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Despite its central role in Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy—and having the most advanced and threatening conventional capabilities—Hezbollah refrained from joining the 12-day war between Israel and Iran. Instead, it offered declarative support, defying long-standing assumptions that Iran had invested billions of dollars in Hezbollah’s military buildup, carried out alongside its nuclear program, in order to ensure the organization’s assistance if Iran were attacked. Yet, on the “day of reckoning”—after having been attacked by Israel—Hezbollah could not fulfill its designated role, even though it is reasonable to assume that the distressed Iranian regime had pressured it to join the fighting.

Following the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah issued a congratulatory message for Iran’s “divine victory” and organized rallies in its honor. Throughout the war, Hezbollah was careful to demonstrate support for Iran and echo its messages. In public statements—including by the organization’s Secretary-General Naim Qassem—complete identification with the Iranian regime was evident: Israel was accused of criminal aggression backed by the United States, endangering regional stability and security without justification and with the assertion that it would not go unpunished. The organization called on regional states and the UN to act against Israel and expressed faith in Iran’s ability to respond and defend itself. Yet, the organization’s senior officials preferred to justify their inaction by claiming that “Iran is strong enough and does not need assistance,” as stated by Mahmoud Qamati, a member of Hezbollah’s political council, on June 17.

Hezbollah also joined Iran’s attempts to prevent moves that would further strain Tehran. Among these were efforts to deter the United States from joining the war and to prevent Israel from eliminating Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, emphasizing his unique religious status and the severe reactions expected from broad segments of the Muslim world if he were harmed. In a statement on the eve of the American strike on Iran on June 19, Naim Qassem declared that Hezbollah was not neutral in this conflict but supported Iran and stood by it, though he refrained from explicitly threatening to join the fighting. At the same time, the organization conveyed messages through international media (Reuters, Newsweek) that it would not intervene in the war, and its statement following the American strike was relatively delayed and reflected hesitation and embarrassment among the organization’s leadership. Lebanese sources were even cited in the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat on June 23, claiming that Israel was trying to drag Lebanon into the war, but Hezbollah remained steadfast in its decision to avoid this.

Hezbollah’s decision not to intervene in the war on Iran’s behalf is understandable given the internal and external pressures it faces:

Hezbollah is still reeling from its defeat in the war with Israel and seeks a period of calm to allow for recovery. The organization is interested in rehabilitating its operatives, organizational structure, internal standing, and especially its military capabilities. Although it is engaged in ongoing efforts to smuggle money and weapons, some attempts—via Syria during the war with Iran—have been uncovered. Smuggling has become particularly difficult since the collapse of Assad’s regime, which led to the loss of strategic depth and the freedom to exploit the Syrian arena, along with the efforts of Lebanese security forces to prevent smuggling through official state crossings. Participation in the war with Iran could have further depleted Hezbollah’s assets and could have caused widespread destruction in Lebanon—especially among the Shiite population in the south, which has not yet recovered from the consequences of Hezbollah’s war with Israel.

The IDF’s military superiority and continued operations against Hezbollah have hindered the organization and worsened its condition. The IDF, claiming ceasefire violations by the organization, continues to attack Hezbollah operatives and infrastructure. The Israeli Air Force’s control of Lebanese airspace and its intelligence capabilities to expose the organization’s activities burden its rehabilitation efforts. Since the ceasefire took effect, about 200 Hezbollah operatives have been killed, some of them key figures in military arrays. Weapons factories and storage facilities have also been damaged. The most prominent was the June 5 strike in Beirut’s Dahiya neighborhood—the most extensive attack since the ceasefire—which occurred shortly before the war between Israel and Iran. Following the strike, Israel claimed it had targeted facilities used to manufacture and store hundreds of drones. Apparently, the timing of the attack was meant to “convince” Hezbollah not to join the offensive against Iran that Israel had planned. Even during the war, the IDF continued its operations against Hezbollah and attacked southern Lebanon more than a dozen times, killing more than ten Hezbollah operatives within two weeks (in addition to the killing on June 24 of Haytham Abdullah Bakri, a money exchanger who served as a conduit for transferring Iranian funds to Hezbollah). Another noteworthy incident was the extensive strike on June 27 following Hezbollah’s attempts to restore an underground site in the Beaufort Ridge area, which was used to manage its firepower.

Hezbollah faced intense internal pressure to avoid joining the war, primarily from the Lebanese leadership, which declared from the beginning Lebanon’s neutral stance. Even after the American strike on Iran, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam emphasized that Lebanon’s highest interest is to avoid any involvement, with Aoun reminding that Lebanon had already paid a high price for others’ wars and could not bear the cost of another. The leadership supported Qatar during the Lebanese prime minister’s visit there on June 24 and condemned Iran’s strike on the US base at Al-Udeid. Opponents of Hezbollah within Lebanon also joined in, including Sunni Member of Parliament Ashraf Rifi, who tweeted on June 20: “To Sheikh Naim Qassem we say: Lebanon is neutral, and you will not drag it back into ruin, when Iran remained shamefully neutral as you dragged Lebanon into war . . . The lives of the Lebanese are precious, and if you want to commit suicide, do it alone.”

The Lebanese leadership came under pressure from Western actors—primarily the United States and France—who demanded action to prevent Hezbollah’s involvement. The issue was also raised during the visit of US envoy Thomas Barrack to Beirut on June 19, who, according to media reports, conveyed a strong warning from Washington on this matter and also sought to accelerate the handling of the disarmament of both Hezbollah and the armed Palestinian factions in Lebanon operating in coordination with the organization.

Implications of the Iran War on the Lebanese Arena

While it is still too early to fully assess the implications of the war between Israel and Iran on the Lebanese arena, it is already becoming evident that Hezbollah’s situation is likely to deteriorate further. The disintegration of the Shiite axis led by Iran—following the war initiated by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in October 2023—together with the consolidation of a new regime in Syria hostile to Hezbollah and Iran and oriented toward improving relations with the West, the Gulf States (and possibly even Israel), had already complicated Hezbollah’s rehabilitation efforts before the war and is likely to continue doing so. Iran will likely continue supporting Hezbollah, but it was already struggling to do so before the war, and the aftermath will likely compound these difficulties. This will particularly be the case if it faces heightened economic strain in the absence of a nuclear deal with the United States that would include sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian assets—in addition to having to prioritize domestic postwar recovery. These challenges may intensify further if Iran concludes that its proxy strategy requires revision. Adding to this (perhaps temporarily) was the killing—announced by Israel on June 21—of Saeed Izadi, head of the Quds Force’s Palestine Corps in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, who served as a key link between Iran and Hezbollah (Hezbollah is already seeking alternative channels for money transfers). Other Iranian officials involved in strengthening Iran’s proxies and promoting the now-collapsed concept of “unified fronts” have also been targeted.

At the same time, Israel is expected to continue its strikes on Hezbollah in its attempts to breach the ceasefire and rehabilitate. Pressure on Hezbollah to comply with Resolution 1701 and disarm is also expected to grow. Already in the first days after the Israel–Iran ceasefire, more assertive voices emerged within the Lebanese system—both from opponents of the Hezbollah who see this as a golden opportunity to break free from its influence, and from figures who previously refrained from criticizing Hezbollah, but now support its disarmament. These include Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Christian leader Gebran Bassil, head of the “Free Patriotic Movement,” who had previously cooperated with Hezbollah. The United States is also increasing pressure on the Lebanese leadership to advance the disarmament effort. According to media reports, during his recent visit to Beirut, US envoy Thomas Barrack demanded that the Lebanese leadership set a timetable for the process and complete it by the end of 2025.

The Lebanese leadership, for its part, finds it difficult to promote Hezbollah’s disarmament. So far, Lebanese leaders have chosen to maintain open channels of dialogue with Hezbollah and avoid confrontation, and they are expected to continue exercising caution to prevent an escalation that could lead to another civil war initiated by Hezbollah. The state leadership has claimed it will pursue Hezbollah’s disarmament through diplomatic means. To delay direct confrontation with the organization, it decided to first disarm the armed Palestinian factions in the refugee camps. However, even this step—originally scheduled to begin on June 16—was postponed under the pretext of the outbreak of the Israel–Iran war. It is also known that in its response to the American envoy’s proposal, the Lebanese government requested a gradual and integrated process that would include Israeli concessions alongside Lebanon’s effort to curb Hezbollah. Hezbollah, for its part, strongly opposes disarmament but does not want to alienate the Lebanese government. It seeks to maintain good relations in order to avoid a violent confrontation, influence the Lebanese state’s response to Israeli actions, and ensure continued support for the Shiite population that forms its political base.

Implications and Recommendations for Israel

In light of Hezbollah’s weakness and the constraints it faces, it is reasonable to assess that the organization will adhere to the “containment strategy” it has adopted toward Israel. Hezbollah is likely to uphold the ceasefire while increasing pressure on the Lebanese leadership to demand that Israel and the United States halt Israeli strikes against it and withdraw from the five positions Israel holds in Lebanese territory. Hezbollah presents these positions as a violation of the ceasefire agreement and uses them to justify its continued existence as an independent armed militia. At the same time, the organization is expected to proceed with its rehabilitation efforts and prepare for a future confrontation with Israel.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s weakened position—alongside the emergence of a new pro-Western leadership in Lebanon that opposes the organization, and the anticipated challenges facing Iran and the entire Shiite axis following the war with Israel—creates a window of opportunity for Israel to advance two of its central interests: first, the establishment of a new security reality along the Lebanese border; and second, a potential change in its relationship with Lebanon. At the same time, Israel must take into account the weakness and limitations of the Lebanese leadership under Aoun and adopt a cautious and realistic approach.

Accordingly, it is proposed:

In the first stage, Israel should focus on improving the security situation along the border while postponing efforts to promote a formal shift in bilateral relations until the Lebanese state is stronger. It is crucial not to pressure the new Lebanese leadership—currently facing significant internal challenges—to advance ties with Israel prematurely. A change in Lebanon’s stance could emerge at a later stage, particularly if additional countries join the Abraham Accords, especially if it includes Saudi Arabia and possibly Syria.

Consequently, Israel should maintain its military operations to weaken Hezbollah and prevent its rehabilitation and return to southern Lebanon. These efforts should be done within the bounds of the freedom of action permitted under the ceasefire agreement but done with caution and in consideration of the Lebanese leadership’s constraints. Israel should also seek to develop coordination channels with Lebanon’s leadership and continue to support the five-party enforcement committee and its ongoing activity (the committee met on June 25 after a break of about three months).

In parallel, Israel should work with the Americans and the Lebanese leadership to formulate a coordinated and gradual plan to create a new security regime on the border. This would include the removal of Hezbollah’s presence from southern Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in its place, in exchange for a gradual IDF withdrawal from the five positions, along with an agreement regarding the future of UNIFIL (and not a demand for its immediate removal).

Western aid to Lebanon should not be made entirely conditional on Hezbollah’s complete disarmament, given the state’s urgent economic needs. Instead, economic assistance should be strategically directed toward strengthening Lebanon’s pro-Western leadership, particularly by advancing the reforms needed to stabilize and regulate the country’s economic and governmental systems. Aid should also be used to counter Hezbollah’s influence by supporting the Shiite population that depends on it, by offering a viable alternative to address its needs. Moderate regional actors (Saudi Arabia, the UAE) and the West should be encouraged to provide economic aid to the Lebanese Army, along with steps to reduce Hezbollah’s influence within it. This would help prevent Lebanon from turning to Iranian, Turkish, or Russian aid and to reduce its dependence on Qatar’s assistance.

Efforts should be made to encourage the US administration to increase its engagement on the Lebanon issue—both by supporting Israeli policy and military activity, and by providing assistance to Lebanon and the Lebanese Army.