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According to IDF data, during the 11 days of Operation Guardian of the Walls some 4,360 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel. This represents almost 400 attacks each day, nearly four times the daily average number of launches during Operation Protective Edge (2014) or the Second Lebanon War (2006). Of the projectiles, 3,400 crossed the Israel-Gaza Strip border. Most fell within the Gaza envelope area – Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip – as well as in Ashkelon and Ashdod. Some 120 rockets were fired toward central Israel, including Tel Aviv. Some 1,100 missiles were intercepted by the Iron Dome system (90 percent success in intercepting rockets headed for populated areas). In this round, 12 civilians (and one soldier) were killed in Israel, compared to 6 civilians killed in Protective Edge (2014), which lasted 7 weeks and 44 killed in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Damage to property was extensive.

Main Features of the Operation on the Civilian Front

Although the duration of fighting was relatively short, in quantitative terms the attacks from Gaza revealed a considerable improvement in the offensive capabilities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in terms of the number of launches per day, the number of rocket barrages, the variety of munitions, and the destructive power of the short-range warheads.

As in the past, most of the attacks were short range, aimed mainly at the Gaza envelope communities. There were, however, numerous launches toward Ashkelon and Ashdod. Ashkelon alone (8 miles from the Gaza border, with a population of about 160,000) was the target of 111 barrages of 960 rockets, about a quarter of the total number of launches. Two women were killed and 295 residents injured. Ashdod (close to 20 miles from the border, with a population of 250,000) was struck by 253 rockets, and suffered much physical damage.

In tandem with the operation were violent riots by Jews and Arabs in Israel, particularly in cities and towns with mixed populations. Their direct influence on events at the front was low, but they were highly prominent and troubling to public.

Overall, the civilian front displayed a high level of functional resilience. There was reasonable functional continuity (apart from the closure of schools within 50 miles of Gaza, reduced flights from Ben Gurion International Airport, and some disruption in internal traffic, also due to the rioting in Israel). Recovery was orderly and rapid. This level of resilience was made possible by a combination of two factors. First, the public in general felt that the military campaign was justified, partly because it was Hamas that began the fighting with rockets targeting Jerusalem, the Gaza envelope area, and heavily populated central Israel. The second factor was the sense of security created by the protection provided by the civilian and military Iron Dome defense system, the improved warning system (some 1,700 localized alarm zones), and the detailed and clear Home Front Command (HFC) instructions. Shelters and other standard protection facilities, wherever in place, were crucial as well.

Significance and Insights

The civilian front functioned well, partly due to the campaign’s short duration and also due to the familiar Israeli tendency to “rally round the flag” of national security.

The HFC is properly prepared throughout the country according to its concept of operation and deployment. Particularly noteworthy is its professional information operation, which offered specific responses for specific population groups. The public had great trust in HFC instructions. Still, the issue concerning a centralized national messaging system remains unresolved.

Once again, the Gaza envelope population bore the brunt of the fighting on the civilian front, and their exposure to high-trajectory missiles and other threats from Gaza (unmanned aircraft and marine craft loaded with explosives) was particularly high. This time they were protected from the threat of terrorist infiltration through attack tunnels thanks to the underground and aboveground barriers, constructed at a cost of more than $1 billion. However, the launches of high-trajectory missiles, the frequent warning sirens, and the reverberations of IDF activity in Gaza created severe physical and mental challenges for local populations, even though they are familiar with and well prepared for these attacks.

As in the past, particularly in the Gaza envelope communities, many residents (in some places, according to media reports, more than half) decided to leave their homes until the fighting was over. This is now accepted as normative conduct, particularly for families with children, who return home as soon as there is a ceasefire. Other places in southern and central Israel also saw residents moving north. There was no government-initiated evacuation of those communities, although plans for such action do exist. Evacuations were handled by the local leadership (mainly in kibbutzim) or by individuals. It appears that contrary to previous government promises, this activity was not sufficiently organized, even in the Gaza envelope.

Evacuation of people from cities such as Sderot, Ashkelon, and Ashdod is in any case a more complicated task due to the size of their populations. In Ashkelon, the target of so many attacks, discussions among its residents about evacuation -- an unfamiliar concept to them -- sometimes included connotations of desertion, echoing views that were more common in the past, for example during the 1991 Gulf War. Such examples indicate that the government should systematically regulate this important issue.

The civil defense concept is based on broad and close cooperation with the rescue and security services and on the effective performance of local authorities, assisted by the HFC as the keystone of the coping mechanism. During Guardian of the Walls, the preparedness of most local authorities proved successful, as was their cooperation with other relevant agencies in managing civilian aspects of the Gaza campaign. Local authorities must maintain and improve these capabilities based on salient lessons from the conflict.

Physical protection from rocket attacks proved essential. The HFC concept that where there are no standard shelter facilities, existing, non-standard facilities must be fully utilized proved to be correct. But due to the short warning time from Hamas rockets and the inadequacies of public shelters, the government must aim for maximum expansion of protection facilities within homes. Figures from the Israel Builders Association show that over 60 percent of apartments in Israel have no safe room, while HFC figures indicate that 27 percent of Israeli residents (about 2.4 million people) have no access to a shelter that meets the national standard. The largest proportion of apartments that are exposed to Hamas threats with no internal shelter is in the central area, including Tel Aviv, where over 400,000 apartments have no safe room. The HFC also found that neighborhood public shelters meet the needs of only about 6 percent of the population, while only about 28 percent are served by shelters in their apartment buildings. Thus, over a quarter of Israel’s population have no access to designated, standard protection facilities. The lack of standard protection facilities is particularly noteworthy in the center and north of the country – areas that could be exposed to high-trajectory missiles in future conflicts. In 2019 the government passed a resolution regarding protection facilities in the north with a budget of over $1 billion, but it was never implemented. The government must prepare a strategic plan to close the gaps, while improving existing facilities.

In conclusion, in view of the of Palestinian terrorist organizations’ expected rebuilding of their military strength in Gaza, it is vital for Israel to maintain and develop its advantages over the enemy, including in civil defense; one of the required measures is furnishing the missing elements and narrowing any gaps. A far more challenging test for Israel will be to face Hezbollah on the northern front. The offensive strength of the Lebanese organization, both quantitatively and qualitatively – including precision guided missiles – requires a higher level of preparedness in all areas, including the closing of any gaps in civilian sheltering. We can assume that a campaign in the north will be longer than in Gaza, and that the damage will be extensive and at least three times more destructive. Some Hezbollah strikes will be more precise and will therefore have a broader impact on the economy and on the country’s functional continuity. The present round was a kind of “preview” of what can be expected in the north, pointing to the need for nationwide preparation as soon as possible. Now is the time to allocate the necessary resources to ensure the preparedness of the civilian front for any possible future conflict. Some resources have already been approved, but have yet to be implemented.

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Col. (res.) Gili Shenhar is the academic coordinator of Emergency Management Programs at Tel Aviv University, and a spokesperson for the home front in emergencies. Col. (res.) Dr. Hilik Sofer is a spokesperson for the home front in emergencies.