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Home Publications Spotlight - Data Analytics Center The Divide Over America: What Israelis Think About the US–Israel Alliance

The Divide Over America: What Israelis Think About the US–Israel Alliance

Spotlight, November 10, 2024

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Leo Greenberg
Theodore Sasson
Rebecca Meller
Mora Deitch
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the divide over america: what israelis think about the us–israel alliance. more than a year of war between israel and its regional enemies has put the us–israel alliance under the spotlight. while the united states has provided israel diplomatic support and more than $22 billion in military aid, the biden administration and the netanyahu-led government have repeatedly clashed on issues such as proportionality, humanitarian aid, and adherence to international law. younger and liberal americans have become more critical of israel, and many israelis have questioned the role of the united states as a limiting factor in israel’s security decision-making. in mid-october, the united states indicated that future weapons shipments might be tied to israel’s facilitation of aid transfers into gaza. against this backdrop, the inss data analytics center conducted polling to capture how israelis currently perceive the us–israel relationship.[1]. according to the inss survey results, a broad consensus among israelis holds that us support is essential for israel’s survival. in july, 73% of respondents (76% of jews and 56% of arabs) agreed with the statement that “the support of the united states is necessary for israel’s survival.” by october, these numbers remained stable, with a slight increase to 76% overall (79% of jews and 63.5% of arabs, see figure 1). among jews, support for this sentiment was highest among left-wing, centrist, and secular respondents, with more than 85% agreeing that us support is necessary for israel’s survival in both july and october (see figures 2 and 3). among both right-wing and religious jews, agreement was initially lower at 70% and 57% in july but climbed to 74% and 65%, respectively, in october, with half of ultra-orthodox (haredi jews) respondents in agreement. figure 1. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, total sample, jews, arabs) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024 and on july 18–21, 2024. figure 2. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 3. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. more significant religious and political divides emerged when respondents considered the extent to which israel should account for us preferences in its decision-making. in the inss poll conducted in august, 57% of respondents (55.5% of jews and 58.5% of arabs) agreed that israel should “very much” or “somewhat” consider us preferences. among jews (see figures 4 and 5), this view was especially prominent among left-wing, centrist and secular respondents: 71% or more felt that us positions should be taken into account. in contrast, only 43% of right-wing, and about a third of religious and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed with that view. figure 4. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. figure 5. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. perceptions of trends in the us–israel alliance also varied across political and religious categories. in the inss survey conducted in october, respondents were asked whether the us-israel relationship had improved, did not change or worsened during the past year. overall, 41.5% of respondents (42% of jews and 39.5% of arabs) expressed the view that the relationship had either improved or did not change. among jews (see figures 6 and 7), about half of right-wing, religious and haredi respondents agreed with this assessment, compared to only about 20%–33% of centrist, left-wing and secular respondents. indeed, in the latter categories, most respondents viewed the relationship having worsened during the past year. figure 6. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 7. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. finally, in the inss survey conducted in july, respondents were asked whether the united states was irreplaceable as israel’s primary ally or if israel should develop ties with other powers such as russia, china, and india. overall, 45% of respondents (48% of jews and 31% of arabs) viewed the united states as irreplaceable. among jews (see figures 8 and 9) a majority of secular and centrist respondents, as well as 80% of left-wing respondents, felt the united states was irreplaceable. in contrast, only around 28%–41% of right-wing, religious, and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed that the united states was irreplaceable. right-wing and religious jews were more likely to support alternative ties, suggesting they were less convinced of the united states’ irreplaceability. figure 8. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. figure 9. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. in conclusion, while most israelis agree that us support is vital to israel’s survival, they express a variety of viewpoints on the nature of the us–israel relationship. left-wing, centrist, and secular jews view the relationship as having worsened over the past year, believe that israel’s government should account more for american perspectives, and regard the united states as an irreplaceable ally. right-wing and religious jews, meanwhile, view the us–israel relationship as fairly resilient over the past year, hold that israel should independently determine its own security decisions, and express a greater willingness to consider alternative alliances. these divergent viewpoints highlight the significance of the us–israel alliance as a political issue for the israeli public. this publication was made possible by the partnership of the ruderman family foundation. _____________________. [1] the “swords of iron” surveys were conducted monthly by the data analytics center at the institute for national security studies, with fieldwork completed by ipanel. a total of 1,000 men and women were interviewed online, of which 800 were interviewed in hebrew and 200 in arabic, constituting a representative sample of the adult israeli population in israel aged 18 and over. the maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ± 3.5% at a 95% confidence level.
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the divide over america: what israelis think about the us–israel alliance. more than a year of war between israel and its regional enemies has put the us–israel alliance under the spotlight. while the united states has provided israel diplomatic support and more than $22 billion in military aid, the biden administration and the netanyahu-led government have repeatedly clashed on issues such as proportionality, humanitarian aid, and adherence to international law. younger and liberal americans have become more critical of israel, and many israelis have questioned the role of the united states as a limiting factor in israel’s security decision-making. in mid-october, the united states indicated that future weapons shipments might be tied to israel’s facilitation of aid transfers into gaza. against this backdrop, the inss data analytics center conducted polling to capture how israelis currently perceive the us–israel relationship.[1]. according to the inss survey results, a broad consensus among israelis holds that us support is essential for israel’s survival. in july, 73% of respondents (76% of jews and 56% of arabs) agreed with the statement that “the support of the united states is necessary for israel’s survival.” by october, these numbers remained stable, with a slight increase to 76% overall (79% of jews and 63.5% of arabs, see figure 1). among jews, support for this sentiment was highest among left-wing, centrist, and secular respondents, with more than 85% agreeing that us support is necessary for israel’s survival in both july and october (see figures 2 and 3). among both right-wing and religious jews, agreement was initially lower at 70% and 57% in july but climbed to 74% and 65%, respectively, in october, with half of ultra-orthodox (haredi jews) respondents in agreement. figure 1. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, total sample, jews, arabs) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024 and on july 18–21, 2024. figure 2. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 3. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. more significant religious and political divides emerged when respondents considered the extent to which israel should account for us preferences in its decision-making. in the inss poll conducted in august, 57% of respondents (55.5% of jews and 58.5% of arabs) agreed that israel should “very much” or “somewhat” consider us preferences. among jews (see figures 4 and 5), this view was especially prominent among left-wing, centrist and secular respondents: 71% or more felt that us positions should be taken into account. in contrast, only 43% of right-wing, and about a third of religious and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed with that view. figure 4. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. figure 5. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. perceptions of trends in the us–israel alliance also varied across political and religious categories. in the inss survey conducted in october, respondents were asked whether the us-israel relationship had improved, did not change or worsened during the past year. overall, 41.5% of respondents (42% of jews and 39.5% of arabs) expressed the view that the relationship had either improved or did not change. among jews (see figures 6 and 7), about half of right-wing, religious and haredi respondents agreed with this assessment, compared to only about 20%–33% of centrist, left-wing and secular respondents. indeed, in the latter categories, most respondents viewed the relationship having worsened during the past year. figure 6. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 7. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. finally, in the inss survey conducted in july, respondents were asked whether the united states was irreplaceable as israel’s primary ally or if israel should develop ties with other powers such as russia, china, and india. overall, 45% of respondents (48% of jews and 31% of arabs) viewed the united states as irreplaceable. among jews (see figures 8 and 9) a majority of secular and centrist respondents, as well as 80% of left-wing respondents, felt the united states was irreplaceable. in contrast, only around 28%–41% of right-wing, religious, and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed that the united states was irreplaceable. right-wing and religious jews were more likely to support alternative ties, suggesting they were less convinced of the united states’ irreplaceability. figure 8. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. figure 9. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. in conclusion, while most israelis agree that us support is vital to israel’s survival, they express a variety of viewpoints on the nature of the us–israel relationship. left-wing, centrist, and secular jews view the relationship as having worsened over the past year, believe that israel’s government should account more for american perspectives, and regard the united states as an irreplaceable ally. right-wing and religious jews, meanwhile, view the us–israel relationship as fairly resilient over the past year, hold that israel should independently determine its own security decisions, and express a greater willingness to consider alternative alliances. these divergent viewpoints highlight the significance of the us–israel alliance as a political issue for the israeli public. this publication was made possible by the partnership of the ruderman family foundation. _____________________. [1] the “swords of iron” surveys were conducted monthly by the data analytics center at the institute for national security studies, with fieldwork completed by ipanel. a total of 1,000 men and women were interviewed online, of which 800 were interviewed in hebrew and 200 in arabic, constituting a representative sample of the adult israeli population in israel aged 18 and over. the maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ± 3.5% at a 95% confidence level.

More than a year of war between Israel and its regional enemies has put the US–Israel alliance under the spotlight. While the United States has provided Israel diplomatic support and more than $22 billion in military aid, the Biden administration and the Netanyahu-led government have repeatedly clashed on issues such as proportionality, humanitarian aid, and adherence to international law. Younger and liberal Americans have become more critical of Israel, and many Israelis have questioned the role of the United States as a limiting factor in Israel’s security decision-making. In mid-October, the United States indicated that future weapons shipments might be tied to Israel’s facilitation of aid transfers into Gaza. Against this backdrop, the INSS Data Analytics Center conducted polling to capture how Israelis currently perceive the US–Israel relationship.[1]

According to the INSS survey results, a broad consensus among Israelis holds that US support is essential for Israel’s survival. In July, 73% of respondents (76% of Jews and 56% of Arabs) agreed with the statement that “the support of the United States is necessary for Israel’s survival.” By October, these numbers remained stable, with a slight increase to 76% overall (79% of Jews and 63.5% of Arabs, see Figure 1). Among Jews, support for this sentiment was highest among left-wing, centrist, and secular respondents, with more than 85% agreeing that US support is necessary for Israel’s survival in both July and October (see Figures 2 and 3). Among both right-wing and religious Jews, agreement was initially lower at 70% and 57% in July but climbed to 74% and 65%, respectively, in October, with half of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi Jews) respondents in agreement.

Figure 1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States' support for Israel is necessary for Israel's survival? (%, Total sample, Jews, Arabs) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on October 10–13, 2024 and on July 18–21, 2024.

Figure 2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States' support for Israel is necessary for Israel's survival? (%, Political segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on October 10–13, 2024.

 

Figure 3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States' support for Israel is necessary for Israel's survival? (%, Religious segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on October 10–13, 2024.

More significant religious and political divides emerged when respondents considered the extent to which Israel should account for US preferences in its decision-making. In the INSS poll conducted in August, 57% of respondents (55.5% of Jews and 58.5% of Arabs) agreed that Israel should “very much” or “somewhat” consider US preferences. Among Jews (see Figures 4 and 5), this view was especially prominent among left-wing, centrist and secular respondents: 71% or more felt that US positions should be taken into account. In contrast, only 43% of right-wing, and about a third of religious and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) respondents agreed with that view.

Figure 4. To what extent do you think Israel should take account of the position of the United States when deciding its war policy? (%, Political segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on August 8–11, 2024.

Figure 5. To what extent do you think Israel should take account of the position of the United States when deciding its war policy? (%, Religious segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on August 8–11, 2024.

Perceptions of trends in the US–Israel alliance also varied across political and religious categories. In the INSS survey conducted in October, respondents were asked whether the US-Israel relationship had improved, did not change or worsened during the past year. Overall, 41.5% of respondents (42% of Jews and 39.5% of Arabs) expressed the view that the relationship had either improved or did not change. Among Jews (see Figures 6 and 7), about half of right-wing, religious and Haredi respondents agreed with this assessment, compared to only about 20%–33% of centrist, left-wing and secular respondents. Indeed, in the latter categories, most respondents viewed the relationship having worsened during the past year.

Figure 6. In your opinion, has the relationship between Israel and the United States improved or worsened in the past year? (%, Political segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on October 10–13, 2024.

Figure 7. In your opinion, has the relationship between Israel and the United States improved or worsened in the past year? (%, Religious segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on October 10–13, 2024.

Finally, in the INSS survey conducted in July, respondents were asked whether the United States was irreplaceable as Israel’s primary ally or if Israel should develop ties with other powers such as Russia, China, and India. Overall, 45% of respondents (48% of Jews and 31% of Arabs) viewed the United States as irreplaceable. Among Jews (see Figures 8 and 9) a majority of secular and centrist respondents, as well as 80% of left-wing respondents, felt the United States was irreplaceable. In contrast, only around 28%–41% of right-wing, religious, and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) respondents agreed that the United States was irreplaceable. Right-wing and religious Jews were more likely to support alternative ties, suggesting they were less convinced of the United States’ irreplaceability.

Figure 8. Which statement do you agree with the most? (%, Political segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on July 18–21, 2024.

Figure 9. Which statement do you agree with the most? (%, Political segmentation of Jewish Israelis) | Note. From the INSS survey conducted on July 18–21, 2024.

In conclusion, while most Israelis agree that US support is vital to Israel’s survival, they express a variety of viewpoints on the nature of the US–Israel relationship. Left-wing, centrist, and secular Jews view the relationship as having worsened over the past year, believe that Israel’s government should account more for American perspectives, and regard the United States as an irreplaceable ally. Right-wing and religious Jews, meanwhile, view the US–Israel relationship as fairly resilient over the past year, hold that Israel should independently determine its own security decisions, and express a greater willingness to consider alternative alliances. These divergent viewpoints highlight the significance of the US–Israel alliance as a political issue for the Israeli public.

 

This publication was made possible by the partnership of the Ruderman Family Foundation

_____________________

[1] The “Swords of Iron” surveys were conducted monthly by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies, with fieldwork completed by iPanel. A total of 1,000 men and women were interviewed online, of which 800 were interviewed in Hebrew and 200 in Arabic, constituting a representative sample of the adult Israeli population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ± 3.5% at a 95% confidence level.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
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the divide over america: what israelis think about the us–israel alliance. more than a year of war between israel and its regional enemies has put the us–israel alliance under the spotlight. while the united states has provided israel diplomatic support and more than $22 billion in military aid, the biden administration and the netanyahu-led government have repeatedly clashed on issues such as proportionality, humanitarian aid, and adherence to international law. younger and liberal americans have become more critical of israel, and many israelis have questioned the role of the united states as a limiting factor in israel’s security decision-making. in mid-october, the united states indicated that future weapons shipments might be tied to israel’s facilitation of aid transfers into gaza. against this backdrop, the inss data analytics center conducted polling to capture how israelis currently perceive the us–israel relationship.[1]. according to the inss survey results, a broad consensus among israelis holds that us support is essential for israel’s survival. in july, 73% of respondents (76% of jews and 56% of arabs) agreed with the statement that “the support of the united states is necessary for israel’s survival.” by october, these numbers remained stable, with a slight increase to 76% overall (79% of jews and 63.5% of arabs, see figure 1). among jews, support for this sentiment was highest among left-wing, centrist, and secular respondents, with more than 85% agreeing that us support is necessary for israel’s survival in both july and october (see figures 2 and 3). among both right-wing and religious jews, agreement was initially lower at 70% and 57% in july but climbed to 74% and 65%, respectively, in october, with half of ultra-orthodox (haredi jews) respondents in agreement. figure 1. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, total sample, jews, arabs) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024 and on july 18–21, 2024. figure 2. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 3. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. more significant religious and political divides emerged when respondents considered the extent to which israel should account for us preferences in its decision-making. in the inss poll conducted in august, 57% of respondents (55.5% of jews and 58.5% of arabs) agreed that israel should “very much” or “somewhat” consider us preferences. among jews (see figures 4 and 5), this view was especially prominent among left-wing, centrist and secular respondents: 71% or more felt that us positions should be taken into account. in contrast, only 43% of right-wing, and about a third of religious and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed with that view. figure 4. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. figure 5. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. perceptions of trends in the us–israel alliance also varied across political and religious categories. in the inss survey conducted in october, respondents were asked whether the us-israel relationship had improved, did not change or worsened during the past year. overall, 41.5% of respondents (42% of jews and 39.5% of arabs) expressed the view that the relationship had either improved or did not change. among jews (see figures 6 and 7), about half of right-wing, religious and haredi respondents agreed with this assessment, compared to only about 20%–33% of centrist, left-wing and secular respondents. indeed, in the latter categories, most respondents viewed the relationship having worsened during the past year. figure 6. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 7. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. finally, in the inss survey conducted in july, respondents were asked whether the united states was irreplaceable as israel’s primary ally or if israel should develop ties with other powers such as russia, china, and india. overall, 45% of respondents (48% of jews and 31% of arabs) viewed the united states as irreplaceable. among jews (see figures 8 and 9) a majority of secular and centrist respondents, as well as 80% of left-wing respondents, felt the united states was irreplaceable. in contrast, only around 28%–41% of right-wing, religious, and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed that the united states was irreplaceable. right-wing and religious jews were more likely to support alternative ties, suggesting they were less convinced of the united states’ irreplaceability. figure 8. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. figure 9. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. in conclusion, while most israelis agree that us support is vital to israel’s survival, they express a variety of viewpoints on the nature of the us–israel relationship. left-wing, centrist, and secular jews view the relationship as having worsened over the past year, believe that israel’s government should account more for american perspectives, and regard the united states as an irreplaceable ally. right-wing and religious jews, meanwhile, view the us–israel relationship as fairly resilient over the past year, hold that israel should independently determine its own security decisions, and express a greater willingness to consider alternative alliances. these divergent viewpoints highlight the significance of the us–israel alliance as a political issue for the israeli public. this publication was made possible by the partnership of the ruderman family foundation. _____________________. [1] the “swords of iron” surveys were conducted monthly by the data analytics center at the institute for national security studies, with fieldwork completed by ipanel. a total of 1,000 men and women were interviewed online, of which 800 were interviewed in hebrew and 200 in arabic, constituting a representative sample of the adult israeli population in israel aged 18 and over. the maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ± 3.5% at a 95% confidence level.
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the divide over america: what israelis think about the us–israel alliance. more than a year of war between israel and its regional enemies has put the us–israel alliance under the spotlight. while the united states has provided israel diplomatic support and more than $22 billion in military aid, the biden administration and the netanyahu-led government have repeatedly clashed on issues such as proportionality, humanitarian aid, and adherence to international law. younger and liberal americans have become more critical of israel, and many israelis have questioned the role of the united states as a limiting factor in israel’s security decision-making. in mid-october, the united states indicated that future weapons shipments might be tied to israel’s facilitation of aid transfers into gaza. against this backdrop, the inss data analytics center conducted polling to capture how israelis currently perceive the us–israel relationship.[1]. according to the inss survey results, a broad consensus among israelis holds that us support is essential for israel’s survival. in july, 73% of respondents (76% of jews and 56% of arabs) agreed with the statement that “the support of the united states is necessary for israel’s survival.” by october, these numbers remained stable, with a slight increase to 76% overall (79% of jews and 63.5% of arabs, see figure 1). among jews, support for this sentiment was highest among left-wing, centrist, and secular respondents, with more than 85% agreeing that us support is necessary for israel’s survival in both july and october (see figures 2 and 3). among both right-wing and religious jews, agreement was initially lower at 70% and 57% in july but climbed to 74% and 65%, respectively, in october, with half of ultra-orthodox (haredi jews) respondents in agreement. figure 1. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, total sample, jews, arabs) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024 and on july 18–21, 2024. figure 2. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 3. to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: the united states' support for israel is necessary for israel's survival? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. more significant religious and political divides emerged when respondents considered the extent to which israel should account for us preferences in its decision-making. in the inss poll conducted in august, 57% of respondents (55.5% of jews and 58.5% of arabs) agreed that israel should “very much” or “somewhat” consider us preferences. among jews (see figures 4 and 5), this view was especially prominent among left-wing, centrist and secular respondents: 71% or more felt that us positions should be taken into account. in contrast, only 43% of right-wing, and about a third of religious and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed with that view. figure 4. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. figure 5. to what extent do you think israel should take account of the position of the united states when deciding its war policy? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on august 8–11, 2024. perceptions of trends in the us–israel alliance also varied across political and religious categories. in the inss survey conducted in october, respondents were asked whether the us-israel relationship had improved, did not change or worsened during the past year. overall, 41.5% of respondents (42% of jews and 39.5% of arabs) expressed the view that the relationship had either improved or did not change. among jews (see figures 6 and 7), about half of right-wing, religious and haredi respondents agreed with this assessment, compared to only about 20%–33% of centrist, left-wing and secular respondents. indeed, in the latter categories, most respondents viewed the relationship having worsened during the past year. figure 6. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. figure 7. in your opinion, has the relationship between israel and the united states improved or worsened in the past year? (%, religious segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on october 10–13, 2024. finally, in the inss survey conducted in july, respondents were asked whether the united states was irreplaceable as israel’s primary ally or if israel should develop ties with other powers such as russia, china, and india. overall, 45% of respondents (48% of jews and 31% of arabs) viewed the united states as irreplaceable. among jews (see figures 8 and 9) a majority of secular and centrist respondents, as well as 80% of left-wing respondents, felt the united states was irreplaceable. in contrast, only around 28%–41% of right-wing, religious, and ultra-orthodox (haredi) respondents agreed that the united states was irreplaceable. right-wing and religious jews were more likely to support alternative ties, suggesting they were less convinced of the united states’ irreplaceability. figure 8. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. figure 9. which statement do you agree with the most? (%, political segmentation of jewish israelis) | note. from the inss survey conducted on july 18–21, 2024. in conclusion, while most israelis agree that us support is vital to israel’s survival, they express a variety of viewpoints on the nature of the us–israel relationship. left-wing, centrist, and secular jews view the relationship as having worsened over the past year, believe that israel’s government should account more for american perspectives, and regard the united states as an irreplaceable ally. right-wing and religious jews, meanwhile, view the us–israel relationship as fairly resilient over the past year, hold that israel should independently determine its own security decisions, and express a greater willingness to consider alternative alliances. these divergent viewpoints highlight the significance of the us–israel alliance as a political issue for the israeli public. this publication was made possible by the partnership of the ruderman family foundation. _____________________. [1] the “swords of iron” surveys were conducted monthly by the data analytics center at the institute for national security studies, with fieldwork completed by ipanel. a total of 1,000 men and women were interviewed online, of which 800 were interviewed in hebrew and 200 in arabic, constituting a representative sample of the adult israeli population in israel aged 18 and over. the maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ± 3.5% at a 95% confidence level.
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