideological commitment to Israel’s destruction, and make it more difficult for a new leadership to maintain the ideological-Shiite axis in the region that has been cultivated under Khamenei’s rule.

Regime change depends primarily on factors beyond Israel’s control, chiefly the Iranian people themselves. Relying on a popular uprising is not a sound policy direction, as the timing, likelihood, and trigger of such an uprising are impossible to assess. Israel’s impressive operational achievements in the 12-day war against Iran do not in themselves indicate its ability to promote political change in Iran. On the contrary, historical experience shows that regime change through foreign intervention brings highly questionable results at best. This can be demonstrated by the overall failure of regime change attempts by the United States and even Israel’s limited forays into the business of regime change during the First Lebanon War and its failed efforts to topple Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Given the uncertainty surrounding if and when such a change might occur, it cannot serve as a working assumption for strategic planning. Moreover, it is advisable to refrain from public declarations on the topic of regime change, as foreign interference may undermine the legitimacy of pro-change forces within Iran. Until such change materializes, measures can be taken to weaken the regime and curb its ability to pose a range of threats to Israel’s national security.

If Israel adopts a strategic decision to promote regime change in Iran, or at least to weaken the regime, it may consider various tools: military means, overt political pressure, soft power efforts, and covert operations. Each of these should be evaluated according to two main criteria: first, whether the action helps shift the balance of power between the regime and its domestic opponents in favor of the latter; and second, whether it advances Israel’s broader strategic objectives in its confrontation with Iran. Israel’s top priority should remain preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, a strategy aimed at achieving this goal (whether militarily or diplomatically) should be prioritized, even at the cost of delaying regime change. This dilemma may arise if distancing Iran from its nuclear aspirations can be achieved through a diplomatic channel. Although such an agreement would bring sanctions relief and potentially act as a lifeline for the regime by easing economic strain, this is a cost Israel should be willing to bear. The relief of sanctions while strengthening the regime in the short term may actually bring about its end in the long term. If economic sanctions sufficiently strengthen the middle class and expose the Iranian populace to the West, these changes may serve as an eventual catalyst for regime change.

It is also worth noting that the US approach, at least at present, reflects not only a willingness to leave the regime in place but also to significantly strengthen it, as long as Iran is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. If Iran is willing to make major concessions, including giving up on enrichment, the United States is willing to provide major sanctions relief and even the possibility of American investment in Iran. Therefore, a fundamental disagreement could arise between Israel and the United States regarding the desired goal and strategy toward Iran, should Israel decide to actively pursue regime change in Tehran. As such, it is advisable for Israel to closely coordinate its strategy in this arena with the United States. Such coordination could also help Israel secure at least partial international legitimacy for advancing its preferred courses of action against the regime in Tehran.

Even if a diplomatic settlement is reached on the Iranian nuclear issue, it remains both appropriate and necessary to sustain international political and economic pressure on Iran. This can be achieved by rallying the international community around other areas of concern, including its missile program, regional aggression, support for international terrorism, influence operations on social media, and ongoing human rights violations.

The assassination of Khamenei, which was raised as a possibility during the war, would not necessarily result in regime change, although it might shake the ruling elite. Unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, the Islamic Republic is based on an institutionalized, structured political system with many mechanisms of continuity. The “Assembly of Experts,” composed of 88 clerics responsible for appointing the supreme leader, would likely have little difficulty selecting a successor, who could prove to be more extreme or more capable than Khamenei. Moreover, the death of the leader might, at least in the short term, strengthen internal cohesion and complicate efforts to destabilize the regime through popular protest. The IRGC could exploit the assassination to deepen their control over state institutions and establish a military-security regime that would be no more moderate than the existing one. Assassinating a senior cleric may also have inadvertent effects, such as elevating him into a martyr and thus glorifying the religious establishment. This could also create a symbolic narrative among global Shiite communities, portraying the conflict with Israel as part of a broader historical struggle, similar in meaning to the events of Karbala. Given Khamenei’s advanced age and growing reports about his declining health, the succession process is already underway. The possibility of his assassination, which was raised during the war, may have accelerated the vetting process of his potential successors.

 Building a coalition that can pose a credible challenge to regime stability is a complex task. Such a coalition would need to be made up of broad and diverse swaths of Iranian society, including those focused on economic improvement, such as workers and pensioners, as well as students who have long been at the forefront of the fight for civil liberties. It is therefore advisable to avoid ties, when possible, with Iranian opposition groups (including some monarchist circles in the diaspora) who are perceived by large segments of the Iranian public as tainted and having betrayed Iran in its time of need. Although aligning with pro-Western and pro-Israel diaspora groups that push for revolutionary change may seem natural, such associations may, in fact, undermine the credibility of internal opposition and ultimately obstruct the desired outcome. It is possible to express support for the protest movement in Iran (if it resumes), and it is important to build capabilities that could be employed in the event of renewed mass mobilization. These could include tools for bypassing internet censorship, a strike fund financed from abroad to help citizens and workers sustain themselves during protests and strikes, and the development of capabilities to disrupt or undermine the regime’s repression mechanisms on a “day of reckoning.” At the same time, it is advisable to promote diplomatic, economic, perception-shaping, intelligence, and other measures, including assistance to various social sectors in Iran and to civil society institutions. These steps may help lay the groundwork for regime change in preparation for a mass protest movement.

Caution must be exercised regarding calls for the partitioning of Iran or the encouragement of separatist trends. The ethnic-linguistic issue in Iran has been a source of sensitivity for years, as nearly 50% of Iran’s population is comprised of ethnic-linguistic minorities, and it has occasionally fueled protest and even violent clashes in regions with minorities. However, most of these groups seek to preserve their cultural identities and to end discrimination, rather than to secede from Iran.

Unlike many Arab nation-states in the region, whose borders were drawn by Western powers following World War I, Iran has maintained a distinct political and cultural identity for centuries, despite profound ethnic and sectarian differences. The historical development of Iran’s ethnic minorities, their religious affiliations (Sunni and Shiite), and their varying degrees of integration into Iranian society significantly diminish the threat they pose to Iran’s national cohesion. The regime’s persistent fear of separatism has heightened public sensitivity to any perceived foreign attempts to promote ethnic fragmentation. Such efforts would likely backfire by uniting large segments of the Iranian public against Israel, which would be viewed as trying to fracture the country.