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The military component of Operation Guardian of the Walls, the fourth significant round of fighting against Hamas and terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip in recent years, ended on May 21, 2021. During the operation, the diplomatic and communications systems conducted an intensive effort that established international legitimacy for the State of Israel. But now, after the military operation is over, the diplomatic and communications systems move onto the next stage. This stage is expected to see attempts to expand actions against Israel in The Hague, condemn it in various forums, initiate commissions of inquiry against it within hostile organizations such as the UN Human Rights Council, encourage international organizations to write critical reports, and initiate hostile journalistic investigations. All of this will likely be done with a bias that disregards Hamas's terrorist activities almost completely.

National strategic communications are a key pillar of Israel’s national security, as was demonstrated once again in Operation Guardian of the Walls. Strategic communications should be among the government’s main efforts in events of this sort, in parallel to the military effort, the effort to defend the home front, and the international diplomatic effort.

This approach properly positions communications as one of the state’s principal strategic efforts. However, despite its high importance, the resources invested in the field are far from adequate and do not match the standards of other national efforts. At the same time, additional problems relating to Israel's communications and public diplomacy that arose during the operation cannot be attributed solely to a lack of resources. Therefore, it is advisable to undertake an orderly process with all the relevant professional elements to draw the necessary conclusions. Decision makers should become familiar with these lessons and try to implement them in order to improve future performance.

The main lessons are as follows:

1. In each military action and operation, strategic communications aim at three main target audiences: Israeli, international, and regional (Palestinian and Arab states), and these can be further divided into sub-audiences. It is important to define and tailor a different outreach strategy for each of these target audiences, based on its own set of messages and actions.

The most important audience in the international theater is the United States. The principal effort is the need to preserve legitimacy in the United States, and this must take into account American public opinion (with an emphasis on liberal audiences), the political system (both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party), and the administration. In addition, it is important to give special consideration to the American Jewish community and the evangelicals. Today, as the progressive wing of the Democratic Party challenges President Biden's administration, this effort is both particularly urgent and complex.

In most military events, strategic communications vis-à-vis the international community comprises the principal effort. Operation Guardian of the Walls, however, was marked by the need to extend outreach efforts toward the citizens of Israel as well, in light of the violence between Arabs and Jews and the sense that Hamas scored significant cognitive achievements (positioning itself as the defender of Jerusalem, fomenting unrest among Israel’s Arab population, launching rockets at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and continuing the rocket fire at Israel’s southern communities until the last day of the operation). The IDF's performance was impressive and effective and its military achievements extremely important, but none became a prominent "symbol" (like the targeted killing of Hamas's military wing commander in Operation Pillar of Defense), such as an attack on the organization's leadership in the Gaza Strip or the return of the Israeli captives and missing soldiers held by Hamas. The lack of such a symbol makes it difficult to market achievements to the Israeli public.

In this situation, it could have been possible to create a stronger communications anchor for the Israeli public through a regular daily or bi-daily press conference of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff (perhaps also the Police Commissioner), and others. In such a briefing it is possible to elaborate on achievements and present them in a clear way, explain the challenges, coordinate expectations with the public – for example, regarding the continued rocket fire from Hamas and its efforts to impart the sense of a cognitive victory – and to answer some of the most relevant questions on the agenda. Such a briefing would also help create continuity in events in the eyes of the public, for example by presenting a digital platform that is updated daily and presents the IDF's main strikes and achievements against Hamas throughout the Gaza Strip.

Such a briefing could also be used for strategic communications and public diplomacy needs regarding international and Arab audiences.

2. The most notable media event during Operation Guardian of the Walls, which also drew widespread international criticism, was the destruction of the al-Jalaa Tower in Gaza. The high-rise was used in part by the foreign media, including the American news agency AP, and was a military target due to Hamas activity from the building. Targets of this kind should be discussed at the highest level in the IDF, and all the international implications must be considered. First, the target could be waived in view of its sensitivity – while Hamas also operates out of hospitals and schools, in this operation, the IDF did not target them. However, once the IDF did decide to carry out the attack, it would have been appropriate to raise the issue for discussion at the highest political level, while weighing all the consequences and possibilities of the action. It is necessary to assess the security benefit in light of public image and diplomatic implications, with the understanding that damage to the building would provoke an outcry from the global media (and especially the American media, given the AP presence there) and create negative public opinion and criticism toward Israel. These would immediately translate into pressure on decision makers in the United States to stop the combat. Indeed, President Biden called Prime Minister Netanyahu following the incident, and some of Israel's closest friends, such as Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), publicly criticized Israel for its damage to the building. Therefore, if a decision was taken to thwart Hamas's activities in the building, Israel could have planned a media campaign, for example, to expose publicly the fact that Hamas uses foreign journalists as human shields and present evidence to this effect. Thus, there was a twofold opportunity – the possibility of thwarting (without the need of a military strike) Hamas activities in the building, and turning this information into a strategic communications asset in the international arena. It would also have served to build international legitimacy for a subsequent attack on the building. This method has been used in the past – for example, when Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly exposed Hezbollah sites in the heart of Beirut that were used for its precision missile project. In addition, an attack on the building could presumably have damaged the Hamas office without destroying the entire edifice. And if, nonetheless, a decision was made to destroy the building, it would be wise to prepare "communications ammunition" in advance – i.e., intelligence information for use in political and media channels, designated online information products for fast and wide distribution, and a PR plan for interviews, speakers, and experts who could help explain the incident and confront the expected criticism. In this situation, it would have been appropriate to postpone the implementation of the operation until the diplomatic and communications elements were in place.

This event highlights the need to think "internationally," because in a campaign for legitimacy, this is an essential component.

Another example is the significant damage the IDF inflicted on Hamas's tunnel system known in the military as the "metro." Perhaps the term rang successfully among the Israeli public, but this was certainly not the case among international audiences, who see the metro train system as one of the most important arteries of daily life that allows hundreds of millions of people to travel to and from work every day. Their automatic response to the Israeli statements regarding the demolition of the Palestinian "metro" in Gaza will thus be negative, especially when it is based on lack of knowledge and ignorance. It is therefore important to understand that there are significant differences between domestic communications and foreign communications, especially in the main messages conveyed. Action must be taken so that internal communications do not harm the international diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts.

3. Every military operation and event has its own media crises. The destruction of the high-rise building was one, but there were others – such as the image of the burning tree on the Temple Mount plaza and Palestinian allegations of a family of seven killed in the al-Shati refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. Lessons learned from such crises, such as accusations of IDF responsibility for killing the child Muhammad al-Dura (2000), or the takeover of the Mavi Marmara (2010), have taught that such crises must be addressed as early as possible while harnessing all possible means. When such an event begins to unfold, usually in the Arab and international media or on social networks, PR and intelligence officials should be convened immediately and attention should focus on the event. For example, regarding the burning tree on the Temple Mount, in parallel with the unequivocal denial of the allegations by official figures, an effort was required to locate photographs, videos, and evidence to prove that it was not a fire in a mosque and that it was started deliberately by Arabs in order to intensify incitement against Israel. In this incident, and also regarding the allegations of killing children, it is essential to harness the intelligence agencies immediately and instruct them to focus on it and release intelligence materials that will refute the allegations. In addition, an official public version must be formulated quickly, with a proactive communications plan to undermine the credibility of the other party. Without effective and rapid coping, these crises will cause long-term damage to Israel's image.

These crises underscore the importance of using intelligence information for communications purposes. It is essential to establish and strengthen mechanisms that enable the detection and "legitimization" of such relevant intelligence for the diplomatic and communications campaign. This must be done quickly, in order to influence the news cycle in relation to said events.

4. It is imperative to strengthen the existing strategic communications mechanisms, and especially the National Information Directorate in the Prime Minister's Office, through the appointment of senior, skilled, and reliable professionals (some offices have been unmanned for years). This body should be given more authority, procedures and working methods should be updated, and positions and budgets should be added. A strong strategic communications headquarters would organize the system, coordinate between all bodies, resolve disputes, intervene in moments of crisis, balance internal public relations and foreign communications, and even involve the Prime Minister personally as needed. However, appointing experienced people who specialize in the subject is necessary not only in the Prime Minister's Office, but also in the IDF Spokesperson's Unit and other systems involved in strategic communications. There must be a genuine understanding in the military and political establishments alike that spokesmanship and advocacy is a profession, and therefore the appointment of people who specialize in the field will improve the performance of the system. At the same time, their success depends not only on their professional level, but also on the degree to which they are integrated into the decision making processes in the army, the defense establishment, and government ministries. Incorporating strategic communications professionals in the decision making processes will enable not only better marketing of the decisions taken, but also better decision making, which takes into account strategic communications and diplomatic aspects alongside security dimensions.

5. The IDF deception exercise that was part of the plan to attack the Hamas tunnel network was an excellent and effective move. But the announcement on behalf of senior IDF spokespeople that ground troops had entered the Strip (which, according to the IDF Spokesperson, was by mistake), was perceived as part of the deception and caused damage. The IDF Spokesperson has no more important asset than his credibility towards the journalists – Israelis and foreigners alike. The IDF Spokesperson is perceived by the media as one of the most reliable, professional, and apolitical elements in Israel, and this image must be guarded with all vigilance. The incident, even if it occurred unintentionally, damaged credibility because it caused the media to report something that was false. The combination of the damage to journalistic credibility in this incident, and the damage to the media infrastructure in the event of the demolition of the tower, created a negative effect that was interpreted as an intentional Israeli attempt to damage media coverage of the operation.

6. Most of the activity in the international media stationed in Israel focused on interviews by various networks with Israeli speakers. These were usually the foreign media spokespeople for the Prime Minister's Office, the IDF Spokesman, and the Foreign Ministry. In addition, Israel should have held regular daily national briefings for the international media that included visual presentations, rather than relying primarily on interviews (which are effective in and of themselves) initiated by the media and the periodic briefings of various parties. Holding regular national briefings would strengthen the Israeli narrative, allow answers to allegations that arise in the media, and provide material for "syncs" (excerpts from speaker interviews) for use by all media – and there are hundreds in Israel, even if not all of them are equally central.

7. Operation Guardian of the Walls once again illustrated what has been clear in recent years – Israel has a problem among progressive and liberal audiences and immigrant communities in the United States and Western Europe. For example, the African American, Hispanic, Muslim, and liberal young communities in the United States have gained great political and media power in recent years and their influence on decision makers has risen considerably. During the operation, President Biden was under pressure by such elements in his party, and this pressure might have even led him to demand of Israel to end the operation. The challenge of having a dialogue with these groups is great but extremely important, so it is worth investing significantly more effort and resources for this purpose. It is recommended to build a long-term action plan that includes meetings, bringing delegations and leaders to Israel, harnessing the diversity of Israeli society for meetings (e.g., Ethiopians, Arabs, left wing individuals), connecting with local and international celebrities and the major organizations of these populations, initiating specific media activities, and perhaps even appointing special speakers who are experienced in addressing these populations. Most journalists and representatives of the media, the world of culture, and academia are part of the democratic and liberal camp. Therefore, investment and effort must be increased to strengthen the base of political and public support for Israel among these audiences. Without a massive and long-term investment, significant support cannot be expected during crisis events such as the Gaza operation.

8. The communications bodies in Israel carried out extensive and professional activities on social media, including uploading information, photos, videos, testimonies, stories, and graphics. Some of the content is promoted and adapted to specific audiences, which involves substantial financial investment. In addition, an effort is made to remove accounts that encourage incitement, terrorism, and violence. Official Israeli activity is conducted in impressive coordination and cooperation with many volunteers and pro-Israel advocacy organizations in Israel and around the world. Nevertheless, the intensity of the online activity of Israel's opponents and critics is much greater and more powerful, and it mobilizes more people and money toward this effort. This fact was illustrated during Guardian of the Walls, as in previous operations. It is therefore essential to expand online activity significantly through the recruitment of organizations and partners, especially in the Jewish and evangelical communities. It is essential to increase the number of people who are active in networks (in Israel and abroad), and invest greater resources in the production, promotion, and focus of materials dedicated to social media among target audiences. Because this highly technological field is constantly evolving, additional resources are also required to integrate new technologies to disseminate information, for example, on the basis of artificial intelligence. This must be done in parallel with strengthening coordination and activity with other government agencies that can assist in the campaign, such as the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. In addition, Israel must deepen its investment in qualitatively and quantitatively measuring outreach activities abroad, both in the social media arena and through surveys and opinion polls. This requires significant resources, but it is critical for the assessment and adjustment of strategic communications activities in times of routine, during operations and crises, and after them.

9. There seems to be no choice but also to engage more in "explaining the communications effort" to the Israeli public. The prevalent feeling that "strategic communications failed" stems from various reasons, which do not necessarily reflect reality and do not rely on any metrics: first, there is a lack of awareness of said activity, as most of it is done behind the scenes – with journalists, on social media, abroad, and in foreign languages. Second, there are people who after every operation make sure to emphasize that "the communications campaign failed." Therefore, it is important to raise awareness among the Israeli public about what is happening in the field through interviews and articles by those involved in the craft – ministers, officials, and professionals. Third, and above all, there is an expectation in the Israeli public that the world will understand events as they are understood in Israel. This, of course, is an unrealistic and erroneous expectation. The international arena is diverse – studies conducted over the years indicate that most people around the world are not at all interested in what is happening in Israel and the region, as most of the Israeli public is not interested in other conflicts in the world. Moreover, the Western world does not experience a security situation similar to the Israeli situation, which is foreign and incomprehensible to it. In addition, the global media, especially the television channels, are addicted to what they perceive as the most severe suffering and distress, and will therefore tend to cover the Palestinian side in more detail. The Israeli media, on the other hand, mainly covers the Israeli side, but also highlights and intensifies any protest demonstration in the world, thus creating a frightening and distorted image that "the whole world against us."

It is important to understand that many in the international community see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle between asymmetric forces, where Israel will always have the upper hand and therefore have the overall responsibility for the situation, in light of its control over the region (the West Bank, and in practice, also the Gaza Strip). Therefore, in the absence of a political solution to the conflict, and even a process toward a solution, the responsibility (and also the blame) in the eyes of many in the international community lies with Israel. In their eyes, even the violence and terrorism perpetrated by the Palestinians stem from the lack of a solution to the problem. The prevailing Israeli perception, of course, sees the situation in a completely different way, and the official communications bodies are dedicated to advance the Israeli narrative, using all the relevant arguments. However, as is well known, it is difficult to change basic, fundamental perceptions – and thus even Israel’s justified arguments are at times ignored or met with indifference by some audiences in the world. Joining this are a lack of attention and understanding among audiences with extremist perceptions (left and right), antisemitic and anti-Israel elements, and a tendency toward hypocrisy, double standards, and self-righteousness. The hostility and basic bias inherent in various bodies in the international arena also add to this feeling. These will not be influenced by any communications campaign, no matter how good it may be. Israel will likely never convince these elements of the justness its path.

Israel's case will always be more complex than the Palestinians’ case because it is grounded in two basic (and even contradictory) messages: one, Israel is the strong side, a successful and prosperous military and technological power on a global scale. And two, Israel is a villa in the jungle, attacked and threatened by many powerful enemies. This is in contrast to the Palestinian case, whose message emphasizes the victims.

In conclusion, there is no country in the world that is the object of such a broad and systematic denigration effort as is the State of Israel. The recent campaign against Hamas saw much success, but also highlighted problems and limitations of the strategic communications effort toward the public in Israel, abroad, and throughout the Middle East. It is important to understand that there is no silver bullet in strategic communications and public opinion, meaning there is no certain solution that, if only adopted, will solve the problems and change the reality. An example of a reality-changing solution is the Iron Dome system, which completely changed military campaigns. Strategic communications, on the other hand, are grounded in psychology, perception, values, cognition, beliefs, education, emotions, and other rational and irrational components that shape worldviews. Therefore, it is advisable to use the lessons of the operation to strengthen and improve strategic communications capabilities and performance for future campaigns and events in the Palestinian arena, Hezbollah, Iran and for many other issues. If strategic communications are indeed a key component of national security, then they must be cultivated accordingly.

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* Yarden Vatikay established and then headed the National Information Directorate in the Prime Minister's Office for over 11 years. He is currently a strategic communications consultant.